By Jonas Balkus

By the end of 2023, Armenia found itself in a perilous position. The decades-long Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenian-backed proxies ended in September 2023 with an Azerbaijani offensive into the disputed region and a swift victory. This conflict had been fought, in varying degrees of intensity, since the last days of the Soviet Union in 1988, and centred around a dispute over whether the region of Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to Armenia or Azerbaijan. Armenia originally had the advantage, winning the initial phase of the conflict in 1994 which ended with the establishment of the ethnically-Armenian and internationally unrecognised Republic of Artsakh within Azerbaijan’s borders. Gradually, Azerbaijan built up its military and launched a successful offensive in 2020, taking Armenian-held lands around Nagorno-Karabakh, followed by the recent offensive which took the entirety of the disputed region in 2023.  

As the Azerbaijani offensive unfolded, Russia, Armenia’s traditional ally, failed to come to its aid. This was primarily due to Russia’s preoccupation with its continuing war in Ukraine but was also a result of increasingly fraught Armenian-Russian relations more generally. The Armenian government, under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, has sought to diversify Armenia’s sources of support away from Russia, with Pashinyan calling his country’s reliance on its neighbour a ‘strategic mistake’. NATO and the EU failed to step into the Russia-shaped hole in Armenia’s support network while other major states, such as Turkey, actively supported Azerbaijan. Armenia was left diplomatically isolated, encircled by unfriendly, more powerful states. Fears began to grow over a possible Azerbaijani invasion of southern Armenia— the country’s existence itself seemed uncertain. Allies and support were desperately needed.

Little wonder then, that in the months since the Azerbaijani offensive, Armenia has been quietly building up its relations with various potential allies. Presently, it is performing a balancing act between seeking closer ties with Iran and with the West— including both the European Union and the United States. In February 2024, a meeting between Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Josep Borrell, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, concluded with a joint memorandum stating that the EU and Armenia sought to “strengthen and deepen their relations based on common values”. The EU subsequently earmarked €5.5 million to help displaced Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh and raised a further €550 million of investments into Armenia as part of its Economic and Investment Plan (EIP) for the country.

Likewise, France, which hosts the third-largest Armenian diaspora in the world, has started supporting the Armenian military. Last month, French officials signed contracts allowing Armenia to buy assault rifles from French company PGM Précision, struck deals to train Armenian troops, and opened discussions for Armenia to purchase short-range Mistral missiles from MBDA, another European defence company. 

Recently, the United States has also stepped up its support for Armenia, with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) pledging $33 million in aid to Armenia in April 2024, and the US European Command sending personnel to train the Armenian Ministry of Defence in communications and countering disinformation.

Armenia’s overtures to the West could not be clearer. Indeed, Foreign Minister Mirzoyan took this a step further on 8th March when he publicly admitted that Armenia was considering an application to join the EU. 

Concurrently, however, the Pashinyan government has sought closer ties to India and Iran. Armenia has been importing weapons from the former for the past few years, and the South Asian power has looked to Armenia as a key land route for it to connect with Europe both economically and strategically. Armenia is yet to import weapons from Iran, but the two countries have seen a warming of ties in recent months, as Iranian officials have called on Azerbaijan to respect the territorial integrity of Armenia. Moreover, Armenia has started cracking down on Iranian dissidents using the country to escape to the West. 

This realignment, naturally, comes at the expense of Armenia’s relations with Russia. Pashinyan has followed through on his anti-Moscow rhetoric with actions including the suspension of Armenian membership of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and expelling Russian border guards stationed in Yerevan since the 1990s. Russia has reacted with outrage – labelling Armenian displeasure with its ‘support’ the product of a ‘frenzied anti-Russian campaign’. Particular ire has been directed to Pashinyan, with the editor-in-chief of the Russian government-funded Russia Today, Margarita Simonyan, labelling him a ‘traitor’ to his people and warning his actions will lead to the ‘complete destruction’ of Armenia.  

Pursuing ties with both Iran and the West has also caused tensions, with Pashinyan recently admitting that Iranian officials were warning him that they opposed ‘extra-regional countries’ in the Southern Caucasus, likely meaning the EU and the US. It is also unclear whether any of Armenia’s overtures to new potential allies will pay off; India was noticeably quiet when Nagorno-Karabakh fell and Western countries would naturally be cautious to embrace a country which, until recently, allowed Russian personnel within its borders. This is all while Azerbaijan also courts Western countries, India, and Iran in search of support against Armenia. Hence, both sides are in a race to convince the same countries to back them. For Armenia in particular, losing this race could mean a threat to the country’s entire existence.

Hence, Armenia’s search for new allies is an opportunity that Western countries should not miss. Tensions remain high between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as claims of the ethnic cleansing of Armenians in Karabakh have surfaced. While the EU and the US are already supporting aid efforts and economic investment in the country, in going further and buttressing Armenian security, these countries can ensure greater balance in the region, preventing the continuation of a bloody conflict characterised by war crimes and violence against civilians— not to mention the destabilising consequences that a renewed conflict may have. 

Further, the void left by dwindling Russian support for Armenia provides a useful avenue for an enhanced Western presence in the Caucasus as a whole. This is especially important given competing attempts by Iran and Russia to gain or maintain influence in the area, often at the expense of populations which seek closer alignment to the West. Iran has already signalled its displeasure at growing ties between Armenia and Western powers and has sought to cultivate relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Likewise, neighbouring countries such as Georgia have been the battleground for Russian attempts to retain hegemony over many post-Soviet countries, allying with sections of society which favour greater alignment with Russia and against those who favour a tilt towards the West— a question of ‘Europe’ or ‘Eurasia’. In improving relations with Armenia— as well as Georgia for that matter— the West could effectively prevent these countries from backsliding into Russian satellite states, counter growing Iranian influence, and prevent ways for either power to exercise more influence over the Caucasus and the Middle East as a whole.

While 2023 marked something of an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, this peace could very well be precarious, and has not come without cost to Armenians or Azerbaijanis. To prevent the resurgence of conflicts and the greater destabilisation of the region, Western countries must take advantage of the opportunities presented by Armenia’s shift away from Russia. Indeed, to prevent the conflict’s exploitation by more malign actors, the West must act before others do.