Iran’s Attacks on Saudi Arabia and the GCC: An International Law Perspective

By Ali Alabdali

On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched an attack on the Republic of Iran. The US claimed that this was due to issues regarding the Iranian nuclear program and the negotiations with Iran not resulting in any tangible progress. This was the second time the US and Israel have militarily attacked Iran during the past year, which was considered a violation of international law by many experts of the field. As one of the responses, Iran fired ballistic missiles and drones on  Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan  as a direct retaliation against the American-Israeli attack. This piece will discuss how the attacks on Saudi Arabia (and the GCC countries and Jordan) are in contravention of international law and what the available responses are for these countries.

Under the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law, the principle of jus ad bellum justifies the use of force and pursuing military operations or war against another sovereign state. Jus in bello, on the other hand, governs the law related to conducting military operations once a state has legally justified such use of force.

Iran’s (Non)Justifications for Attacking Saudi Arabia

As a justification for the use of force, the Iranian Foreign Minister said that the United States and Israel have initiated an illegal, illegitimate, and unprovoked attack against Iran. He further indicated that Iran’s counterstrikes on Israeli and US military bases in the Middle East were legal and justified under international law and the law of self-defense. Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, all states are under an obligation to “refrain (…) from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Furthermore, Article 51 of the Charter dictates that nothing in the UN Charter “shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” Although Article 2(4) prohibits states from using force, states can use armed force, with the authorisation of the Security Council or in the event of self-defence, as the use of force is “either permitted under Article 51 or prohibited under Article 2(4).

Taking the above articles into account, Iran is legally able to use force against Israel and the United States, as the latter’s attacks on Iran were in contravention of international law according to over 100 experts in international law, citing Article 51 of the Charter.

Nevertheless, Iran’s attacks on Saudi Arabia (and the other GCC countries and Jordan) were unwarranted and illegal as it struck sovereign states’ territory that were not part of the conflict. Saudi Arabia did not attack Iran, and a military attack on Saudi Arabia (and other countries) as a reaction was not warranted. Although Iran might claim that Saudi Arabia might have had a role in the attacks, Saudi Arabia publicly informed the US that it will not allow the American forces to use the Saudi airspace or bases for any attack on Iran when the United States were strategically studying the options to conduct a military operation on Iran a month prior to the 28th of February attacks. Saudi Arabia has informed Iran of this decision, particularly that it will not allow the territory of Saudi Arabia to be used by the United States to attack the territorial integrity of Iran. The Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia has personally informed the President of Iran of this decision in a phone call. In this regard, Saudi Arabia has urged and continuously urges countries to engage in diplomacy as the peaceful solution to the settlement of any dispute. Therefore, Iran attacking Saudi Arabia and the GCC and Jordan under the principle of belligerence (i.e co-belligerency) would not legally stand as there is no tangible evidence that substantiates that these countries have committed actions that would surpass the threshold of becoming a belligerent country under the law of armed conflict. Notably, many experts believe that the co-belligerence threshold is high and is determined by “the directness of the contributions made by the assisting parties to the collective conduct of hostilities.”

Principles Guiding the Use of Force, which Iran has not Abided by

In addition to the above, a state conducting any military operation needs to abide by certain principles governing the use of force. These principles are distinction, necessity, precaution, and proportionality.

Under these principles, any attack by Iran must be limited to military objectives only, which by their very nature make an effective contribution to military action. Furthermore, any military attack needs to use a specific degree and force that is necessary and required to achieve a legitimate military purpose, strictly in order to secure the defeat of the enemy, even if such attack is directed against a military objective as Iran has claimed. Moreover, Iran should refrain from any armed attack if there is an expected loss of civilian life, damage to civilian objects, or potential injury in relation to any potentially gained military advantage. Notably, the attacks on Saudi Arabia (and the other GCC countries and Jordan) were directed towards several cities in close proximity to civilian objects and life, and have been detrimental to civilians. Military leaders need to weigh any military gain against the harm that will potentially result towards civilians. Furthermore, Iran has been targeting Saudi Arabia and the Gulf’s energy infrastructure, which is with the intention to cause economic losses in the region rather than to gain military advantage. This affects electricity, water, heating, and technology that is substantial for civilian life. As a result, such attacks would amount to violations of international law and international humanitarian law. In this regard,  the UN Security Council has passed a resolution demanding that Iran complies with its obligations under international law, international humanitarian law, and human rights law and cease all attacks on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. Furthermore, the resolution has stressed that Iran’s attacks on these countries “constitute a breach of international law.” Iran needs to refrain from attacking any civilian infrastructure or object, and the Council “condemns that residential areas were attacked, that civilian objects have been targeted and that the attacks resulted in civilian casualties and damage of civilian buildings.” Additionally, the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva has passed a resolution that found that the Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia, the GCC countries, and Jordan contravene international law, especially that these countries are “not involved in the hostilities” and would therefore not be considered co-belligerents as highlighted above.

Recourse by Saudi Arabia (and the GCC and Jordan)

Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, Saudi Arabia is legally able to individually or collectively defend itself against the Iranian attack. Moreover, the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) is the law that covers state responsibility. ARSIWA indicates that if a state has committed an internationally wrongful act through its actions, then the injured state can obtain reparations/damages from it. Such reparations include ceasing the wrongful act, offering appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, and providing full reparation for the injuries caused, including restitution, compensation, or satisfaction. In this case, Iran’s acts were attributable to it under the UN Charter and the law of armed conflict and constitute a breach of an international obligation as discussed above. Furthermore, the attacks were not related to any circumstances precluding wrongfulness, such as self-defence or necessity. Therefore, Saudi Arabia is legally entitled to obtain reparation from Iran under ARSIWA. In this regard, the Human Rights Council resolution mentioned above has indeed called for Iran to “provide full, adequate, effective and prompt reparation for all injury and damage caused by its internationally illegal wrongful acts.”

Other possible options available to Saudi Arabia are “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” in accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter. Furthermore, recourse to the United Nations Security Council in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter is available, which Saudi Arabia along with countries in the GCC and Jordan, have already sought, and can potentially seek again. Such peaceful means of settling the dispute can be used to de-escalate the conflict. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, the GCC countries, and Jordan have been diplomatically discussing with several countries the means to end the war, and prevent further Iranian attacks on the region. A ceasefire was eventually reached between Iran and the US/Israel after mediation efforts by Pakistan, which temporarily reduced but not fully ended the Iranian attacks on Arab countries. Nevertheless, any continuation of the war and attacks by Iran on Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries rests on the state of negotiations between the US/Israel and Iran.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries and Jordan were in contravention of international law and international humanitarian law, particularly as Iran has not abided by international law principles, which the UN Security Council and the Human Rights Council have found. The current state of affairs shows that Saudi Arabia (and the GCC countries and Jordan) are seeking strategic restraint, engaging diplomatically to de-escalate and permanently end the war, as well as seeking the Security Council to take measures to ensure that the Iranian attacks are immediately ceased.

Ali Alabdali is a legal professional specializing in international law, with experience in international relations and international organizations. He currently holds an LLM in international law from UC Berkeley and an LLB from City University of London and has started a PhD in public international law at Utrecht University. Disclaimer: All views expressed are strictly my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any institution I have worked at or studied in