By Daniel Miller

St Peter’s College, Oxford

This year will mark twenty years since the first Tamazight lessons were taught in Moroccan classrooms. The result of decades of activism by Amazigh activists for greater linguistic and cultural recognition, the time that has passed since has largely witnessed frustration around the speed of implementing policy change and suspicions around the government’s true intentions. However, with significant steps taken over the last three years or so, are we finally seeing genuine progress towards long-promised linguistic and social equality? In a nation where language and identity have long played a vital role in the political landscape, the Tamazight question encapsulates many of the tensions and challenges which have impacted Morocco’s development more widely. 

A short history of language policy in Morocco

Morocco is a nation characterised by linguistic pluralism. Since the arrival of Arabic and Islam in the ninth century CE, bilingualism between Tamazight and vernacular Arabic – known as Darija – and diglossia between the former two and the prestigious literary Arabic, has been a distinguishing feature of Moroccan society. Tamazight native speakers are themselves divided based on the level of mutual intelligibility between their dialects, Bentahila dividing the dialects into three groups. While these three dialects – Tamazight in the central Atlas Mountains, Tashelhiyt in the centre of the country, and Tarifit in the northern Rif region, referred to generally as Tamazight – do demonstrate a significant level of mutual intelligibility, they also vary significantly on the phonetic, morphological, and lexical levels.

The arrival of French at the beginning of the last century, soon established as a language of modernity, and an alternative to Classical Arabic in high culture and administration, further complicated this sociolinguistic landscape. The lasting impact of the French can be seen in two ways. Firstly, their language remains a necessity for those seeking high level employment or education beyond secondary school. Secondly, the French colonists’ approach to the native linguistic communities, informed by European understandings of nationhood and language led to the division of communities on the basis of language, breaking the established socio-linguistic heterogeneity. Colonial authorities portrayed Amazigh communities as being more open to European influence and more easily drawn away from their Islamic faith than their Arab peers, culminating in the 1930 Dahir Berbère, a decree that legally separated the Arab and Amazigh communities. This emancipated the latter from the sharia-based legal system that remained in place for the Arab population. The lasting importance of this dahir was the creation of an understanding of the distinctness of Amazigh (and thus also Arab) language and culture, and its preferential treatment of speakers of Tamazight, creating lasting tensions between the two communities.

That Morocco, like neighbouring Tunisia and Algeria, opted for a policy of Arabisation after independence from France in 1956, was therefore motivated more by political and ideological factors than the sociolinguistic heritage of the nation. Indeed, it can be seen as embodying the same “one nation-one language” ideology introduced by the French through policies like the Dahir Berbère, and like them harnessed the education system to promote one national identity through language. The Arabo-Islamic identity promoted as a “return to tradition” left little room for Tamazight, and the language was increasingly vilified as opposing national unity, the unfortunate pre-Islamic vestige of an illegitimate culture opposed to that promoted by the Moroccan state.

Early Amazigh nationalism and the first steps towards recognition

Arabisation was to remain an official policy in Morocco for more than thirty years, but not without its fair share of opposition from Amazigh activists inside and outside of the country. Amazigh activists rejected the idea that Moroccan identity is inherently Arabic-speaking and Islamic in character and received support from activists in Algeria and France. Such transnational collaboration only exacerbated fears that Amazigh nationalism served as a threat to national unity and cohesion. 

Intellectuals in Morocco and Paris had attempted to promote Berber culture from the 1960s, but it was the student uprisings of 1980 among the Kabyles, the largest Amazigh community in Algeria, and the “Berber Spring” that really galvanised and politicised these calls for linguistic and cultural recognition. However, crackdowns on those who campaigned openly were common. Notably, in 1994 seven teachers were held for several weeks and charged for carrying banners written in Tifinagh, before ultimately being released after international outcry. Such an approach only reinforced the belief that the state was a “bastion of Arabo-Islamic imperialism”, and the increasingly secular, globalist Amazigh nationalist movement found itself evermore at odds with Islamist and Arab nationalist groups.

The end of Arabisation was heralded by a 1994 speech in which King Hassan II expressed a desire for “Tamazight dialects” to be included in the national curriculum. In 2000, this came to fruition with the National Charter for Education and Training, which completely overhauled the existing education system, reintroducing French to teach the sciences and technology, and creating provisions for the gradual introduction of Tamazight teaching in schools. The abandonment of Arabisation, and the notable inclusion of Tamazight in the new policy, constituted an effort to combat rising Islamic extremism, against which Amazigh nationalists were natural allies. To enable this official promotion of Tamazight in society, Hassan’s successor, the current Mohamed VI, announced in 2001 the establishment of IRCAM. 

The Foundation of IRCAM

The Royal Institute of Amazight Culture (Institut Royal de la culture amazighe, or IRCAM) is a government institution tasked with developing and codifying Tamazight as well as funding and promoting Amazigh cultural identity in Moroccan society. Housed in state-of-the-art facilities in a wealthy area of Rabat, and with an annual budget apparently in excess of one hundred million dollars, IRCAM represents significant investment into following up on the promises made in the 2000 charter. 

However, the creation of IRCAM can be seen as one of the most divisive events in the history of the Amazigh nationalist movement, polarising those who support the institute and its actions, and those who oppose it, either on principle or “out of resentment for not having been recruited into it.” Despite its thirty-three-member “administrative council” being selected from the existing Amazigh “associational structure”, with equal representation from each of the three Amazigh speaking regions as well as activists from different national movements, IRCAM ultimately remains under the direct control of the government. Critics thus argue that “IRCAM is not an Amazigh institution because it is not under Amazigh control in any form or fashion”, and instead enables the government to monopolise Amazigh cultural production by choosing who constitutes the official voice of the Amazigh national movement as well as supporting only those events and artists which they approve of. 

Moreover, many activists at the time considered these directives towards linguistic equality as a ploy to gain the favour of the Western liberal democracies such as the USA and the EU who “hold the purse strings for development aid”, while dividing the movement both internally and from their brothers in Algeria and France. There was little faith that the policies announced would ever be implemented, and these policies were themselves seen as concessions falling well short of the full equality targeted by activists. Hsen Larbi commented in 2003 that: 

“The creation of IRCAM does not even begin to fill the gap between the Amazigh demands and what the government is ready to offer. One of the Moroccan Amazighs’ key demands is a full recognition of their identity and culture, which would involve the inclusion of Tamazight as a national and official language in the Moroccan constitution.” 

However, it can be argued that the slow pace of initial progress reflects more the difficulty of IRCAM’s task than any covert operation to derail the efforts of Amazigh nationalists. The members of IRCAM were faced with an unstandardised language without even an agreed script, let alone the dearth of dictionaries, teaching materials or qualified instructors. Their aim of implementing Tamazight into the education system and promoting its use across Morocco thus could not be achieved without significant effort to solve these problems first, each of which would create debates and increase tensions between the supporters and detractors of IRCAM. 

Whose script is it?

The first task was therefore to develop a national standard for Tamazight, in which dictionaries and textbooks could be created and new teachers trained, before it could be implemented into the education system. This would require the codification of the three major dialects into a single monocentric variety as well as establishing a single script for its use. 

It was the latter which was perhaps the most polarising of IRCAM’s early decisions, and which also reflects the range of ideological and practical considerations which continue to hinder progress towards full recognition of Tamazight. The IRCAM committee was faced with three candidates for the official script for Tamazight in Morocco. Activists outside IRCAM favoured Latin, the most widely used by Tamazight speakers at the time, in large part due to their reactionary attitude to the perceived Arabic and Islamic domination of Morocco. On the other hand, the Moroccan elite favoured Arabic, on the basis of increasing national unity and a spurious belief that genetic similarities between Arabs and Tamazight speakers made it most linguistically viable. However, Amazigh activists condemned this as a thinly veiled ploy to once again subsume Amazigh culture and language within an Arabo-Islamic national identity. The final option was an adaptation of Tifinagh, a native Amazigh script used by the Tuaregs and since adopted by some early Amazigh activists based in France.

It was this final option that was chosen, with the fully alphabetic neo-Tifinagh voted by IRCAM members to be the official script for the new Moroccan Standard Amazigh (MSA) after a highly contested election. Responses to the decision once again divided the Amazigh community. IRCAM were accused of choosing the script on behalf of the Amazigh people without putting the matter to popular vote. Opponents of the decision accused the Moroccan authorities of using IRCAM to isolate Moroccan Imazighen from their brothers across the Maghreb and Europe, who used Latin as their primary script, thus limiting transnational collaboration. Furthermore, teaching their own standard language in the script of their choice would allow them to further monopolise Amazigh cultural expression and harness it for nationalist purposes. The members of IRCAM therefore saw themselves admonished as makhzenisé, selling out on their principals and betraying the Amazigh national cause for government salaries.

However, such interpretations do not represent the full complexity of IRCAM’s decision. While militant Amazigh nationalists actively supported Latin as a means of aligning themselves with the secular West, most non-activist Imazighen used Latin only due to convention. Indeed, a survey carried out by the Revue Tifinagh in 1996 and work by Cherif Sini in 2002 revealed that young Tamazight speakers in Morocco actually ideologically favoured Tifinagh – despite its practical limitations – as they considered it a symbol of their identity. Evidence from the Amazigh community did not therefore show consensus on which of Latin or Tifinagh should be chosen as the script, however all studies reveal a universal rejection of Arabic.

The contemporary political climate furthered the cause of Tifinagh over Latin. The 2002 election had seen the Islamist Justice and Development party (Parti de la justice et du développement or PDJ) become the third largest in government, whilst the Arab nationalist Istiqlal remained second. In this climate, IRCAM members justifiably feared reprisals from Islamists if the organisation placed its support behind Latin, associated with secularists and partisan nationalists. Such a perceived challenge to national unity may well have jeopardised possible future concessions further down the line. The selection of Tifinagh can therefore be considered a political compromise, between the Arabic promoted by the state and the Latin of Amazigh militants, officially “couched in a language of cultural authenticity.” 

Official language status

For the rest of the decade, there were few major developments in the Tamazight language debate in Morocco. IRCAM continued its work on the new standard, creating materials for its teaching in school, which officially began in 2004. Militants continued to argue that the slow implementation of existing policies, and the absence of further concessions, demonstrated that they were mere lip service to win the favour of the Amazigh community and the support of Western governments. Indeed, as Tamazight was taught in only a small number of schools in the countryside, if anything these policies increased the existing educational inequality between urban and rural areas. Notably, their core demand for equal status to Arabic in society remained unaddressed.

This situation was to change dramatically in 2011. From the 20^th of February, demonstrators inspired by the Arab Spring protests occurring across the Arab world took to the streets to demand constitutional change and increased democracy. Particular pressure was put on the King to reduce his personal power.

These protests culminated with the King proposing a new constitution on the 17^th of June 2011, which was officially approved by popular vote the following month. The most liberal constitution in the nation’s history, notably contains the declaration that, like Arabic, “Tamazight also constitutes an official language of the State, being common patrimony of all Moroccans without exception.” Recognition of Tamazight as an official language, one of the core long-term goals of the Amazigh nationalist movement, was a major step, and was accompanied by further commitments towards its integration into “teaching and the priority domains of public life.”

However, critics have once again questioned the motivations behind these changes. Whilst concessions were made, the King was able to maintain most of his powers. Furthermore, the recognition of Tamazight has been labelled an attempt to gain greater support amongst the Amazigh community at a time when social pressure against the King was highest amongst other groups in society, particularly the Islamists who were to later win the 2011 election.

Combatting the rise of Islamism had two aims. Firstly, it constituted a threat to royal authority, and the known opposition of Amazigh nationalists to Islamists made obtaining their support both logical and essential. Secondly, Morocco’s growing reputation as a breeding ground for terrorism, especially following the April 2011 Marrakesh bombing, was detrimental to efforts to attract international investment and aid. Once again therefore, concessions were motivated primarily by political and financial considerations. By equating greater recognition of Amazigh rights with steps towards liberal democracy, the highly publicised move of awarding official language status garnered the admiration of potential investors in the Moroccan economy, without necessitating any concrete changes to reduce the control of the King. 

Recent developments

Once more, slow progress saw the measures proposed in the 2011 constitution denounced as purely symbolic. By the end of 2018, Tamazight was still only taught in 4,200 out of 11,120 primary schools nationally despite over fifteen years having passed since its inception and little, if anything, had been done to achieve the integration of the language into the priority domains of life. However, both economic and political difficulties have posed a significant hindrance. The education system has consequently suffered from a lack of investment, particularly in teaching training and teaching materials, making any attempt at a nation-wide implementation of the standardised Tamazight language, especially in areas where Tamazight speakers are not the majority, simply not feasible. In addition, ensuring interpreters and translators in other domains are suitably qualified to work in a language and script which have existed only twenty years, and is the native tongue of no one (the population either speaking colloquial Amazigh or Arabic dialects), requires professional training which has been so far only limited. 

But perhaps most significant have been political difficulties. All changes from 2001 until today have been proposed by the King directly or indirectly via IRCAM. However, these proposals must then be approved by the government. The moderate Islamist PJD, which had won the 2011 elections won again in 2016, was largely opposed to the proposed changes. Furthermore, on neither occasion was the PJD able to form a majority government, and the complexity of coalition governance made approving even changes they supported a drawn-out process. In fact, it took eight years for unanimous approval of Tamazight’s national language status.

However, the political situation has changed dramatically since the 2021 elections. Whilst Amazigh nationalist parties are not permitted, a number of activists took part in the elections, increasing their political visibility. But most importantly, the PJD experienced a total wipeout, losing all but 13 seats, and the liberal National Rally of Independents (Rassemblement national des independents or RNI) took power. Led by the Amazigh Aziz Akhennouch, the victory of the RNI was attributed in part to the support of Amazigh voters (although the PJD blamed electoral fraud and vote buying) and his government has been proactive in working to realise the changes proposed in 2011. Over the last three years, laws have been presented – and most passed – permitting the use of Tamazight in parliament, public institutions, courts of law, and the workplace, as well as funding the training and provision of translators in these environments when required. Furthermore, Akannouch responded to criticisms that he has exploited a folklorique façade of Amazigh culture by securing the recognition of Yennayer, Amazigh New Year, as a national holiday, a long-time goal of Amazigh militants across the region . Finally, IRCAM has seen somewhat of a renaissance, with greater freedom to work on the development of its standard Tamazight, including the development of a free app-based Tamazight-French-Arabic dictionary in 2022 . In education, provisions have been made to increase dramatically the number of Tamazight teachers, and this year, the government announced the target of 2025/26 for its introduction of the language to fifty percent of the nation’s primary schools, including areas with no significant Amazigh population.

Conclusion

After decades of activism and frustration at a lack of real change on the ground, it seems that the movement for full recognition and integration of Tamazight into Moroccan society is starting to reap its rewards. But do we really have reason to be optimistic?

The history of the battle for linguistic equality in Morocco encapsulates many of the issues that have impacted and stymied the development of the country more broadly. Economic issues have limited the ability of consecutive governments to implement changes in the educational and public spheres and have often resulted in years passing between a directive’s announcement and its actual appearance in public life. The slow rate of implementation has not been aided by political tensions. Islamist governments opposed concessions to the increased acceptance of Tamazight, and as such approval of bills was also often delayed. These tensions resulted in the weaponisation of the Amazigh nationalist cause, the King announcing improvements at times of need, such as the 2011 protests, to gain Amazigh support against Islamists and other opponents as well as to attract economic support from Western liberal democracies. This in part explains why the biggest demands, that of official language status and full linguistic equality, were seemingly put off, allowing for further concessions when required in the future.

However, it is important to note that there were some improvements, and that the slow rate of change was not entirely down to economic concerns and political machinations. The necessity of developing and codifying a national standard Tamazight, and the subsequent creation of teaching resources and the training of staff, was always to be a lengthy process. And whilst it has been criticised for monopolising Amazigh cultural expression and taking power away from smaller regional movements, IRCAM has ultimately performed its task admirably in tight political circumstances. The difficulty of its position of balancing the demands of activists with the pressures of the government and wider public opinion was exemplified by its selection of Tifinagh as official script and since being granted more breathing room to act in recent years, it has had increasing success in promoting its standard Tamazight. Therefore, now that there finally exists a government which supports the implementation of the changes outlined in the 2011 constitution, the possibility of achieving genuine linguistic and cultural equality is greater than ever. Whilst it can be argued that Akhannouch and the RNI have themselves weaponised the Amazigh cause to garner support and distract from rising inflation and corruption accusations, evidence on the ground does support that meaningful change has occurred since their rise to power. Although the situation can change quickly, attested by the last 20 years,, the battle for linguistic equality in Morocco can perhaps be considered to have seen its own Yennayer, with decades of inaction and unkept promises exchanged for genuine progress towards a brighter future.

Sources:

Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1983.

Bentahila, Abdelâli. Language Attitudes amongst French-Arabic Bilinguals in Morocco. Cleveland OH: Multilingual Matters, 1983.

Crawford, David. “Royal Interest in Local Culture: Amazigh Identity and the Moroccan State,” in Maya Shatzmiller (ed) Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005.

Tilmatine, Mohand. “French and Spanish Colonial Policy in North Africa: Revisiting the Kabyle and Berber Myth”. International Journal on the Sociology of Language 239 (2016).