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Oxford Middle East Review is a non-partisan project that seeks to bring together a wide range of individuals with different backgrounds, beliefs, ideas, aspirations, viewpoints, and methodologies, while sharing an adherence to principles of equality, social justice, freedom of speech, and tolerance.

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A Note on Transliterations

This journal aims to use a system of transliteration with a priority to make reading as accessible as possible to those with no knowledge of Middle Eastern languages rather than to adhere to strict uniformity in transliteration convention. Common English transliteration conventions for particular languages are used; e.g. Arabic *'ayn* is marked with a simple apostrophe. Colloquial transliterations in articles generally follow the author's own conventions to best reflect the quoted person's pronunciation. Words commonly used in English (e.g. Sheik or Emir) are written after English conventions.

Table of Contents

From the Editors

Dear Reader,

Welcome to the third edition of the Oxford Middle East Review (OMER). OMER was founded in 2016 at St Antony's College, Oxford, by two Middle Eastern Studies students, who sought to create an engaging forum for students and aspiring scholars to critically discuss issues pertaining to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

In our efforts to continue this tradition, we have pursued an interdisciplinary approach for OMER's third edition. This issue includes six articles, diverse in both geographical and research focus. Separately, these articles offer insightful analysis from historical, anthropological, and political perspectives.

Nia Clark completed her BSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics, and is now studying for an MPhil in Modern Middle Eastern Studies at St Antony's College, Oxford.

Seeking to account for Turkey's dramatic foreign policy shift from amity to enmity towards Syria in the wake of the Arab Spring, Nia Clark applies role-theory to the regional relations between the two countries. She shows how the Arab Spring, and the resulting international and regional pressures, revealed the incongruities of AKP foreign policy. No longer able to simultaneously fulfill its role as democratic exemplar and regional leader in the face of calls from both the Syrian people and the international community for Assad's deposing, Turkey developed a new role as "regional protector," which prioritised democracy promotion above all else.

Tory Gullo obtained an MPhil in Modern Middle Eastern Studies with a focus on Persian Studies in 2018 from Exeter College, Oxford. She currently serves as an Intelligence Officer in the United States Air Force.

Tory Gullo's article explores the formation of Afghan nationalism through the lens of a local television network, Tolo TV, and one of its most popular and longest-running series, *Afghan Star*, a singing competition now in its twelfth season. Intending to offer a modern corollary to the importance scholars have already attributed to music in the creation of an Afghan national identity in the early twentieth century, she demonstrates how *Afghan Star* serves as a democratic forum for Afghan citizens of all kinds to discuss and promote their visions of a multi-ethnic Afghan identity. Drawing upon performances from *Afghan Star*'s latest season and the original Dari songs included therein, she provides an intimate look at how Afghan women and minorities not only assert themselves in this discourse on nationalism, but even question the political tropes of good governance and democracy.

Alexis Nicholson graduated from St Antony's College, Oxford, in 2018, with an MPhil in Modern Middle Eastern Studies. She currently works as an analyst at Kharon, a sanctions-related risk assessment firm.

Combining firsthand accounts from top American and Iranian security officials with recently declassified US government documents, Alexis Nicholson provides an encompassing view of US-Iranian collaboration following the September 11 attacks which serves an important departure from the prevailing vision of a continuous, forty-year long estrangement between the two countries after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. She argues that shared interests prompted American and Iranian officials to collaborate diplomatically and militarily in their efforts to defeat the Taliban. Even after the successful overthrow of Taliban forces, US-Iranian collaboration endured as diplomats from both sides eagerly cultivated this relationship in discussions about the political future of Afghanistan.

Imogen Resnick graduated from University College, London, in 2018, with a BA in Jewish History. She is now pursuing an MSc in Modern Middle Eastern Studies, at St Antony's College, Oxford.

Imogen Resnick seeks to bridge the gap between Middle Eastern and Jewish Studies with a particular focus on the often understudied Anglo-Jewry and its position within the British political landscape of the mid-twentieth century. Through her use of diverse archival material and political records, she illustrates the 1982 Lebanon War's impact on Jewish feminists' relationship with the British Left and their redefined conceptions of Israel and Zionism. Her discussion reveals the rupture between Jewish feminists and their British leftist counterparts as the 1982 Lebanon War provoked an upsurge of pro-Palestinian sentiment and antisemitism.

Timo Schmidt completed his MSc in Migration Studies in 2018, from St Antony's College, Oxford, with a focus on integration policy and the governance of migration. He currently works as a research assistant at the Migration Policy Institute.

In his article, Timo Schmidt delves into the experience of European migrants residing in the Kasbah des Oudayas, a historic neighbourhood of Rabat, Morocco, and investigates their sense of spatial belonging to the area itself as well as social belonging to the Moroccan residents. His extensive use of participant observation and personal interviews illuminates how legacies of French colonial urbanism, Moroccan interpretations of authenticity, and the social functions of gossip form a complex terrain which Europeans must navigate in order to successfully integrate into their new neighbourhood. According to his assessments, while the migrants have successfully developed a sense of spatial belonging, they are unable to translate this sentiment into social belonging vis-à-vis their Moroccan neighbours.

Carolina Zucchi is an MLitt student in Middle Eastern Literary and Cultural Studies at the University of St Andrews. In October 2019, she will start an MSt in Linguistics, Philology, and Phonetics at the University of Oxford. Her main research interests include comparative and historical linguistics and Middle Eastern folklore studies.

Carolina Zucchi's article is situated at the confluence of Arabic, Turkic, and Russian linguistics, and explores the Arabic dialect spoken by Arab communities of the Qashqadarya region of southeastern Uzbekistan. By analysing four seminal folktales of the Qashqadarya Arabic dialect, she chronicles the linguistic and cultural development of these Arab communities within Uzbekistan. Her comparison of the Qashqadarya dialect to other Arabic varieties and local languages suggests the possible geographic origins of the Qashqadarya Arabs and the heavy Persian and Turkic influence on their language.

The Managing Editors
Allison Holle, Exeter College
Jeremy Jacobellis, Exeter College

From Honeymoon to Divorce:

Exploring the Dramatic Change in Turkey's Foreign Policy Towards Syria in 2011 Through Role-Theory

Nia Clark

The Arab Spring not only posed challenges for the states within which the protests occurred, but also placed pressure on other states to respond to the calls for democracy. The Syrian uprisings called for the removal of the authoritarian Assad regime, with whom Turkey had cultivated a close relationship. There was a transition from amity to enmity, with Erdoğan actively denouncing the Assad regime, proclaiming that "we will not stop until we rescue our brothers in Syria."[1] This paper explores this change and argues that mounting regional/ international pressures following the Arab Spring served to highlight the incongruencies inherent within AKP foreign policy. Turkey was forced to confront the contradiction of acquiring international prestige for its democracy promotion while simultaneously reaping the benefits of developing close relationships with autocratic regimes. Ultimately, Turkey enacted a new role as "regional protector" and moved decisively against the Syrian regime.

In the years preceding the 2011 Syrian uprisings, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) cultivated an economic, political, and cultural relationship with Syria, highlighted by the fifty-one protocols signed by the two countries in 2011 that were based on a common destiny, history, and future. That same year, protests intensified in Syria and, after unsuccessfully attempting to persuade Bashar al-Assad to implement reforms, Turkey cut its ties with the Syrian regime. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Turkish Prime Minister, 2003-2014, and current President) explicitly called for Bashar al-Assad to resign, likening him to Mussolini, Hitler, and Gadhafi.[2] Yet, Turkey had several important stakes tied to the survival of the Assad regime, such as the containment of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) in Syria. A failed state in Syria would inflame the Kurdish problem, as well as jeopardise the success of the AKP's "zero problems with neighbours" policy. While Turkey could not have predicted the violent and destabilising civil war, "its turn to active support for anti-Assad insurgents does not appear to be consistent with traditional realist calculations of threat."[34] So why then, did Turkey abandon its amity with Syria?

This study emphasises the utility of "role-theory" for understanding this transformation. Role-theory assumes that a state's foreign policy is enacted according to

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[1] Speech presented at the AK Party's Provincial Congress by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 24 March 2018, in Nilay Kar Onum, "Erdogan Vows to Rescue Syrian 'Brothers' from Terror," Anadolu Agency, accessed 1 April 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/erdogan-vows-to-rescue-syrian-brothers-from-terror/1098394>.

[2] Sebnem Arsu, "Turkish Premier Urges Assad to Quit in Syria," New York Times, 22 November 2011, accessed 3 May 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/world/middleeast/turkish-leader-says-syrian-president-should-quit.html>.

[3] Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), 212.

[4] Traditional realist arguments understand foreign policy as the pursuit of rational interests (such as power, strategy, security, and economic wealth) derived from the anarchical international structure.

decision-makers' subjective conceptions of their state's role on the world stage. These role conceptions are influenced by varying components of both domestic and international politics. As a theory, its advantage chiefly lies in its ability to consider the systemic constraints and international expectations placed on states, while also allowing for consideration of domestic influences and political pressures. It has significant potential for incorporating multiple levels of analysis and negotiating the agent-structure dilemma.

Drawing from the literature on role-theory, this study captures the shift in Turkish foreign policy in 2011 through an analysis of Turkish role conceptions. Turkish foreign policy was transformed under the AKP, and it developed new roles in foreign policy. This paper finds that Turkey assumed two principal roles, acting both as an "example" state and as a "regional leader." In short, Turkey's example role was illustrated by its promotion of democracy and the prestige it was given as a model of a moderate Islamist democracy; for instance, "in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, many spoke of emulating the 'Turkish model.'"[5] However, the AKP also developed its regional leader role on the basis of its "zero problems with neighbours" strategy and successfully cultivated close relationships with its neighbouring, autocratic regimes. When the masses – within the countries that Turkey had developed amity with – began demanding democracy, there was an evident conflict between these two role conceptions.

The Arab uprisings of 2011 interrupted the status-quo and placed new "role expectations" on Turkey, both regionally and internationally. In the initial turmoil that ensued, Turkey began using a strategy of "role segregation," whereby it oscillated between trying to preserve its relationships with autocratic regimes and promoting democracy. However, when Assad ignored Erdoğan's calls for Syrian political reform and the domestic situation worsened, a new role conception emerged. Turkey resolved its inter-role conflict by merging together its regional leadership role with democracy promotion. The role of regional protector emerged, which became evident in the discourse and rhetoric of the AKP government. The AKP in 2018 underlined that:

> "As a human and moral responsibility, we have accepted our Syrian brothers and sisters into our country and will continue to do so until the Syrian conflict is resolved […] As an honest friend and neighbour, Turkey will continue to work for a free, fair, democratic and prosperous Syria."[6]

Addressing unexpected foreign policy change has long posed a challenge for International Relations (IR) scholarship. While there has been significant literature on role-theory, which analyses the causal relationship between roles and state behaviour, the process of "role change" has been somewhat neglected. Role change can lead to states altering their foreign policy behaviour. This study finds that there are two important elements that explain why Turkey began to enact the role of regional protector in 2011. Firstly, Turkey had an inter-role conflict between its two principal foreign policy roles, which led to incongruent expectations; thus, when these roles were merged, they combined

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[5] Christopher Phillips, "Turkey's Syria Problem," *Public Policy Research* 19, no. 2 (2012): 137.
[6] "2023 Vision," AK Parti, http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/2023-political-vision#bolum_>.

democracy promotion with regional activism. Secondly, the impact of the Arab Spring – which constituted a change at the international level – heightened the pressure on Turkey's foreign policy decision makers to resolve the contradictions within its roles and condemn Assad.

This paper proceeds in three parts. First, the role-theory framework is laid out and the ways in which the literature has approached Turkish foreign policy are examined. The second part contextualises the AKP's foreign policy and presents the AKP's primary role conceptions of regional leader and example. The third section examines the Arab Spring, the resultant role expectations on Turkey, and the development of its role as regional protector.

Theoretical Overview
Role-theory
Broadly, the idea of a role is borrowed from the theatre, where an actor is expected to follow her script and act accordingly. In role-theory, "roles consist of patterns of appropriate or expected behaviour that are drawn from the actor's social position in an organised group or the kinds of people it is possible to be in a given society."[7] In his foundational work, Kalevi J. Holsti integrated role-theory, from the field of sociology, with the study of foreign policy.[8] He focused on the idea that roles, as idealised self-conceptualisations, could shape the way a state acts within the international system. Resultantly, actors are actively involved in the process of categorising themselves and tend to conceive of several roles concurrently.

The concept of role contains several basic dimensions: "role conception," "role expectation," and "role performance." Role conceptions refer to foreign policy decision makers' perceptions of their state's position in the international system. Within the literature, speeches and statements of leaders are often considered as representative of national role conceptions. A role conception can be seen as a product of a state's socialisation process, influenced by its history, culture, and societal characteristics.[9] Thus, role conceptions are particular to each polity. The national role conceptions that a state holds are constituted by its own self-definition, but, crucially, roles are also impacted by the expectations of others. The expectations of others constitute role expectations, which are the "norms, beliefs and preferences concerning the performance of an individual in a role relative to individuals occupying other roles."[10] The state's role conceptions, combined with the role expectations of others, result in the state's role performance, i.e. state behaviour and action.

I find that there are three primary advantages of using role-theory to analyse foreign

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[7] Leslie E. Wehner and Cameron Thies, "Role Theory, Narratives, and Interpretation: The Domestic Contestation of Roles," *International Studies Review* 16 (2014): 414.

[8] Holsti analysed speeches from leaders of every country from 1965 until 1967 to derive his seventeen foreign policy roles. Kalevi J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 233-309.

[9] Holsti, "National Role," 233-309.

[10] Cameron Thies, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in Latin America," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 13, no. 3 (2017): 666.

policy. First, its concern with the interaction between agency and structure. Waltzian, third-image analyses – which privilege the system – have dominated IR. These theories are often insufficient when explaining change: they anticipate smooth transitions in foreign policy as states react to a systemic alteration in the international balance of power. If this were the case, as the shock of the Arab uprisings altered the international system, we would expect to see an according shift in Turkey's foreign policy. In reality, there was a clear interval of uncertainty and policy fluctuation. Changes within the international system can only set the basic parameters for state action: ultimately, "individual states will respond differently to the same structural incentives."[11] Meanwhile, an emphasis on agency has largely been associated with the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), which focuses on the process of foreign policy decision making, rather than generalised theories.[12] Role-theory allows for actors to have the "capacity to create, modify, and violate expectations that emerge from and within relations with Others and from the limitations of structures."[13] By looking at the interaction between agent and structure, role-theory can offer a useful dialogue between FPA's largely agent-based theorisations and IR's system-based arguments.

Second, role-theory facilitates analysis between state-identity and behaviour. This is exceedingly useful for the research tradition on social identity: roles can link identity and action.[14] Emerging as a reaction against the neo-realist and positivist orthodoxy that has dominated IR, the constructivist turn has resulted in a proliferation of studies on state and national identity. Constructivism does not view state behaviour as the result of fixed national interests, but as part of a pattern of action that both shapes and is shaped by identities over time. Its ontology holds ideational or social-psychological factors as significant and independent variables in themselves.[15] However, analysing identity has opened the door to many analytical obstacles.[16] While constructivist arguments have agreed that identity "generates [the] motivational and behavioural disposition" of international actors,[17] it does not illustrate that identity directly determines individual foreign policy initiatives. Constructivism has tended to link identity to interests by using an identity-interest nexus; however, "interest" is a "slippery" concept when it is applied to real instances of state action.[18] Role-theory, however, provides the conceptual tools to operationalise state-identity, whilst also incorporating factors such as socio-economic demands, international

[11] Jakob Gustavsson, "How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?" *Cooperation and Conflict* 34, no. 1 (1999): 92.

[12] Valerie Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1 (2005): 1-30.

[13] Wehner and Thies, "Role Theory," 415.

[14] Cameron Thies, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy," *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of International Studies* (2010): 662-681.

[15] Ji Young Choi "Rationality, Norms and Identity in International Relations," *International Politics* 52, no. 1 (2015): 114.

[16] Maja Zehfuss, "Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison," *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 3 (2001): 93-117.

[17] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 224.

[18] Kuniko Ashizawa, "When Identity Matters: State Identity, Regional Institution-Building, and Japanese Foreign Policy," *International Studies Review* 10, no. 3 (2008): 577.

and domestic expectations, ideology, strategy, and geographic variables.

Role-theory's third major advantage lies in its capacity to span across different levels of analysis.[19] It concentrates on both the international and the domestic sphere, moving between the individual, the state, and the system as levels of analysis. Mainstream IR has often focused on the interactions between unitary state actors rather than looking within the domestic sphere. While IR has increasingly moved to study the role of domestic politics and decision making, it has largely failed to reconcile this movement with the years of work produced by FPA.[20] Despite the constructivist turn and the according proliferation in studies of state-identity and ideational factors, role-theory remains "largely unfamiliar" to IR scholars.[21] Role-theory could be incorporated into the wider IR literature and should be recognised as a way of crossing multiple levels of analysis.

Role-Conflict and Role Change

Role-theory can provide insight into what happens when there is a clash between a state's competing or non-compatible roles. According to the literature, two types of role-conflict can occur: inter-role (conflict between roles) and intra-role (conflict within a role).[22] Inter-role conflict occurs when actors find themselves with multiple role conceptions, which are incompatible or incongruous.[23] Foreign policy decision makers often face multiple (and sometimes conflicting) role expectations that come from both the domestic, regional, and global levels.[24] Intra-role conflict occurs when the enactment of a specific role is contested by the domestic and international actors.[25]

This paper finds that role change can occur as a result of a role-conflict. While role change has been analysed in the role-theory literature, it has often been portrayed as a "gradual" process.[26] Albeit, it has been acknowledged that more rapid change can occur when states experience "internal upheaval" (like a revolution).[27] However, the case of Turkey in 2011 offers an insightful example of a state altering its role conceptions following an external change in the international system (the Arab Spring). Unexpected, exogenous changes can lead to contrasting and varying role expectations for the actor,

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[19] Holsti, "National Role Conceptions," 233-309.

[20] Juliet Kaarbo, "A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory," *International Studies Review* 17, no. 2 (2015): 189.

[21] Cameron Thies and Marijke Breuning, "Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role Theory," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8 (2012): 1.

[22] Moch Faisal Karim, "Role Conflict and the Limits of State Identity: The Case of Indonesia in Democracy Promotion," *Pacific Review* 30, no. 3 (2017): 388.

[23] Tewes examines the role-conflict in Germany's foreign policy between enacting a role to deepen EU integration or a role regarding EU enlargement. Henning Tewes, "Between Deepening and Widening: Role Conflict in Germany's Enlargement Policy," *West European Politics* 21, no. 2 (1998): 117-133.

[24] Gauvav Ghose and Patrick James, "Third-Party Interventionism in Ethno-Religious Conflict; Role Theory, Pakistan and War in Kashmir, 1965," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17 (2005): 430.

[25] There has also been an increasing understanding that domestic role contestation can be fruitful in terms of explaining why certain roles emerge. Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, *Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

[26] Glenn Chafetz, et al.,"Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime," *Political Psychology* 17, no. 4 (1996): 736.

[27] Chafetz, et al., "Role Theory," 736.

causing decision makers to re-prioritise and change their behaviour.[28] By analysing the impact of changes on the international level and the concomitant role expectations, this case-study has potential to offer fresh insight for the role-theory literature and enhances scholarly understanding of foreign policy change.

It is important to note that this work holds several assumptions. It argues that both international and domestic factors can impact a state's foreign policy behaviour; crucially, it holds that these factors are channelled through the foreign policy decision makers who subsequently "identify, decide and enact foreign policy actions."[29] This study assumes that Turkish decision makers can be representative of Turkey's national role conceptions. It should be clarified that, while roles may not be uniformly shared within a polity – and may be domestically contested – foreign policy is ultimately made by individual decision makers in the name of the state. This essay does not regard public opinion or domestic role contestation in Turkey as significant factors in 2011. Özgür Özdamar argues that domestic role contestation has been marginalised under the AKP as the party has successfully secured control over (Kemalist) state institutions.[30] Therefore, this paper will focus on the AKP's ideology and strategy, alongside how it has used foreign policy to consolidate its power, obtain the "elimination of effective role contestation," and develop new role conceptions.[31] I will largely consider Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu (Chief Foreign Policy Advisor, 2003-2009, Foreign Minister, 2009-2014, and Prime Minister 2014-2016) as Turkey's foreign policy decision makers. While there has been increasing work done on the impact of these leaders' personalities and of psychological variables in determining their perception of events, this is not addressed within the confines of this study; this would, however, make a valuable future avenue of research. This paper will draw upon Holsti's (1970) typology of role conceptions; it does not provide a comprehensive account of Turkey's historical national role conceptions, but rather concentrates on the specific roles that are relevant to the foreign policy decisions made in 2011.

Literature on Turkish Foreign Policy
Within the literature available on Turkey's foreign policy under the AKP, there have been two key debates. The first has been the role of ideational factors, specifically Islamism and neo-Ottomanism. One of the most recurrent themes is the role of political Islam in Turkey's foreign policy. The AKP's neo-Ottoman identity has also been discussed, with Alexander Murinson arguing that the AKP's rule has marked a clear transformation in

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[28] Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis, "Identifying Parameters of Foreign Policy Change: An Eclectic Approach," *Cooperation and Conflict* 49, no. 4 (2014): 483.
[29] Bülent Aras and Aylin Gorener, "National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation: The Ideational Bases of the Justice and Development Party's Foreign Policy Activism in the Middle East," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12, no. 1 (2010): 74.
[30] Özgür Özdamar, "Domestic Sources of Changing Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the MENA During the 2010s: A Role Theoretic Approach," in *Domestic Role Contestation,* 89-104.
[31] Özdamar, "Domestic Sources," 90.

Turkish history with the return of neo-Ottomanism.[32] The second key debate has been on the extent to which the AKP's rule constitutes continuity versus change. The new foreign policy under the AKP has been conceptualised as a shift away from the West and an axis shift.[33] Soner Cagaptay argues that Turkey has shifted from the West and its traditional Kemalist orientation, and instead has moved towards the Islamic world.[34] These claims have been challenged by thinkers such as Katerina Dalacoura, who argues that increased involvement in the Middle East does not by default mean that Turkey is turning away from the West.[35]

While this paper agrees that identity is important, it cautions against monolithic conceptualisations of Turkish identity. Much of the scholarship on recent Turkish foreign policy has referred to the AKP's "Islamist" identity as a way of explaining its deeper engagement with the Middle East. The crude narrative given is that, after the AKP attained power, Turkey's identity shifted from a pro-Western (Kemalist) identity towards an increasingly Islamist one. However, this narrative ignores the multiple foreign policy strategies enacted by the AKP. For instance, it does not provide an explanation for the AKP's "initial pro-European swing," nor why Turkey's membership of NATO has remained a key tenet of its foreign policy.[36] Furthermore, deterministic and static identity conceptions that emphasise Turkey's Islamic identity cannot explain Turkey's movement against the Syrian Ba'ath Party in 2011.

Despite the significant literature available on Turkish foreign policy, the Syria-Turkey relationship has been understudied. However, several key contributions to the literature should be noted. The normalisation of relations between Turkey and Syria has been explored by Marwan Kabalan[37] and Reem Abou-El-Fadl.[38] An essential contribution has been Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür's book, *Turkey-Syria Relations, Between Enmity and Amity* (2013), which presents a collection of essays that analyse the alignment changes.[39] This collection stands out in its inclusion of multifarious perspectives, bringing together different theoretical approaches with varying levels of analysis. The principle argument given in this book is that, in order to understand the alignment shifts, it is necessary to look at the interaction of identity and interests, exogenous and endogenous factors, regional and global dynamics. However, none of the essays explicitly address the question of what made Turkey change its traditional foreign policy of non-involvement

[32] Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 6 (2006): 945-964.

[33] Ahmer Sözen, "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transitions and Challenges," *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 1 (2010): 103-123.

[34] Soner Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

[35] Katerina Dalacoura, "Muslim and Modern: Why Turkey's 'Turn to the East' is No Slight to the West," *Juncture* 21, no. 4 (2015): 324-327.

[36] Lisel Hintz, "'Take It Outside!' National Identity Contestation in the Foreign Policy Arena," *European Journal of International Relations* 22, no. 2 (2016): 336.

[37] Marwan Kabalan, "Syrian-Turkish Relations: Geopolitical Explanations for the Move from Conflict to Cooperation," in *Turkey-Syria Relations,* 27-39.

[38] Reem Abou-el-Fadl, "Turkey's Cold War Alliance: Nation-building and the Utility of the 1957 Syrian Crisis," *Turkey-Syria Relations*, 39-55.

[39] Hinnebusch and Tür, *Turkey-Syria Relations*.

in Middle Eastern conflicts during the Arab Spring. This study hopes to help fill this lacuna by concentrating specifically on this foreign policy change.

While role-theory has been given considerable attention in the FPA literature,[40] only a limited number of works have analysed Turkey's role conceptions and their impact on its foreign policy.[41] While Özdamar, et al., contrast Turkey's foreign policy roles enacted before the Arab Spring with the ones enacted afterwards,[42] they do not use role-theory to explore the redirection of foreign policy in 2011.

The AKP in the Context of Turkish Foreign Policy
This study provides an analysis of the role change that occurred in 2011, and argues this change emerged due to an inter-role conflict between the roles of example and regional leader. Without an understanding of the specificity of these roles and their implications, it is difficult to explain both why and how the role of regional protector emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring. This section will contextualise the AKP and account for the development of its primary role conceptions.

National role conceptions are particular to each polity and are products of a nation's socialisation process, rooted in its history and culture. They are often shaped by a nation's "formative experiences" and its founding elites.[43] Ultimately, the Kemalist paradigm has had an enduring influence on Turkey's foreign policy. Mustafa Kemal founded the Turkish Republic on the basis of a commitment to secularism and the Westernisation of a society inherited from the Ottomans.[44] Islam was relegated to the private sphere, state institutions were secularised, and there were attempts to "westernise" culture; for example, in 1928, the Arabic script was replaced with the Latin alphabet. Significantly, the Kemalist paradigm was also enshrined by "an apparatus of institutional safeguards to prevent any deviation from the established line in years to come."[45] Kemalist foreign policy tradition emphasised "non-intervention, a Western orientation, and vigilance with regard to national sovereignty."[46] Turkey's foreign policy has remained largely Western-orientated: Turkey was a part of the Western bloc during the Cold War and it has also pursued membership in multiple Western organisations, such as the OECD, the Council of Europe, and NATO. Accordingly there has been a tradition of non-intervention in the MENA region; albeit, there have been some notable deviations from this. Under Turgut

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[40] Marijke Breuning, "Words and Deeds: Foreign Assistance Rhetoric and Policy Behaviour in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom," *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (1995): 235-254; Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot, "Role Theory," 727-757; and Thies, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy," 662-681.

[41] Bülent Aras, *The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey's Position* (London: Frank Cass, 2002); Aras and Gorener, "National Role Conceptions," 73-93; Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Erşen, "Reassessing the 'Turkish Model' in The Post-Cold War Era: A Role Theory Perspective," *Turkish Studies* 15, no. 2 (2014): 258-282; and Özgür Özdamar, et al., "From Good Neighbor to Model: Turkey's Changing Roles in the Middle East in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring," *Uluslarasi Iliskiler* 11, no. 42 (2014): 93-113.

[42] Özdamar, et al., "From Good Neighbor," 93-113.

[43] Aras and Gorener, "National Role Conceptions," 78.

[44] See Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) for an in-depth analysis on the formation of the Turkish Republic and Kemalism.

[45] Aras and Gorener, "National Role Conceptions," 78.

[46] F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 18-19.

Özal, who served as Prime Minister from 1983-1989 and President from 1989-1993, Turkey began to liberalise its economy. One of the major results of this was an economic opening within the Middle East as Özal stimulated Turkish commercial involvement in Libya, Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf states. [47] By consequence, its political relations with these countries in the region improved and Turkey's foreign policy became more multidimensional. However, the AKP would later challenge the Kemalist tradition in a far more comprehensive and multifaceted way.

Turkey's relationship with Syria over the years has largely conformed to Kemalist ideals. During the Cold War, Turkey's Western alignment and membership of the Baghdad Pact (a Cold War military alliance formed in 1955 between Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the UK) contrasted with Syria's pro-Soviet position. In the post-Cold War era, their relationship deteriorated when, from 1984, Syria gave support to the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan. This became Syria's "political card" that it used against Turkey over water issues and sovereignty over Hatay. Their relations reached a crisis point in October 1998. Ankara pressured Damascus by placing ten thousand Turkish troops on the Syrian border, threatening an invasion if Damascus did not stop supporting the PKK and expel Öcalan.[48] This escalation to near-war may not seem in line with the Kemalist foreign policy tradition of distancing Turkey from the Middle East. Importantly, the times when Turkey did not conform to traditional norms were generally due to its attempts to "forestall provision of regional support to the PKK from states such as Iraq, Iran and Syria."[49] This period ended with the watershed Adana Accord (1998), commencing the normalisation of relations between Syria and Turkey and Syria's expulsion of Öcalan. However, although the accord historically marked the normalisation of relations, under the AKP, there began a movement "beyond simple normalisation, towards amity, even alliance."[50]

The AKP came to power in 2002, signifying a new era of Turkish politics and its foreign policy. The party was founded in 2001 and is a conservative democratic party that is Islamic-oriented, although not anti-capitalist or *de facto* anti-Western. Unlike its Kemalist predecessors – who emphasised secularism – the AKP brings Islamic values to the fore. Yet, unlike the former Turkish Islamist parties, the AKP does not denounce the world capitalist system and has reconciled itself "with Turkey's European orientation, which their predecessors had opposed and [the AKP has] prepared a liberal party programme."[51] There have been both continuations and alterations to traditional Turkish foreign policy; the AKP has maintained some roles while developing others. Thus its foreign policy has been multifaceted: it is a member of NATO, a candidate for EU membership, and a member of the OIC. Some of its foreign policy can be viewed as a continuation of the Kemalist tradition, such as its commitment to gaining EU membership. It has also developed its role in multiple regions: the Balkans, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central

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[47] Özal developed Turkish relations with Libya, Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf states by stimulating Turkish commercial involvement in the region. Larrabee and Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 128.

[48] F. Stephen Larrabee, "Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 4 (2007): 109.

[49] Özdamar, "Domestic Sources," 92

[50] Hinnebusch and Tür, *Turkey-Syria Relations*, 2.

[51] Yesim Arat, "Religion, Politics and Gender Equality in Turkey – Implications of a Democratic Paradox?," *Third World Quarterly* 31, no. 6 (2010): 871.

Asia, Africa, Europe, and the US. It should be noted that "the objective is not to diminish the role of Turkey in one area so as to add strength to another, but to be active in all of them."[52] While the AKP has complied with many tenets of traditional Turkish foreign policy, it has increasingly turned from tradition, especially within the Middle East where the AKP has pursued a more active role.

The two primary role conceptions under the AKP have been that of example and regional leader. This study finds that the conflict between these two roles is fundamental for understanding Turkey's foreign policy change towards Syria in 2011. Having contextualised the AKP's foreign policy and introduced the key tenets of the ideology, these roles will now be analysed.

Role of Example

The role of example is one of the seventeen conceptualised by Holsti and it "emphasises the importance of promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by pursuing certain domestic policies."[53] In 2008, Erdogan proclaimed that "Turkey, with its democracy, is a source of inspiration to the rest of the Islamic world."[54] Under the AKP, Turkey has undergone an ideological transformation, which could be depicted as "the Westernisation of political Islam."[55] The AKP projects a synthesis of traditionally conservative values with democracy and a free market economy.

The ideology of the government and the political needs of its leaders constitute sources of a state's role conceptions. As the AKP emerged, it emphasised its democratic credentials and strove towards EU membership by committing to political reforms. This foreign policy enabled the AKP to minimise the Kemalist institutions' influence.[56] The EU harmonisation packages reduced the influence of the military by reducing its role in the National Security Council, and ensured that military expenditures were placed under parliamentary scrutiny.[57] It is seemingly paradoxical that – in the process of enacting Kemalist ideals by becoming a part of Europe – the Kemalist institutions and the political influence of the military in Turkey have weakened. In emphasising its democratic leanings and pursuing EU membership, the AKP were able to achieve civil-military reform and thus further consolidate their power to have greater control over their foreign policy.

While committing to democratisation was used by the AKP to strengthen its rule, it also was used to acquire more prestige on an international level. The AKP globally advocated compatibility between Islam and democracy by promoting the "Turkish Model." This conception developed in conjunction with the democratic EU reforms

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[52] Dalacoura, "Muslim and Modern," 326.

[53] Holsti, "National Role Conceptions," 268.

[54] Erdoğan speech, in Aras and Gorener, "National Role Conceptions," 85.

[55] Bilal Sambur, "The Great Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: The Case of Justice and Development Party and Erdoğan," *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies* 2, no. 2 (2009): 121.

[56] Burhanettin Duran, "Understanding the AK Party's Identity Politics: A Civilizational Discourse and its Limitations," *Inside Turkey* 15, no. 1 (2013): 298.

[57] The military traditionally saw itself as "the custodian of the Atatürk legacy and has directly intervened three times when it felt democracy in Turkey was threatened." Larrabee and Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, xv.

that Turkey was pursuing. As an example, the "Turkish model" was promoted strongly by the decision makers during the AKP's first term in power.[58] Erdoğan declared "our democracy and modernity… have been inevitably making Turkey an example, a model as well as a partner."[59] The AKP projected an image of Turkey as a Muslim nation with a secular state and democratic regime, a vision received well internationally.[60] Moreover, Emel Dal and Emre Erşen also point to the influence of the US officials, who – especially after 9/11 – emphasised the Turkish model as an "alternative" to radical Islam.[61] The US was determined to fight against radicalisation and, in 2004, it developed the Broader Middle East and North African (BMENA) initiative, which was set up to promote economic development, human rights and good governance to the Middle East. Significantly, Turkey and the US became co-chairs. In addition, as part of the BMENA initiative, Turkey (alongside Yemen and Italy) became a co-chair of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue programme. Erdoğan, Gül, and Davutoğlu regularly referred to the concepts of democracy and human rights as values that Turkey disseminates within the region.[62] Turkey presented itself as a "modern role model" for other Muslim countries, especially within the MENA region.[63]

Importantly, Turkey continually emphasised the importance of democratisation as an internally driven process and argued against the imposition of democracy or violations of state sovereignty. Therefore, unlike the US and the EU, Turkey's development aid agency (the Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency: TIKA), does not have an explicit democracy promotion programme. Nevertheless, one of its key project areas is administrative and civil infrastructure and it is within this area that Turkey has promoted democracy.[64] TIKA was founded in 1992, but it was underfunded and focused predominantly on the newly independent Turkic states. However, under the AKP it received more resources and its geographic scope expanded considerably. The funding allocated to the MENA region began increasing from 2004. This increase in democracy promotion remained at a "micro" level in the sense that Turkey remained committed to non-imposition and respected the sovereignty of states.

One of the most elaborate vocalisations of Turkey's example role was made by Erdoğan at Harvard University in 2003. In this extract Erdoğan emphasises "gradual processes" and condemns the exceptionalism of the Middle East:

"Turkey is ready to do its fair share to promote democratization in the Middle

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[58] Melia Benli Altunışık and Lenore Martin, "Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 4 (2011): 574.

[59] Erdoğan, "Democracy In The Middle East, Pluralism In Europe: Turkish View," paper presented at Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, 30 January 2003, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:2xvoX8NiM_wJ:www.belfercenter.org/files/erdogan%2520speech,%-2520full%2520-%2520english%2520version.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari>.

[60] Aras and Gorener, "National Role Conceptions," 85.

[61] Dal and Erşen, "Reassessing the 'Turkish Model,'" 268.

[62] Daniela Huber, *Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity and Interests in US, EU, and Non-Western Democracies* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 157.

[63] Crystal A. Ennis and Bessma Momani, "Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi Foreign Policy Strategies," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 5 (2013): 1127-1127.

[64] Huber, *Democracy Promotion*, 151-152.

East and facilitate such a momentous transformation […] With the EU, more than forging cooperation, Turkey is on the path of integration. The decision by the EU to launch accession talks with Turkey will be the victory of the message that democratization is the starting point of the project of harmony of civilizations."[65]

Erdoğan's speech is evidence of Turkey's conformity to Holsti's example role: the state used its status as a democracy to augment its international prestige. It also emphasised the individuality of the "Turkish model" to suggest that Turkey can uniquely promote democracy in the Middle East as a Muslim country. In many ways, this role characterised the AKP's first term in power (2002 to 2007). It is however notable that, whilst the rhetoric of democracy promotion did not disappear completely, it diminished during the second term of AKP rule. The AKP argued that it was indirectly aiding democratisation through economic engagement with and supplying developmental aid to its neighbours, in addition to opening up its borders.[66] Nevertheless, it did not promote the "Turkish model" as strongly. This decline can be explained by the fact that, as Turkey's relations with its neighbouring autocracies deepened, it prioritised these relationships over democracy promotion.[67] This demonstrates the emerging tension that was between Turkey's role conceptions of regional leader and example.

Role of Regional Leader
This role conception refers to "responsibilities that a government perceives for itself in its relations to states within a particular region."[68] Under the AKP, Turkey positioned itself increasingly as a regional leader within the Middle East, by adopting policies like "zero problems with neighbours," and developing its relationships within the region. The sources for roles are often numerous, including geography, economic resources, socio-economic demands, and ideology.[69] Turkey's activism in the Middle East was rooted in historical memory, economic growth, the AKP's ideology, and Turkey's geo-strategic position.

Central to the development of this role was Davutoğlu, who strongly influenced the AKP's foreign policy and has been regarded as its intellectual architect. His foreign policy doctrine was outlined in his book *Strategic Depth*, which places great value on the geo-strategic location of Turkey. The core five principles of "strategic depth" are: (1) a balance between security and freedom, (2) a new diplomatic style, (3) rhythmic (adaptable) diplomacy, (4) zero problems with neighbours, and (5) a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Davutoğlu emphasised the legacy of the Ottoman Empire from which, he argues, Turkey has inherited a geographical and historical depth that places it at the centre of many areas of influence and necessitates its engagement with the region. He wrote that:

"[Turkey] should be seen neither as a bridge country which only intersects two

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[65] Erdoğan, "Democracy In The Middle East."
[66] Emiliano Alessandri and Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Unfinished Transitions: Challenges and Opportunities of the EU's and Turkey's Response to the 'Arab Spring,'" *Global Turkey in Europe*, working paper no. 4. (2013): 6, http://www.iai.it/ content.asp?langid=2&contentid=833>.
[67] Huber, *Democracy Promotion*, 157.
[68] Holsti, "National Role Conceptions," 261.
[69] Holsti, National Role Conceptions," 246.

points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West [...but as a] central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character."[70]

He coined the term "tarihdaş" – meaning people who share the same history – in order to refer to the links between the nation and people living in the former Ottoman territories.[71] In doing so, Turkey's sphere of interests in the MENA region are historically legitimised.

According to Kemalist tradition, Turkey viewed the former Ottoman territories from a "defensive" perspective.[72] Thus, "strategic depth" is a clear departure from the previous Kemalist alienation from the Middle East. This also signifies a movement away from the "bridge" role conception that was used increasingly in the 1980s under Özal, which emphasised Turkey's geographical location as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East. This developed under "strategic depth," moving from bridging continents to bridging civilisations.[73]

The geopolitical thinking conceptualised by Davutoğlu has been used to reappraise Turkey's role in the region. There have been clear efforts at diplomacy and at enacting a multi-dimensional foreign policy. For instance, Ankara has sought to solve political problems with neighbouring countries. This was evidenced by Turkish mediation between Syria and Israel, as well as Turkey's active role in resolving the international dispute on Iran's nuclear activities. It has also demonstrated its willingness to take a regional stand. This was seen in 2009, when Turkey strongly criticised Israel's attack on Gaza.[74] Erdoğan strongly condemned Israel for the brutality of this operation and also for conducting it at a time when promising developments were being made in the Turkish-mediated Israel-Syria peace talks.[75] The crisis culminated in Davos, when Erdoğan criticised Israel in front of the World Economic Forum and the international media.

The principle of "zero problems with neighbours" became a motto for Turkey's foreign policy. Since enacted, the policy has achieved much success; Turkey's relations with Iran, Iraq, and Syria were normalised, which was especially significant given the former hostilities between the countries. Indeed, the poster child of its success was Turkey's rapprochement and amity with Syria. In 2004, Assad made a landmark official visit to Turkey and, by 2009, Syria and Turkey removed visa requirements. Their economic relationship also developed considerably. In 2007, a free trade zone was introduced. As a result of improved relations and the visa and free trade agreements, Turkish-Syrian

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[70] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkish Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007," *Insight Turkey* 10, no. 1 (2008): 78.

[71] Cenk Saraçoğlu and Özhan Demirkol, "Nationalism and Foreign Policy Discourse in Turkey Under the AKP Rule: Geography, History and National Identity," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 3 (2015): 311.

[72] Saraçoğlu and Demirkol, "Nationalism and Foreign Policy, 312.

[73] Lerna Yanik, "The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision: Bridging Turkey's Location, Role and Identity After the End of the Cold War," *Geopolitics* 14, no. 3 (2009): 533.

[74] Özdamar, "Domestic Sources."

[75] Ilker Aytürk, "The Coming of an Ice Age? Turkish-Israeli Relations since 2002," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 4 (2011): 677.

trade rose rapidly from $796 million USD in 2006 to $2.5 billion USD in 2010.[76] Another benefit for Turkey incurred from deepened ties with Syria was cooperation on the containment of PKK activities; PKK separatist claims had long constituted a central threat to Turkey's nation-state.

The role of regional leader was thus rooted in economic and strategic needs, the AKP's ideology, historical memory, and geography. There was an inherent contradiction between the "zero problems with neighbours policy" and the role of example that had been emphasised during the AKP's first term. In 2009, the Iranian regime used violence and repression to suppress protests during the Green Movement. This movement had arisen following the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to president for a second term, which the protestors viewed as fraudulent. However, Erdoğan immediately congratulated the new Iranian president on his election. Moreover, President Gül visited Tehran at the peak of the oppression and did not raise the issue or demonstrate support for the protestors. This illustrates the primacy of the regional leader role during the AKP's second term and makes Turkish support for the Arab Spring more mystifying. What made Turkey sacrifice its "zero problems with neighbours" policy?

Turkey's Role Change Following the Arab Spring
The Arab Spring began in Tunisia in late 2010 and triggered similar protests across the region in Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Yemen, and Syria. The Arab Spring was an epochal moment – a regional phenomenon with international implications. Within these countries, popular movements rose up against their respective authoritarian regimes and – drawing from the principles of universal rights and good governance – and called for regime change. The Arab Spring challenged long-established regimes and any analysis of Turkish foreign policy in 2011 needs to acknowledge that the uprisings created an environment that was both "uncertain and volatile."[77] These uprisings necessitated a response from the AKP to an unexpected and changing situation.

Role of Regional Protector
During the international conference on "The Arab Awakening and Peace in the New Middle East; Muslim and Christian Perspectives," Davutoğlu boldly proclaimed that "Turkey is a protector of those oppressed in the Middle East."[78] The emergence and development of the role of regional protector in Turkish foreign policy was one of the key factors that explain why there was a movement to enmity and why Erdoğan publicly called for President Assad to step down. In Holsti's typology, the role of regional protector encompasses "special leadership responsibilities on a regional or issue-area basis [with an] emphasis on the function of providing protection for adjacent regions."[79]

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[76] Huber, *Democracy Promotion*, 160.
[77] Ziya Öniş, "Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest," *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 3 (2012): 49.
[78] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey is a Protector of Those Oppressed in Middle East," speech presented at the International Conference Arab Awakening and Peace in the New Middle East: Muslim and Christian Perspectives, Istanbul, 7-8 September 2012, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-minister-davutoglu-turkey-is-a-protector-of-those-oppressed-in-middle-east.en.mfa>.
[79] Holsti, "National Role Conceptions," 262.

Resultantly, rather than just trying to augment its regional influence, Turkish foreign policy has increasingly embraced an "order instituting role."[80]

During times of pressure, foreign policy decision makers are forced to reconcile contradictions or competing demands of their identity and roles.[81] The Arab Awakenings had this effect on Turkey and underscored the inter-role conflict of Turkish national role conceptions. There had been a chronic tension between the way in which Turkey had pursued its role of regional leader while maintaining its example role as a democracy. Tensions between democracy promotion and amity with autocratic regimes obviously pre-dated the Arab Awakenings, as evidenced by the Iranian 2009 Green Movement. However, the scope of the 2011 demonstrations, where the masses demanded democracy within regimes that Turkey had developed close relations with, heavily underscored this contradiction. Consequently, there was increased pressure applied from regional and international role expectations. The Arab Spring alone, understood as change to the system, cannot explain in itself why Turkey's relations with Syria broke down completely by the end of 2011. There was no smooth and predictable adjustment of foreign policy, and there were remarkable fluctuations and hesitations within Turkish deviating responses. Furthermore, the rhetoric of protecting the oppressed has its roots in both the "strategic depth" doctrine and Turkey's democracy promotion. This is where role-theory demonstrates its explanatory power.

Role Expectations during the Arab Spring

Role expectations in role-theory are important because the appropriateness of a state's behaviour is significantly determined by what others in the community expect from it.[82] By consequence, they are a major repertoire of state behaviour. I find that there were significant regional and international role expectations that were placed upon the AKP. These expectations were filtered through the decision-makers, who then went through the process of role change, before a new role conception emerged. An actor's foreign policy is largely shaped by internal factors, ideas, and processes, but it also responds to the expectations of others.

The role expectations that were placed on Turkey made it apparent that the Western-oriented international society did not think Turkey was enacting its role of "example" appropriately. There was systemic pressure from "the interests of the global powers such as the United States and Western-centred international society."[83] The globally dominant, liberal norms of "democratisation" and "humanitarian protection" put pressure on Turkey.[84] There was dissatisfaction amongst the international community and it largely moved to stand against Assad's regime. This is evidenced by the UN General Assembly vote to condemn Syria's repression of civilians: in 2011, 122 voted

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[80] Aras and Gorener, "National Role Conceptions," 83.

[81] Michael Barnett, "Institutions, Roles and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International States Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (1993): 274.

[82] Dal and Erşen, "Reassessing the 'Turkish Model,'" 261.

[83] Özden Oktav, "The Syrian Uprising and the Iran-Turkey-Syria Quasi Alliance: A View From Turkey," *Turkey-Syria Relations*, 203.

[84] Marwa Daoudy, "The Structure-Identity Nexus: Syria and Turkey's Collapse," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 3 (2016): 1082.

in favour, thirteen against, and forty-one abstained. Furthermore, many states either deported the Syrian ambassadors or announced that they were unwanted, including, Australia, France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain, Canada, and the US.[85] One of the fundamental cornerstones of Turkish foreign policy since its conception has been its Western orientation and Turkey feared losing its credibility.

Expectations were not only placed on Turkey from the Western-centred international society, but from within the region itself. Following the Iraq War, regional politics in the Middle East were increasingly marked by bipolarity, which has been characterised as the "new regional Cold War."[86] The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and the US can be placed on one side with Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas on the other. Turkey originally eschewed entry into the regional Cold War and the AKP deliberately tried to avoid being drawn into this regional conflict. For example, through "zero problems with neighbours," Turkey developed amity with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, but did not abandon its relationship with the US. However, the Arab Spring reinforced the region's bipolarity and sharpened its sectarian Sunni-Shia divide. The US and GCC supported the Syrian opposition in the hope of limiting Iran's influence, which firmly aligned with Assad. There was a clear movement to try and inhibit Iran's ideological and political expansion in the Middle East.[87] Turkey, who had helped mediate the Iranian nuclear weapons crisis and was thanked in 2010 by Ahmadinejad for its "clear and frank" stance on the issue, was no longer seen as a "neutral country."[88] Prior to the Arab Spring, Turkey had promoted itself as an independent power that could develop relationships with both Sunni and Shi'ite regimes. Nevertheless, the hardening of the regional conflict made it increasingly difficult for Turkey to be opposed to conflicts that are "based on religious and sectarian polarisation."[89] The Syrian uprising altered the regional balance of power amongst the two poles and Turkey shifted towards the US axis.[90] These new regional expectations on Turkey constrained the AKP's "zero problems with neighbours" policy further.

Turkish officials feared losing both international and regional credibility if they did not condemn the regime. The dynamic interplay between Turkey's own national role conceptions and the expectations of others is evident. The Arab Spring constituted a change in the international system, which placed new role-expectations on Turkey. This necessitated that Turkey recognise its inter-role conflict, which had not yet been resolved. From this conflict, the new role of "regional protector" emerged, which had its roots in the AKP's primary roles of regional leader and example. This will be examined in the following section.

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85 Thowhidul Islam, "Turkey's AKP Foreign Policy Toward Syria: Shifting Policy During the Arab Spring," *International Journal on World Peace* 33, no. 1 (2016): 30.
86 Melia Benli Altunışık, "Explaining the Transformation of Turkish-Syrian Relations: A Regionalist Perspective," *Turkey-Syria Relations*, 184.
87 Islam, "Turkey's AKP Foreign Policy," 27-28.
88 Oktav, "The Syrian Uprising," 201.
89 Oktav, "The Syrian Uprising," 203.
90 Daoudy, "The Structure-Identity Nexus," 1080.

Responding to the Role-Conflict

There are various approaches that an actor can adopt when confronted with a role-conflict: denial, segregation, or merger.[91] The denial strategy is to simply do nothing to resolve the contradiction and dilemma. This had been the AKP's approach until the Arab Spring made it impossible to ignore. During the AKP's second term in power, its role of example diminished in favour of its role as regional leader. Yet, it did not abandon its democratic credentials and this remained a firm part of Turkish state identity. Thus the tension between its role as an exemplar of democracy and its "zero problems with neighbours" strategy predated the unanticipated Arab uprisings. When the Green Movement occurred, Turkey did not confront its role-conflict; this was most likely because there was not the international pressure or mandate to act. Until 2011, Turkey was reaping the benefits – both strategically and economically – of its zero problems strategy, while acquiring international prestige for its democracy. It had been possible for Turkey to put forward one set of credentials without abandoning the others.[92] Therefore, Turkey may have portrayed itself as a model democracy, but it did not actively challenge its neighbours for their autocratic methods.

Role segregation refers to a strategy where, in place of solving the role-conflict, the state "oscillates between roles in order to avoid role change, that is, the completely new inception of its international role."[93] As the Arab Uprisings began, Turkey vacillated between promoting democracy (its example role) and hastening to preserve its relationships with the regimes (its regional leader role). In Egypt, Turkey spoke out and was one of the first states to openly back the demonstrations and support the fall of President Hosni Mubarak. Contrastingly, when the uprising began in Libya, Turkey was a reluctant participant in the NATO intervention and assumed a generally passive position. There were serious economic interests at stake, including comprehensive trade and investment linkages that had developed under the AKP and its Strategic Depth doctrine.[94] In Libya, "it was becoming increasingly complicated for Turkey to pick and choose sides, and as a result, the government began experiencing mounting pressure over expectations created by recent activism and discourse at home and abroad."[95] However, following the uprisings in Libya, there was increasing international pressure as "norms relating to social justice, human rights and accountability disseminated regionally, which necessitated a response from Turkey."[96] As the Syrian uprisings began, Erdoğan called on Assad to initiate reforms, but Turkey did not yet assume an active stance against the regime. The diplomatic ties between the two countries were weakened, but it was clear

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[91] These three approaches are rooted in the role-theory of micro-sociology, which has charted the ways that an individual can deal with a role-conflict. Tewes finds the approaches of denial, segregation and merger applicable to understanding the role-conflict in Germany, 1990. Tewes, "Between Deepening and Widening," 123-124.

[92] Duran, "Understanding the AK Party's Identity Politics," 92.

[93] Tewes, "Between Deepening and Widening," 125.

[94] Ziya Öniş, "Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest," *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 3 (2012): 46.

[95] Ahmet K. Han, "Paradise Lost: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy and the Case of Turkish-Syrian Relations," *Turkey-Syria Relations*, 67.

[96] Daoudy, "The Structure-Identity Nexus," 1081.

that Turkey was still conflicted and did not openly support the rebels. It would maintain this position for several months.

However, there was a marked shift when Erdoğan and Davutoğlu called for Syrian regime change in October 2011. A role merger occurred following the Syrian uprising, with the role of regional protector emerging out of the regional leader and example role conceptions. Assuming the role of regional protector, Turkey could no longer allow for amity with oppressive regimes, nor could it passively respond to the crisis. The amount of Turkish development aid given to Libya, Egypt and Syria increased. While the AKP's previous democracy promotion (under the example role) had emphasised the importance of respecting sovereignty, Turkey's commitment to non-intervention diminished. Erdoğan publicly denounced Assad and even moved to actively pledge military intervention while calling on the international community to introduce sanctions. By October 2011, Turkey had imposed its own sanctions on Syria and it began to host the anti-government Free Syrian Army in Turkey. This strongly differs from the democracy promotion that Turkey had enacted during the AKP's first term in power: Turkey now directly confronted the regime by "public naming and shaming."[97]

Attached to Turkey's promotion of democracy was a sense of shared civilisation and regional responsibility. The idea of fraternity was tied to their discourse, emphasising the idea of a shared civilisation with Syria. Erdoğan claimed that, "The Syrian question is our internal affair […] We have ties of kinship, history and culture. Therefore, we cannot passively watch what is happening."[98] This is where the merger between example and regional leader is most clear: decision-makers directly supported the uprisings by emphasising Turkey's regional responsibility.

In June 2011, as the AKP won the general election, Erdoğan boldly claimed:

> "Today the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans have won as much as Turkey. We will become much more active in regional and global affairs. We will take on a more effective role. We will call, as we have, for rights in our region, for justice, for the rule of law, for freedom and democracy."[99]

The idea of civilisation remained central. During the 2012 Party Congress, Erdoğan used the term "civilisation" fourteen times, but only used the term "conservative democracy" twice.[100] "Civilisation" denotes a sense of belonging to the Middle East region, while simultaneously demonstrating their commitment to humanitarian values, which are seen as linked to Western civilisation. The civilisational discourse that the AKP have used following the Arab Spring has combined its linkages to so-called "Western" ideals of democracy and human rights with its historical linkages to the Middle East region. The role of regional protector

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[97] Huber, *Democracy Promotion*, 157.

[98] Erdoğan, in Jakub Pilch, "Turkey's Recent Role Conceptions and Shifts in its Foreign Policy," (MA diss., Central European University, 2012): 28.

[99] Erdoğan, in "Mandate for a New Turkish Era," *New York Times*, 16 June 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/world/europe/16iht-M16-TURKEY-POLICY.html?mtrref=r.search.yahoo.com&gwh=9991CD9A0344134F074E39BCE1D856DC&gwt=pay>.

[100] Duran, "Understanding the AK Party's Identity Politics," 93.

emerged in 2011 as a synthesis of the AKP's regional activism and its democracy promotion. This role change thus explains why Turkey ultimately moved against Syria; international expectations provoked Turkey to confront its inherent role contradictions and consequently it merged the role conceptions of regional protector and example together.

Conclusion

This paper set out to demonstrate the explanatory power of role-theory when analysing Turkey's foreign policy change towards Syria in 2011. The Arab Spring provoked a serious test for Turkey's foreign policy and challenged the role conceptions that it had developed. As demonstrations intensified within Syria, a continuation of Ankara's previous strategy became increasingly difficult. However, its response to the shift was inconsistent and the decision to condemn Assad cannot be seen as a clear response to Turkey's national interests, given the economic linkages between the countries and the security benefits of the relationship. Nor was it a direct, smooth foreign policy change that came only from the systemic shock of the Arab Spring. This case study underlines that foreign policy change should not be regarded as a simple consequence of structural dynamics in the international system, but needs to be explained by the interaction of the agent with the structure.

The AKP and the role conceptions it developed are an essential part of explaining the foreign policy change. In its first term, the AKP actively engaged with the EU accession process and reconfigured the domestic political environment in order to give it increasing liberty in its foreign policy. It internationally promoted itself as a role-model democracy and used its liberty to enact new role conceptions. Ankara's foreign policy also increasingly emphasised the historical and civilisational linkages between Turkey and the former Ottoman countries. The AKP's pursuit for regional leadership through its "zero problems with neighbours" policy was an unprecedented strategy in Turkish foreign policy. This role conception contrasted with the Kemalist opposition, which "did not see Turkey as part of, much less a leader in, the Middle East."[101] Clearly, the AKP's own national role conceptions of Turkey and their concomitant implications for foreign policy matter.

Turkey assuming the role of regional protector in 2011 represented a clear foreign policy change. Turkey had developed incongruent foreign policy roles and the Arab Spring necessitated a reconciliation. The Arab Spring placed new demands on the AKP and they had to grapple with regional and international role expectations. At a time of democratisation and conflict in a region that the AKP had emphasised its shared history and destiny with, Turkey had to confront its own contradictions. The increasing role expectations that Turkey was placed under – both regionally and internationally – eventually led to a role merger. The regional protector merged Turkey's regional activism with its democracy promotion. Erdoğan, as he visited Damascus, claimed that "he could not distinguish the Turkish and Syrian faces in the audience and referred to the Syrians as brothers."[102] This emphasis on kin and fraternity is rooted in the Strategic Depth

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[101] Hinnebusch and Tür, *Turkey-Syria Relations*, 213.
[102] Hinnebusch and Tür, *Turkey-Syria Relations,* 210.

doctrine that had formed the basis of its regional leader role conception. The adoption of the regional protector role was rooted in internal conditions of the state, its interactions, and systemic influences.

When Turkey moved against Assad's regime, it anticipated a regime change and could not have foreseen the current, devastating situation. The subsequent Syrian quagmire has provoked many issues for the AKP, including the influx of millions of Syrian refugees, the persisting Kurdish problem, the upsurge of the extremist Islamic State, and an annual economic loss of an estimated seven to eight billion USD.[103] Moreover, the Gezi Park protests and the 2016 Turkish *coup d'état* illustrate the significant domestic unrest that has arisen; Turkey's model democracy seems to have been in decline. Indeed, the AKP's harsh response to the Gezi Park demonstrations, the aftermath of the attempted coup, and the 2017 constitutional referendum have diminished its credibility as a model democracy.[104] The impact of Turkey's response to Syria in 2011 on its role conceptions and the subsequent shifts in its foreign policy is beyond the scope of this study. However, the continuing impact of the Syrian crisis underlines the importance of studying Turkey's foreign policy shift in 2011. Moving forward, this study has demonstrated that role-theory can help generate further insights into foreign policy change, specifically following exogenous shocks to the international system. Despite Holsti's seminal work and the development of role-theory within the foreign policy analysis literature, the great potential of role-theory has yet to be realised. With its capacity to span multiple levels of analysis, negotiate the agency-structure dilemma, and operationalise identity, role-theory has significant explanatory power and holds compelling promise for the future of IR.

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[103] Daoudy, "The Structure-Identity Nexus," 1083.
[104] Dal and Erşen, "Reassessing the 'Turkish Model,'" 272.

Lions of the Future:
How a Singing Competition is Transforming Afghanistan

Tory Gullo

This paper addresses how the television singing competition Afghan Star *has contributed to the broader discussion of national identity in Afghanistan. Considering decades of war, an ineffectual government, and conservative opposition, the ability for a television programme to influence its audience has become even more significant. This article examines the motivations that underscore* Afghan Star's *production and asks how the programme acts as a democratic forum to discuss issues of national identity. Additionally, the paper explores – via lyrical analysis – the way female participants and rappers engage with that discourse. Through addressing its audience's crucial concerns such as gender rights, economic disparity, and government corruption,* Afghan Star *establishes itself as a major player in defining what it means to be both modern and Afghan.*

"This is a proud nation of Lions and Lionesses; as One Nation and One Voice we are all Afghans."[1] - Sayed Jamal Mubarez

In 2005, Tolo TV launched Afghanistan's first singing talent competition: *Afghan Star*. The groundbreaking show – which transcends the ethnic, gender, and age divisions that have too often blighted Afghanistan's social history – sought to showcase Afghanistan's singing talents and unite the nation through a love of traditional music. In the final rounds, viewers participate in equitable voting – a system that contrasts with the insecurity of regular political elections. The programme entered its fourteenth season in 2018, making it the longest running series on Afghan television.

How has *Afghan Star* dominated Afghanistan television in the face of two decades of war and violent opposition? Considering Afghanistan's evermore uncertain future, will there continue to be a place for such reality television series? Katherine Sender argues that one must examine reality television shows such as *Afghan Star* as a product of necessary compromises among professional, economic, and gender constraints.[2] This means examining the labyrinth behind *Afghan Star* and its network, Tolo. Saad Mohseni, an Australian-Afghan banker, founded Tolo under its parent organisation Moby Media Group in 2003 to facilitate news and entertainment enterprises in South and Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Through a political, social and economic analysis of Saad Mohseni and Moby Group, and a lyrical analysis of performances in *Afghan Star* Season Twelve (2017-2018) this paper hopes to shed light on *Afghan Star*'s position as a democratic forum through which Afghans can discuss issues related to national

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[1] Aryana Sayeed and Sayed Jamal Mubarez, "Jamal Mubarez NEW SONG – Sacred Obligation" (Sherzaad Entertainment, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcF9g9Ufu1k>.
[2] Katherine Sender, "Introduction: Migration Genres, Travelling Participants, Shifting Theories," in Marwan M. Kraidy and Katherine Sender, eds., *The Politics of Reality Television: Global Perspectives* (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 5.

identity. The paper will address the following questions: Who is Tolo TV and what are its motivations in producing *Afghan Star*? To what extent does *Afghan Star* facilitate a discussion of Afghan national identity and unity? And how do the show's participants engage in this discourse? Overall, although commercial interests inherently underscore *Afghan Star*, its semi-democratic processes and convincing characters facilitate a new public to discuss Afghan national identity.

A crucial element of this study involved watching *Afghan Star* and transcribing the raps of Season Twelve winner Sayed Jamal Mubarez. The lyrics to Mubarez's raps were not available in online or print sources. Thus, I conducted translations in conjunction with doctoral student Munazza Ebtikar of the Department of Oriental Studies (Anthropology) at the University of Oxford through listening and transcription. Ebtikar assisted to identify translation inconsistencies and in distinguishing colloquialisms, idioms, and the Hazaragi dialect which were essential to produce as accurate translations as possible. All transliterations follow the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* transliteration guide unless the source provided a transliteration.

Additionally, this paper will use the term "Dari" instead of "Persian/Farsi" when referring to the lingua franca of Afghanistan because it is recognised as such in Afghanistan's constitution. There is debate about how dominant ethnic groups may utilise the term Dari as a way to distance the Afghan people from cultural and historical ties to the Persian-speaking world, namely Iran and Tajikistan. However, this paper will use Dari to refer to the language spoken in Afghanistan and Farsi when referring to those who speak the Persian/Farsi language at large. The way in which certain groups utilise language as a means to establish an Afghan identity will be explored later the paper.

This paper will begin with a historical overview of how media has been used since the late nineteenth century to create a cohesive Afghan national identity and the challenges media faces in convincing ethnic groups, minorities, and politicians to endorse said unity. Then, the paper will discuss Tolo's motivations for producing *Afghan Star*, focusing on how it uses national unity as a pathway to enter into democratic discussion about what it means to be Afghan in the twenty-first century. Finally, the paper will examine how participants in *Afghan Star* Season Twelve become immersed as characters in Tolo's democratic forum, namely how it normalises women's participation in this discussion. Throughout the programme participants represent the ideal for Tolo's vision of a future Afghanistan, but how to achieve a true sense of national unity.

Media in Afghanistan: A Historical Overview
Afghanistan's varied geography reflects its diverse demography. The Hindu Kush Mountains run from the northeast corner of the country to the southwest, dividing the country into northern plains and a southern wasteland known as the Sistan Basin, one of the driest regions in the world. It has been home to Greeks, Mauryas, Mongols, and Persians, and more recently the British, Soviet Union, and United States. Largely an agrarian society, more than fifty ethnic groups who speak over forty languages comprise

Afghanistan.[3] The largest ethnic groups are Pashtuns (forty-two percent), Tajiks (twenty-seven percent), and Hazara and Uzbek (nine percent each).[4] Weaving the many ethnic threats into a single overarching carpet of "Afghanness" is one of the largest challenges Afghanistan faces.

Afghanistan's leaders have struggled to consolidate these groups since the nation's political inception in 1747. In fact, the term "Afghan" traditionally refers to one of five Pashtun tribes living around the valley of Peshawar resulting in Afghanistan's literal translation to mean "land of the Pashtuns." This terminology is problematic for minority ethnic groups as it prioritises the Pashtun people and imposes a national identity based on this single tradition on other groups. Mohammad Rawan argues that the disjointed development of media since the late nineteenth century in Afghanistan shows the lack of a uniform identity that ultimately hinders the development of Afghan society.[5] As leaders attempted to redefine "Afghan" to include all those who reside within the Afghan state as a mode to push Afghanistan into the modern era, more tensions arose between ethnic groups vying for power. The historical context of what it means to be "Afghan" creates difficulties between different ethnic groups, especially Tajiks and Hazaras – among others – who feel that Pashtuns discriminate against them. This is one of many tensions that make forming an Afghan national identity difficult; it is a narrative the media has intertwined itself with since Afghanistan's first newspaper.

As early as the end of the nineteenth century, Afghanistan's media sector was already developing. One of the first major newspapers in circulation, Mahmud Tarzi's Seraj-al-Akhbar, advocated for total independence from the British and provided the first justification for the modernisation of Afghanistan. Seraj-al-Akhbar attempted to link modernisation, patriotism, and Islam together as indivisible and intrinsic elements of Afghan society; it promoted national unity and solidarity in light of a politically stagnant and isolated state.[6] One of the main goals of the paper was to educate Afghans through transforming the traditional and outdated system. Tarzi attempted to spread the idea of a national consciousness intended to unite Afghanistan's people. Only through unity would Afghanistan be capable of overcoming its political isolation. In 1953, Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud Khan took politicised media further by actively using journalism to reflect his policies. Under Daoud's administration various ministries, state institutions, and educational agencies disseminated thirty-one new journals.[7] While Afghan media maintained – and continues to maintain – its role in educating the population, those in power slowly began to exploit it for the sole purpose of keeping that power."[8]

[3] Nigel Allan, "Defining Place and People in Afghanistan," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 42, no. 8 (December 1, 2001): 545.

[4] Timothy Olson, "'Only the Name Is New': Identity, Modernity, and Continuity in '*Afghan Star*'" (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2017): 16, http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1453&context=masters>.

[5] Shir Mohammed Rawan, "Modern Mass Media and Traditional Communication in Afghanistan," Taylor and Francis Group (2002), 158.

[6] Rawan, "Modern Mass Media," 157.

[7] Rawan, "Modern Mass Media," 159.

[8] Rawan, "Modern Mass Media," 155.

As radio became more widespread, the government redefined its official purposes fourfold: spreading the message of the Quran, contributing to public education, perpetuating the treasures of Afghan folklore, and reflecting the national spirit.[9] However, musicians – not politicians – benefited the most from media usage in Afghanistan's larger cities. Ustads (musical masters), with the addition of radio and later cassette tapes, helped popular music develop and spread. They brought together Dari texts, Pashtun musical style, and Hindustani theory and terminology, creating music unique to Afghanistan that transcended culturally distinct communities.[10] Music provided entertainment, but also an avenue through which Afghans could begin to perceive nationhood, or at least what it meant to be an Afghan in the broadest sense of the word.

However, it is arguable when Afghanistan first achieved "nationhood." According to Benedict Anderson, a nation is "an imagined political community, and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." [11] Therefore, from to a lack of an "imagined political community" in Afghanistan due to a limited intellectual class, ethnic diversity, and colonial suppression, Afghanistan struggled to define its nationhood at least until Prime Minister Daoud. Raghav Sharma argues that as the nationalising state began to define ethnic differences, it also denied the idea of nationhood to minorities which protracted social conflict and making the country vulnerable to external invasion – alongside weak political leaders and limited government reach.[12] Arguably, the strongest sense of Afghan nationhood existed in the war against the Soviets (1979-1989), when multiple ethnic groups aligned against the common threat of foreign invasion. Unfortunately, this unity deteriorated in the years following victory over the Soviets. As one group came to power and attempted to monopolise the state they denied rights to other groups. The Afghan Civil War (1989-1996) cemented tribal politics, factionalism, and weakness of state institutions in Afghan society. The current Afghan government remains unable to overcome these tribal politics and factionalism. These institutionalised divisions are one of the largest hurdles facing those today who advocate for a united Afghanistan.

Nation-building is contingent on the extent to which the state is successful in an ideological and culturally homogenising project – in other words, the state's ability to inspire nationalism. The complex relationship between the state, external actors, and national minorities exacerbated differences and made it difficult to form a cohesive Afghan nation. However, despite the challenges that Afghanistan faces to build a nation as defined by Anderson, Afghans do cultivate a strong sense of national pride – national unity encompasses a mosaic of groups, ethnicities, and languages – that identify as "Afghan" under a single umbrella. If nationalism consists of demarcating territory and the standardisation of everything within it, then national unity seeks to embrace diversity within those lines instead of rejecting those who do not meet the standard. Private commercial networks and state-run media have had the wherewithal to produce and

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[9] John Baily, "The Role of Music in the Creation of an Afghan National Identity, 1923-73," in Martin Stokes, ed., *Ethnicity, Identity and Music: The Musical Construction of Place* (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1994), 46.

[10] Baily, "The Role of Music," 51.

[11] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised ed. (London, UK: Verso, 2006), 6.

[12] Raghav Sharma, *Nation, Ethnicity and the Conflict in Afghanistan* (London, UK: Routledge, 2016), 47.

implement their own versions of what it means to be part of the nation that is Afghanistan. Not so different than the media before it, Tolo TV attempts to define a cohesive Afghan identity through programmes such as *Afghan Star*. Although Afghanistan's diversity has contributed to a history of embedded tribalism and factionalism, media has also been a tool through which groups promote and justify their power. Since Afghanistan's political inception intellectuals and politicians have struggled to define what it means to be "Afghan." This notion of nationhood has undergone iterations that include and exclude ethnic groups, and which remains debated today. The paper will now examine how Tolo TV participates in this discourse; although Tolo does tap into this pre-existing notion of nationhood to promote its programmes such as *Afghan Star*, throughout this process it also establishes a public domain that normalises discussion of Afghanistan's nationhood.

Tolo TV and Afghanistan's first media tycoon

Afghan Star was conceptualised on the television network Tolo, meaning "dawn" in Dari. Moby Media Group, Tolo's parent organisation, seeks to launch and build media businesses in high-growth and emerging markets, such as Afghanistan.[13] After the fall of the Taliban in 2001 Saad Mohseni and his siblings Zaid, Jahid, and Wajma Mohseni returned to Afghanistan after growing up in Melbourne, Australia for most of their lives. Saad had made a career in banking, commodities and equity capital markets, and established Moby Media Group shortly after his return. The company obtained a broadcast license in 2002, which allowed the Mohsenis to establish the radio station Arman FM.[14] Mohseni is now the chairman and chief executive of Moby Group, a private media company that owns Tolo TV, Tolonews, Lemar TV, and additional channels across Central and Southeast Asia. Moby Group also acts as an advertising and consulting agency and owns several restaurants.

Moby Group faced many challenges since Arman FM's inception. Although radio and television networks were established in 1928, decades of war left this infrastructure in shambles.[15] In order to help restore basic radio infrastructure the Mohseni family invested $300,000 USD and received a $280,000 USD grant from USAID. This grant was part of USAID's initiative to support independent media as a means to unite Afghanistan, and is a fraction of the $166 million USAID and the US State Department have used to support Afghan media development.[16] In 2003, Moby Group launched Arman FM, which began broadcasting twelve hours a day. One of the first radio hosts Mohseni hired was Massoud Sanjer, now *Afghan Star*'s producer. Sanjer had hosted Radio Shari'a under the Taliban and was a well-known presenter across the nation. After Arman FM's launch,

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[13] "Welcome to MOBY Group | MOBY Group," accessed 5 April 2018, http://www.mobygroup.com/>.

[14] Graham Bowley, "An Afghan Media Mogul, Pushing Boundaries," *New York Times*, 27 July 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/business/an-afghan-media-mogul-pushing-boundaries.html>.

[15] In 1928, Afghanistan had its first successful radio broadcast. By 1940, they could broadcast Radio Kabul all over Afghanistan, and by 1966 programming times increased from six hours to sixteen hours. By 1990, Radio Afghanistan was the only state-owned station in the country, broadcasting more than fifty programming hours and reaching five million listeners. Rawan, "Modern Mass Media," 161.

[16] Ken Auletta, "Afghanistan's First Media Mogul," *New Yorker*, 28 June 2010, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/07/05/the-networker-2.

it was natural for Moby Group to shift attentions to television proliferation. The group invested nearly three and a half million US dollars, in addition to a two million dollar USAID grant to create the most popular channel in Afghanistan – Tolo.

Due to improved infrastructure and media projects, Tolo is available to seventy-five percent (six million) of Afghans with a television, and attracts 49.8 percent of television viewership.[17] Comparatively, the national service Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA) attracts only 2.9 percent of viewers. The next closest television competitor is Khurshid, who captures 8.5 percent of the audience share and is known for its entertainment programmes and soap operas.[18] The BBC identifies at least five major types of media in Afghanistan: mainstream commercial media; externally funded local FM radio; ethnic, religious, and political media; Taliban media; and government controlled media.[19] Tolo is a commercial media outlet with an expansive reach beyond the government controlled RTA network. These various TV channels compete for a slice of Afghanistan's audience in an attempt to promulgate their own message and views. With the largest stake in Afghanistan's television audience and as the most successful network, Tolo has the resources and opportunity to be a major player in transforming society. What, then, does Tolo have to gain from its network dominance?

Although Tolo also runs a news network Tolo News, its most popular programmes are Tolo TV's entertainment shows. Over its fourteen seasons since 2003, *Afghan Star* has become more professional, aesthetically pleasing, and competitive. Similar to Al-Jazeera's influential coverage of the 2011 uprisings in the Arab world, Tolo has used reality television programmes like *Afghan Star* to leverage its ascendancy as Afghanistan's most influential media. The programme is open to Afghans of all ages and ethnicities, and it brings Afghanistan's diversity onto a single stage. All parties can sit at the table to engage in democratic discussion about topics to include, but not limited to, Afghan national identity.

In his essay Reality TV and Multiple Arab Identities (2010), Marwan Kraidy illustrates how reality television in the Middle East does indeed stir contention in public life. He argues that reality TV provides an alternative interpretation of modernity to that which traditional approaches suggest. In his discussion of the Lebanese series Superstar, similar in format to *Afghan Star*, Kraidy argues that the show brings simmering social and political tensions to the surface, forcing participants and audiences to ask "How can [one] be Arab and modern at the same time without one of these identities usurping the other?"[20] Media, politicians, and civil society each attempt to answer this question by defining their own visions of what it means to be "Arab and modern." Kraidy argues that reality television serves as a "hybrid-text" in the sense that it mixes the traditional

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[17] Holly Robinson, et al., "Afghan Media in 2014: Understanding the Audience" (Altai Consulting, February 2015): 7, http://www.altaiconsulting.com/insights/afghan-media/>.

[18] Robinson, et al., "Afghan Media in 2014."

[19] David Page and Shirazuddin Siddiqi, "BBC – Policy Briefing: The Media of Afghanistan – The Challenges of Transition – Media Action" BBC (2012): 6, http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/publications-and-resources/policy/briefings/asia/afghanistan/policy-afghanistan>.

[20] Marwan Kraidy, *Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public Life, Communication, Society, and Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 193.

and the modern.[21] Kraidy does not reduce television to a debate between this binary, but argues that television is a platform to address issues along every part of the spectrum. Each television network attempts and competes to legitimise their modernity; and they accomplish this by appealing to some groups over others, which amplifies the resonance of some political agendas while blunting others.[22] In Afghanistan, this competition is evident in Tolo's success at the detriment of the national network. RTA has consistently used religion to legitimise itself and mobilise the population, whereas Tolo, and other private networks, appeal to social issues and national identity. David Page and Shirazuddin Sidiqi criticise RTA for its poor coordination, short-term goals, and heavy focus on advancing the agendas of its donors – distorting the media market and creating dependency on donor support.[23]

Central to Tolo's programming is its focus on national unity, an ideal permeating the vision of modernity it competes to establish in Afghanistan. Whether through challenging the government, promoting women's involvement in society, or supporting the Afghan national army, Tolo seeks to breakdown ethnic divisions and transcend traditional-modern boundaries in favour of an Afghanistan where people identify as "Afghan" first and their ethnic group second. Saad Mohseni says that the Afghan people, not international geopolitical actors – namely the United States – shoulder the responsibility to enact this unity and define Afghanistan's future.[24] National unity is thus the bedrock of Tolo's foundation.

In the context of Kraidy's argument, Tolo instrumentalises "national unity" as a means to encourage social change. Mohseni claimed that he chose to invest in Afghanistan's media sector because "you can really influence people, particularly younger people."[25] His colleagues asserted that he played a crucial role in forging the identity of a generation of young Afghans who stand as a bulwark against the country's collapse.[26] Tolo's social influence is evident not only in its popularity, but in the fierce criticism it receives. The former Minister of Information and Culture – Abdul Karim Khurram- accused Mohseni of broadcasting programmes that disgraced Afghan culture, citing depictions of women with multiple partners and dressed in revealing clothing. He claimed that Tolo is "serving America's interests."[27] In October 2017, religious clerics and their followers protested against *Afghan Star* when it came to Herat for auditions. They carried banners which lambasted the show as "satanic" while asserting it had no place in Herat's ancient history and traditions.[28]

[21] Marwan Kraidy, "Reality TV and Multiple Arab Modernities: A Theoretical Exploration," *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication* 1, no. 1 (2008): 51, https://doi.org/10.1163/187398608X317414>.

[22] Kraidy, *Reality Television and Arab Politics*, 199.

[23] Page and Siddiqi, "BBC – Policy Briefing: The Media of Afghanistan," 3.

[24] John Dempsey and Saad Mohseni, "The Afghan Surge Trump Needs," *Politico*, 17 May 2017, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/05/17/afghan-surge-trump-215146>.

[25] Auletta, "Afghanistan's First Media Mogul."

[26] Bowley, "An Afghan Media Mogul, Pushing Boundaries."

[27] Auletta, "Afghanistan's First Media Mogul."

[28] Sahrab Serat, "موسیقی تهدید است یا انفجار؟؛ واکنش‌ها به اعتراض روحانیان هرات به 'ستاره افغان' [Is Music a Threat or Explosion? Reactions to the Protest of Clerics of Herat against '*Afghan Star*']," BBC Persian, 22 October 2017, http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan-41713348.>

Ironically, these demonstrations utilised their freedom of expression to criticise musicians on *Afghan Star* for freely expressing themselves. *Afghan Star* has spurred vocal opposition into action, suggesting that a societal transformation threatening these clerics' authority is occurring. In fact, many Afghans criticised the march. Facebook and Twitter users questioned why the protesters marched against music and singing which make people happy, but not against continued terrorist attacks carried out by religious extremists. One user wrote, "Extreme mullahs in Herat are not minding the killing of people in the name of religion, they are trying to prevent the holding of the celebration of *Afghan Star* in Herat. Islam is in danger."[29] This heated debate underscores the importance of *Afghan Star* for Afghan society: the programme generates a democratic forum where Afghans debate what it means to be living in modern Afghanistan. Various forms of social media, in conjunction with *Afghan Star*, ignite this discussion and advance the programme's ability to empower Afghans to take part in this developing discourse.

Tolo's financial background and political affiliations add another layer through which to consider the authenticity of the modernity it promotes. Presently, Moby Group's revenue is estimated at over sixty-million US dollars per year and is projected to increase fifty to seventy percent in the subsequent years, allowing it to fund networks such as Tolo and embark on other projects across the region.[30] Although Tolo is not the main producer of Moby's revenue, it does contribute through local advertisers who pay about five hundred US dollars for a thirty second advertisement slot. In a country where the average annual national income per capita is four-hundred and ten US dollars, those who can afford the power to advertise wield considerable power. The Mohseni family has invested over ten million US dollars, with an addition of $2.2 million USD from USAID. This assistance to Tolo suggests that the network must answer in some respect to its foreign donors. Just as the image of the blue burqa – central to justifying international presence in Afghanistan – did not go unnoticed by Afghans,[31] Afghans are hyper aware of international funding and motivations that drive Tolo's agenda.

Havana Marking's documentary *Afghan Star* depicts how women challenge social norms by singing on stage, but also struggle to find a culturally legitimate voice. [32] While western advocates for women's rights may praise Tolo as the saviour of female singers in Afghanistan, the status of Afghan women is more closely linked to the historical state of war Afghanistan has experienced for decades. Tolo is an indigenous network, not a foreign import. Thus, Tolo is more a continuation of historical Afghan media practices – educating the population, and then promoting a particular modernity to it – in the way it encourages Afghans to ask difficult questions about Afghan national identity, rather than an international pawn.

Since 2003, Tolo has become self-sustainable – one of the few commercial networks in the country to be considered as such. While Western influence is no doubt present,

[29] Serat, "Is Music a Threat or Explosion?"
[30] Auletta, "Afghanistan's First Media Mogul."
[31] Lina S. Khodor, "Liberation at Gunpoint: Deconstructing Politicized Representations of Afghan Women," (n.d.): 46.
[32] Julie Billaud, *Kabul Carnival: Gender Politics in Postwar Afghanistan, Ethnography of Political Violence* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

Tolo is more subject to its audience's satisfaction and the success of its programmes to generate profit. Programmes like *Afghan Star* – that adopt a political posture – suggest that Tolo engages in what Zala Volcic calls "commercial nationalism," or the promotion of nationalism to attract viewers, improve popularity, and obtain more advertising contracts in order to increase its yearly revenue.[33] Tolo's relative financial stability gives it "a license" to make bold political statements, even within Afghanistan's tense and chaotic political climate.

However, one cannot reduce reality television to a binary between the traditional and modern. The discussion must also include the social and political environment in which the programme and its network operate. While Afghans consider Tolo a strong modern outlet that provides trustworthy news, alongside platforms for open discussion, the network has also invited political criticism.[34] These criticisms commonly centre around the portrayal of ethnic tensions between the historically political dominant Pashtuns and the less prominent Tajiks, the latter of which the Mohsenis are thought to identify with. Powerful politicians and warlords manipulate ethnic tensions and accuse Tolo of biased reporting. Former Attorney General Abdul Jabar Sabet had Tolo's offices raided and staff members arrested while then-incumbent president Hamid Karzai refused to appear on Tolo's presidential debate in 2014.[35] Saad Mohseni himself, who says he no longer believes government can be an effective tool for change, is often the reason for his network's strained relationship with the government. At times this tension incites Mohseni to deliberately attack old ethnic alliances that dominate Afghanistan's political sphere, or challenge the conservative ruling elite. Mohseni argues, "If [a] show brings a smile to millions of Afghan faces on a nightly basis, what right does the government have to take away those moments of joy from people?"[36]

In *Afghan Star* Season Twelve Episode Twenty-Eight, judge Aryana Sayeed and participant Sayed Jamal Mubarez performed a duet and broke into a side-stepping dance. However, the producers cut the performance in the broadcast that evening. Instead, they posted the full episode on YouTube, which now has over five million views. First, considering the ongoing threats Tolo and its employees face politically and from terrorist attacks – most recently two Tolo journalists were killed in a targeted suicide attack September 2018[37] – this episode is one example of Tolo's perseverance, providing the network with the credibility necessary to compete in Afghanistan's tense political atmosphere.

Second, it highlights the media's need to self-censor in order to become a legitimate player for the audience's attention. Afghanistan's Media Law of 2009 promotes a "free independent and pluralistic mass media" and "protection of rights of journalists," which in theory should prevent such self-censorship. However, the law caveats that this freedom is relevant only when broadcasts do not include content that is defamatory or

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[33] Zala Volcic and Mark Andrejevic, "Commercial Nationalism on Balkan Reality Television," *The Politics of Reality Television,* Marwan M. Kraidy and Katherine Sender, eds. (London: New York: Routledge, 2011), 115.

[34] Robinson, et al., "Afghan Media in 2014," 8.

[35] Auletta, "Afghanistan's First Media Mogul."

[36] Auletta, "Afghanistan's First Media Mogul."

[37] Tamim Hamid, "TOLOnews Loses Two Of Its Journalists," TOLOnews, 5 September 2018, /afghanistan/tolonews-loses-two-its-journalists>.

contrary to Islam.[38]

However, some Afghans and international journalists dismiss Tolo as "pure entertainment," rather than a political, democratic experiment. They point to Tolo's blending of local and western wardrobes into chic outfits, the integration of Afghan and Western instrumentation, and the ability to vote via text to discredit Tolo's status.[39] Ultimately, these critics argue that Tolo's entertainment value is not worth the conflict with extremists who characterise music as vulgar and oppress women's rights.[40] However, this overlooks the way entertainment provides an escape from continuous fighting and hardship – an escape that also opens space for public discussion. If its ultimate motivation is to establish national unity, it does so through an appeal to the pathos. Mohseni affirms: "We enable people to escape. They go somewhere else. Their lives become less, I don't know – people underestimate the importance of entertainment."[41] Media provides new hope and images; it permits respite from intractable problems and allows people to escape their misery.[42] Whether that be through pure entertainment or through open discussion, Tolo and *Afghan Star* delegate the ability to define Afghan national unity to the Afghan people themselves.

The context in which Afghans formulate and debate national identity and unity is shaped by the social, economic, and political realities in which Afghans live – its poverty and inequalities, job scarcity and international aid dependency, and ineffective government. This section has attempted to show how *Afghan Star* navigates this complex environment in conjunction with its network's social, political, and economic motivations. As it competes to secure its own interpretation of Afghan modernity, it must continually reevaluate its position in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, Tolo remains Afghanistan's main media outlet that includes indigenous, social, and economic issues by compiling them into a single united Afghan identity.

Afghanistan: A Nation United?

Afghan Star is not the first instance in which music has been used in Afghanistan to support a nationalist movement. John Baily explores how music was central to the creation of an Afghan national identity, asserting that although the Afghan government wanted to establish a national identity, they had no idea how to achieve it. Instead, radio and music made national identity possible under monarchical rule (1929-1973) even if not state-directed.[43] The fall of the Taliban marked the end of a period of musical depression and the regeneration of musical development and expression. Moby Group acts as one of many media patrons in this revival.

Afghan Star's website states, "the show exceeds all ethnical [sic], language and

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[38] Page and Siddiqi, "BBC - Policy Briefing: The Media of Afghanistan," 23.

[39] Mujib Mashal, "A Rapping Barber, a Defiant Teenager and a Release for War-Weary Afghans," *New York Times*, 6 March 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/world/asia/afghan-star-kabul-afghanistan.html>.

[40] Mashal, "A Rapping Barber."

[41] Bowley, "An Afghan Media Mogul, Pushing Boundaries."

[42] Auletta, "Afghanistan's First Media Mogul."

[43] Baily, "The Role of Music," 56.

gender barriers, and has been a catalyst for social and cultural change in Afghanistan since its inception. *Afghan Star* brings together the entire nation through music!" Massoud Sanjer believes that *Afghan Star* has broken down ethnic and gender divisions in Afghanistan. He views the way male and female participants share the stage and the ethnic variety of past winners as evidence of national unity.[44] Daoud Sediqi, former director and presenter of *Afghan Star*, said that the show allowed him to create a better culture and "move people from the gun to the music."[45] In his study of *Afghan Star*, Timothy Olson recorded participants' reactions to *Afghan Star*. Participants affirmed that *Afghan Star* "brings people together," "It's a place where men and women of all ethnicities stand together as equals," "It symbolised the freedom Afghans desire," and "It helps to combat racism and sexism."[46] *Afghan Star* provides a platform to discuss poignant topics such as sectarianism, gender equality, and freedom. It allows Afghans to engage in a shared, common experience, one which concentrates on the idea of a unified nation and creating that ideal.

The song "Hambastegī" or "Solidarity"[47] originally aired in 2018 in the finale of *Afghan Star* Season Twelve, epitomises the way Tolo utilises nationalism to attract viewers, and defines itself as the courier for Afghan national unity. The song features multiple languages and ethnicities, including Sikhs and Hindus – with populations numbering two to three thousand in Afghanistan – making them the smallest ethnic groups in the country.[48] In the television performance each ethnicity sang in its own language accompanied by Dari subtitles. As follows:

"Guria
Our flag is black, red, and green.

Baluchi
The country is our paradise and dignity,
Our god, our religion, and our land are one in the same.

Sikh and Hindu
This life is ours,
And our shadow is on our side.

Turkmen
Come let us become united until our flag always flies high,
Day and night we try to make the country flourish.

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[44] Olson, "Only the Name Is New," 97.
[45] Marking, *Afghan Star* (Full Documentary) Real Stories, 31:52.
[46] Olson, "Only the Name Is New," 66.
[47] AfghanstarToloTV, Unity Song – *Afghan Star* S12 – Grand Finale, Online (Kabul, Afghanistan: 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=re4wlNwjnQM>.
[48] "Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Hindus and Sikhs," Home Office UK (February 2017), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/590778/AFG_-_Sikhs_and_Hindus_-_CPIN_-_v3_1__February_2017_.pdf>.

Uzbek
Our flag is our soul
Like the blood in our veins,
The fluttering of this flag in the sky is our glory and happiness.

Shighnan
We love our homeland more than life,
We are kind in solidarity.

Nuristani
We are Nuristani girls,
It is expected of us that we show patient feelings,
We praise the occurrence of unity and equality.

Pashayi
We are a country with one voice,
We are united!"[49]

As each ethnic group sang their verse in their language, the producers depicted images of smiling Afghans from multiple provinces. This advanced the metaphorical image of a united Afghanistan of which the lyrics speak. The use of ethnic languages such as Sikh accompanied with subtitles in the national language, exposed viewers to Afghanistan's diversity while maintaining effective communication. Tolo also produced an accompanying music video panning Afghanistan's dramatic mountains, lush and green lands, harsh desert, and the Afghan flag fluttering in the wind.[50] The audience waved the flag in the television performance, reaffirming the idea that, with Afghan unity, "our flag" will stand tall. Although Afghan music has survived decades of war, it cannot veil the reality of past conflict and ongoing poverty. High unemployment and insecurity conflicts with the ideal of national unity because it highlights the social and economic inequality that underscores Afghanistan politics. Ten percent of the wealthiest Afghans control the country's economy and politics while the majority of the population cannot meet basic needs.[51] Although national unity at times seems far removed from Afghanistan's reality of war and poverty, Tolo is still able to mobilises ethnic and national unity to attract audiences. It appeals to sentiments that are sadly absent from the political sphere.[52]

The network's facilitation of nationalism and national unity also occurs outside the show's airtime. Before the final round of Season Twelve, Tolo News featured an article in Dari entitled, "Culture Activists Consider the Role of *Afghan Star* in National Unity."

[49] AfghanstarToloTV, Unity Song – *Afghan Star* S12 – Grand Finale.

[50] AfghanstarToloTV, Unity Song New Clip, Online (Kabul, Afghanistan: 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z1Yx-DnwSDE>.

[51] Obaidullah Burhani, "Afghanistan's Economic Problems and Insidious Development Constraints," *Foreign Policy Journal*, accessed 6 May 2019, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2018/10/25/afghanistans-economic-problems-and-insidious-development-constraints/>.

[52] Volcic and Andrejevic, "Commercial Nationalism on Balkan Reality Television," 125.

The article states that "the twelfth season of *Afghan Star* has been considered the most interesting *Afghan Star* programme. It has been said that this programme was effective in creating national unity between ethnic groups."[53] Zuzanna Olszewska's study of young Afghan poets in Iran found that many poets focused on national unity and did not divide their patriotism into ethnicity.[54] Such patriotism among the refugee community suggests that Afghans recognise unity as a mainstay in constructing a broader national identity. As the conversation about what it means to be "modern" and "Afghan" evolves in the Afghan diaspora, *Afghan Star* has cast its net of influence wider to include those communities via video auditions. Season Twelve's top twelve contestants included one contestant residing in Denmark and another whose family had migrated to Iran. As Afghans continue to flee their homeland, the importance of establishing a sense of national unity and identity increases. *Afghan Star* is one medium through which this conversation can occur.

In conclusion, this section has argued that *Afghan Star* indeed facilitates and ostensibly promotes national discussion about national identity. Its openness to all ethnicities and ages directly correlates to the modernity it envisions, and offers Afghans a place to not only express their artistic selves, but tell their story in the context of a national story.

Performing on *Afghan Star*

Afghan Star's success and the music it produces would be less influential without its charismatic characters. If Tolo as a national network must maneuver social, political, and economic hurdles, then the participants in its programmes are not exempt. Throughout *Afghan Star*, participants actively perform on the physical and metaphorical stage that Tolo provides to encourage discourse on national identity. This relationship between reality TV, the participants, and its audience was most apparent throughout Season Twelve of *Afghan Star*, particularly in the raps of winner Sayed Jamal Mubarez and runner up Zulala Hashemi.

Afghan Star's women

From a social perspective, *Afghan Star* has most notably normalised women's participation in society. It permits women to compete as equals and on the basis of talent with men. This is a notable development even within the history of *Afghan Star* itself. In the third season of *Afghan Star*, participant Setara Hussainzada was unable to return to her home in Herat after her elimination from the show. In her final performance, Setara allowed her headscarf to fall to her shoulders and danced around stage, swinging her hips and

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[53] TOLOnews, " فرهنگیان نقش ستارۀ افغان را در وحدت ملی اثرگذار میدانند [Cultural Activists Consider the Role of *Afghan Star* in National Unity]," 23 March 2017, https://www.tolonews.com/fa/afghanistan/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%87 D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B4-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8 B1%DB%80-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1- %D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AB%D8%B1%DA%A F%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%86%D8%AF>.

[54] Zuzanna Olszewska, "'A Desolate Voice': Poetry and Identity among Young Afghan Refugees in Iran," *Iranian Studies* 40, no. 2 (1 April 2007): 213, https://doi.org/10.1080/00210860701269550>.

moving her shoulders. Although she received death threats and could not return to her Herati residence, she defended her actions. In Season Twelve, nine years after Setara's provocative dance, Zulala Hashemi became the first woman to reach the final round of *Afghan Star*. In starkly different ways, Setara and Zulala became national symbols – Setara politicised to defend traditional female roles, while Zulala became a symbol of the marriage between old and new. Politicians, extremist groups, and advocates engage in a tense discussion in which Afghan women were posited as contentious symbol of nationhood – where women's honor was equated to the nation's honor.[55]

As the first woman to reach the finals Zulala Hashemi became an instant sensation among international aid agencies. However, the audience learns little about Zulala herself. Ethnically Pashtun and born and raised in Jalalabad, 150 kilometers east of Kabul, Zulala sings traditional Pashtun folk songs and symbolises more conservative and traditionalist views. Her mother encouraged her to audition for *Afghan Star*, before which she had never sung in public. Therefore, her courage to participate in such a popular and visible arena resonates with advocates for Afghan women's rights as well as Tolo's progressive attitude. Throughout the show Zulala maintains this shy and deferent persona. But at what price? In many ways, Tolo has utilised Zulala's character to promote its agenda in support of women's rights, but at the expense of Zulala's ability to express her own personality and views. While there is no evidence that Zulala was forced to represent Tolo's agenda, as with Mubarez, it is reasonable that Tolo recognised the potential of her character as an avenue through which to communicate their broader views.

Nonetheless, Zulala's success is an indicator for social change. Judge Aryana Sayeed, a popular London-based singer known for her outspoken support of Afghan women, said, "For the first time people voted for a girl – and one who comes from a very conservative province."[56] The judges praised Zulala for her polite and modest character. Her modesty and respect made her singing less provocative to conservative audiences. Her Pashtun heritage and proper display of female humility balanced the potentially offensive reality of a woman singing in public.

Season Twelve's seventh place winner, Shaqayeq Roya, was the antithesis to Zulala. Born of an Iranian mother and Afghan father, Shaqayeq grew up in Iran. She wears modern, sometimes tight-fitting clothes and uses hats and berets to cover her head often, revealing most of her hair. On stage, she is very animated and even argues with the judges and other contestants. However, it is likely that her Iranian background and immodesty contributed to the audience voting her off the show. Francois Jost argues that audiences favour participants more closely related to themselves and often favour race, ethnicity, and social background above talent. Upon her dismissal, Shaqayeq said she hoped people voted for talent and did not consider her Iranian accent.[57] Shaqayeq's concern illuminates

[55] Wazhmah Osman, "Thinking Outside the Box: Television and the Afghan Culture Wars" (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2013): 129, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1316578572/?pq-origsite=primo>.

[56] AFP, "*Afghan Star*: Rap, Stilettos and a Musical Revolution," *Mail Online*, 18 March 2017, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/~/article-4326100/index.html>.

[57] AfghanstarToloTV, "Top 7 Elimination – *Afghan Star* S12 Episode 19," Online (Kabul, Afghanistan: 26 January 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAJgm7djNYY&index=17&list=PLqsbla5KGclqzo-W-4d_JjXLnvtDT73st>.

the differences in how Afghans in Afghanistan and the diaspora conceptualise Afghan modernity. It is important that *Afghan Star*, while it does not completely reconcile these two interpretations of "Afghanness," opens up a public space where both sides can express their arguments.

Throughout Season Twelve, the judges favoured Zulala – arguably the more "Afghan" participant of the two women. Zulala did not forcibly challenge social boundaries – in stark contrast to Shaqayeq, who infamously gloated in the face of a losing participant. Why was Zulala, with a less developed voice, more popular than the talented Shaqayeq? Jost says, "The public prefers bad singers who represent their community to a good singer deprived of a strong link with those whom he represents."[58] The singer's personal identity becomes a carrier for the community's wider identity. Zulala had stronger ties to Afghanistan and represented not only traditional values but traditional and folk-style music. Therefore, Zulala's character embodied a true Afghan modernity more effectively than Shaqayeq's foreign character.

Participants also extend the democratic forum for discussing national identity outside the show's boundaries. Zulala said that she is prepared to face the challenges that female artists in Afghanistan face. Her mother says, "She will overcome [the] ethnic problems"[59] that Season Twelve winner Mubarez often refers to when he sings about Afghanistan's unity – whether that is through supporting the Afghan national security forces, criticising the government, or advocating for women's rights. In a trio with Zulala and Babak Mohammadi, he raps:

> "What do I see in that chair but a perfect girl?
> I don't know if she is Pashto, or really Hazara,
> Is she Uzbek or Tajik?
> She is the shape of everything
> O God, all are beautiful
> She is an Afghan girl.
> Who are all the people of every ethnicity?
> All of them are the best."[60]

These lyrics promote the idea that one's ethnicity does not determine beauty; instead beauty and national identity trump ethnic differences. During the performance, the girl in the chair, Zulala, represents the "shape of everything." This means everything in Afghanistan – from the diverse landscape, to religion, to ethnic variety – comes together to create this idea of being Afghan. Zulala physically represents this "Afghanness" and

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[58] Francios Jost, "When Reality TV Is a Job," in *Politics of Reality Television*, 41.

[59] TOLOnews, " راه یافتن دختر خانم و رپ خوان به دور نهایی ستاره افغان" [A Girl and Young Rapper Find a Way to the Final Round of *Afghan Star*]," 1 March 2017, /fa/arts-culture/%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%85-%D9%88-%D8%B1%D9%BE-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86>.

[60] AfghanstarToloTV, "Group Song – Dukhter Sardar," *Afghan Star* Season 12 Top 3 Elimination, Online (Kabul, Afghanistan: 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NXafc_960Hw>.

shows that it is possible to be the "Afghan" girl in the chair of her country's future.

It also transforms Zulala from a merely a female singer to a national symbol. A woman's character has often been invoked to establish cultural authenticity in the debate of what constitutes true Afghan identity. In this performance, Tolo uses Zulala to bolster their credibility and establish a competitive, authentic vision and literal image of Afghanistan. The idea that all ethnicities can unite under the single banner of "Afghan," while maintaining ethnic identity and traditions, is also a trend in Mubarez's later performances.. The YouTube video of the performance of "Dukhter Sardār" has more than 1.3 million views, one of the most popular videos of that season. Afghans are actively engaged in the discussion of what it means to be Afghan; Zulala, Shaqayeq, and other female participants have been central to normalising women's participation in the national identity conversation.

Rapping Afghanistan's Modernity

A self-trained rapper and men's barber from Mazar-e Sharif, Mubarez' raps integrate social gender issues, economics, and politics into *Afghan Star*'s simulated democratic sphere. His original lyrics – coupled with his modest background – transcend societal boundaries that historically have favoured some groups over others and excluded women. Therefore, Mubarez' raps merge *Afghan Star*'s democratic forum with traditionally taboo subjects to transform public perception.

The rap "Peer Mujarad" (Old Single Man) uses economic arguments to critique traditional marriage processes, and also invokes love to activate tension between patriarchal authority and youthful rebellion. In the traditional engagement practice, the suitor, or khāstegār, goes to the woman's house to ask the father for her hand. The khāstegār brings a bouquet of flowers to the sister and mother, while the bride-to-be provides tea, sweets, and fruit. The families discuss the potential marriage, ask questions of the potential betrothed, and negotiate each party's economic contribution. The whole process is called khāstegārī. In "Peer Mujarad," Mubarez reflects on his own experience with khāstegārī, and critiques these traditions based on Afghanistan's current economic state.

Mubarez constantly refers to the fact that a wife costs money and "nobody wants to give a girl to a poor person." He warns young khāstegārān to be wary of marriage because the cost will make them resent their wives; according to Mubarez, if all is spent on attaining a wife, what is left for life after the wedding? According to the "Survey of the Afghan People," 54.5 percent of Afghans expressed unemployment as a reason for leaving Afghanistan, and young people aged eighteen to thirty were more likely to express a desire to migrate than any other age group.[61] Young, single men were more likely to express this desire than married men. Mubarez's use of economic issues like Khāstegārī broadens the discussion which occurs on *Afghan Star*, and facilitates inclusion of economic consideration in national discussions about Afghan national identity. This becomes even more important as Afghanistan becomes more uncertain and less secure.

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[61] Mohammad Shoaib Haidary, et al., "Afghanistan in 2017: A Survey of the Afghan People," The Asia Foundation (2017): 171-173, https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2017_AfghanSurvey_report.pdf>.

Although Mubarez is only twenty-two, in the rap he worries about becoming old and that his poverty will prevent him from marrying. Recounting one khāstegārī, Mubarez raps,

"He [the girl's father] said, "You have come to propose, how much do you make?
You have come to propose, but where is your mother?
You cannot fulfill my daughter's discontent.
Get out of my house, may there be a curse on you!"[62]

Mubarez laments the fact that even if his is a good man, his income will determine if he stays single or not – and therefore if he will, in essence, become a man. These questions illustrate that families are most interested in finances because money equates to status, security, and the potential to leave poverty and the country. He asserts that he is a poor young man who "only earns 300 [Afghanis] a day, so where can he find 10,000 [Afghanis]?" Difficulty to secure a wife redefines traditional interpretations of what it means to be an "Afghan man."

Early on in the competition, Mubarez, composed "Inteqād Dowlāt" or "Critique of the Government." In the rap, he blames rich government officials for the country's poverty and unemployment; the government gives empty promises, does not care about security, and uses their position to only help themselves become richer instead of helping the poor. Rock and roll music accompanies the rap, which reflects the anger Mubarez expresses and highlights the way in which young artists increasingly utilise Western instrumentation to engage in political discussion. In his opening line, he asserts his anger and blames it on the government. Then he begins to list his grievances. He says,

"The poor are martyrs while the wealthy are generals,
People are in fear and dread,
The security situation is dire."[63]

This juxtaposition of "martyrs and generals" is indicative of the respect the wealthy deny the poor. Although "martyr" has stronger religious undertones than the word "mujahideen" – which refers to those who fought in the jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s – Mubarez's use of the general term "shaheed" is meant to encompass all Afghans whom decades of conflict affected. In this verse, Mubarez claims that those in positions of power sacrificed the friendship of countrymen deemed inferior in order to achieve their status – trust between Afghans has hence deteriorated. People live in fear and dread of the security situation, as Mubarez raps, and also fear that government and military leadership cannot defend them, or are themselves immobilised by fear.

Government corruption one of the largest contributing factors to the unemployment

[62] Sayed Jamal Mubarez, "Peer Mujarad," Online (Kabul, Afghanistan: 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tp241tKpssQ>.
[63] Sayed Jamal Mubarez, "Inteqad Dowlat," Online (Kabul, Afghanistan: 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VgswgNnQTvU>.

crisis in Afghanistan and resulting mass emigration.[64] Mubarez raps:

> "Those without work and who are desperate are fleeing from this country
> The number of unemployed youth in this country, I swear to God, it is a lot
> They [the government] promised that those who are educated will not stay unemployed
> That every young educated person will become an owner of a house
> But all the promises were destroyed
> The youth's contribution became blind and stiff […]"[65]

According to a recent survey, 27.9 percent of youth in Afghanistan are unemployed with 55.9 percent receiving only primary education or none at all.[66] Even educated youth struggle to find employment. Mubarez raps, "We kill because of unemployment" shedding light on the desperate situation. The unemployment rate has steadily increased since the withdrawal of NATO-led assistance forces in 2014.[67] His metaphor – that the potential of Afghanistan's youth has become "blind and stiff" - alludes to the government not caring about young people and thus removing their stake in society. He uses the word tābūt which not only means stiff, motionless or dead, but also a coffin or casket. This allusion to death and complete immobility creates an image of the youth being locked in a coffin: the government is burying them alive. However, by performing this intense, contempt-filled rap on a national stage – publically identifying the government as an enemy of the people – Mubarez normalises open critique of corruption and encourages action against it. By not using the word corruption, fesād in Dari, Mubarez can be more descriptive and appealing to his audience. If he can utilise a western medium to discuss central obstacles to Afghanistan's future, audience members are encouraged to overcome their inhibitions and engage in discussion.

Considering Tolo's history of political opposition, Inteqad-e Dowlat aligns with the network's critique of Afghanistan's convoluted and dynamic political system. The programme's voting method allows viewers to engage in a simulated democratic election. With presidential elections postponed for nearly three years and rife corruption, there are rare opportunities for Afghans to participate in a fair democratic process. Mubarez's critique reinforces the idea that Tolo is more responsible and democratic than the incumbent government. His claim metaphorically extends his stage to the audience and invites viewers to participate in the show's voting process, illustrating the possibility of a democratic modernity. However, one must be wary not to conflate Mubarez's motives with Tolo's. He chooses the topics of his raps based on what he sees every day in Afghanistan; he envisages that his raps will "open the pain and cries of the people," and

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[64] Burhani, "Afghanistan's Economic Problems."
[65] Mubarez, "Inteqad Dowlat."
[66] Christina Wieser, Ismail Rahimi, and Silvia Redaelli, "Afghanistan Poverty Status Update: Progress at Risk," The World Bank (14 February 2017): 21, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/667181493794491292/Afghanistan-poverty-status-update-progress-at-risk>.
[67] Wieser, Rahimi, and Redaelli, "Afghanistan Poverty Status," 23.

are not informed by what Tolo instructs him to rap.[68]

While Mubarez's beliefs often align with Tolo's messaging, he himself has had conflicts with the network which he expressed in an Instagram live video, now available on his Facebook page.[69] His rap, "Rabete-yeh Khob" is a metaphor for his deteriorating relationship between himself and Tolo.[70] Viewers who understand the true meaning behind this rap, which occurred halfway through the season, may question the authenticity of later raps that promote national unity. Although his final performance included lyrics about the power of unity, Mubarez reveals that he struggled to define himself as a rapper and poet after his relationship with Tolo began to fray.[71] While his announcement solidifies Mubarez's position as the people's rapper, it also confirms that Tolo is a commercial venture which depends on its participants to remain within a limited political sphere. If participants become too political, as Mubarez does, it threatens the delicate balance Tolo has perfected between its political, economic, and social goals and its opposition.

This section has argued that although Mubarez may reveal Tolo's commercial nature, his raps enable *Afghan Star* to engage with a wider variety of topics within its semi-democratic format. Participants are not immune from the complex political web that Tolo and Moby Group navigate, but they do have creative license to add their personal interpretations of Afghan national identity into this labyrinth.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to address questions concerning the reality television series *Afghan Star*. What is Tolo TV and what are its motivations in producing *Afghan Star*? To what extent does *Afghan Star* facilitate a discussion of Afghan national identity and unity? And how do the show's participants engage in this discourse? Tolo has successfully established itself as a bastion for national unity amidst a cluttered mediascape. Although social, political, and economic factors contribute to how Tolo formulates Afghan modernity, programmes such as *Afghan Star* provide a public forum in which Afghans can actively determine that modernity. *Afghan Star* has facilitated societal and cultural transformation in Afghanistan; it has challenged politicians and traditional values; and it has stirred contention in public life and offered a stage to express both grievances and delights. Overall, although commercial interests inherently underscore *Afghan Star*'s agenda, its semi-democratic processes and convincing characters facilitate a new public forum to discuss Afghan national identity.

Tolo has empowered and continues to empower a plethora of groups in Afghanistan: many men and women – both young and old, Tajiks, Hazaras, Pashtuns, and Uzbeks – believe it is possible to create a life that minimises violence and uncertainty. To use Kraidy's words, *Afghan Star* has "mobilised people, crystallised issues, and incessantly stressed the

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[68] Sayed Jamal Mubarez, personal correspondence, Facebook messenger, 17 February 2018.
[69] Sayed Jamal Mubarez, "Jamal Mubariz جمال مبارز [Home]," Online (Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan: 2018), https://www.facebook.com/sayed.jamal.mubariz/videos/1569701799817888/..
[70] Mubarez, "Jamal Mubariz."
[71] Mubarez, "Jamal Mubariz."

questions 'what constitutes reality' while simultaneously preempting the formation of consensus on that question."[72] As Afghanistan continues to define itself as a nation, *Afghan Star* will continue to shape that identity – to promote its young lions and lionesses to dare to define their country's future.

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[72] Kraidy, *Reality Television and Arab Politics,* 193.

Iran and the United States in Afghanistan: An International History, 1996-2002

Alexis Nicholson

As Iran and the United States each engage in negotiations with the Taliban in 2019, it is worth recalling a period not so long ago when the Iranian and American governments coordinated military and diplomatic policy on Afghanistan based on their common security interests in 2001. This paper explores Iranian and American engagement in Afghanistan from 1996, with the advent of the Taliban, to the unprecedented, albeit brief, period of Iran-US cooperation in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks. The primary source research brings together UN and US government documents along with interviews and memoirs offered by the participating American and Iranian diplomats, to analyze the domestic political environments of Iran and the US, as well as the broader international dimensions that enabled and motivated the two countries to work together.

The September 11 attacks opened an unprecedented window for a thaw in Iran-US relations. The tragic events propelled the governments in Tehran and Washington to temporarily set all other issues aside and coordinate policies based on their common security concerns in Afghanistan. Recognising the increased likelihood of a US military campaign against the Taliban, which provided protection to Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network, Iran offered its assistance to the US in overthrowing the Taliban and creating a post-Taliban political order in Afghanistan. Iran itself nearly went to war with the Taliban three years prior, following the 8 August 1998 Taliban siege of the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e Sharif, a city in northern Afghanistan. The September 11 attacks thus revealed a coincidence of interests between Iran and the US in Afghanistan: the desire to hold influence in a stable Afghanistan free of the Taliban and radical Islamist terrorism.

Tehran and Washington used the already functioning United Nations 6+2 group on Afghanistan as cover to launch a bilateral dialogue on seeking avenues of cooperation. The UN group meetings began four years prior in 1997 and narrowed to substantive, bilateral talks between Iran and the US with the objective of coordinating military policy against the Taliban following the September 11 attacks. While deliberations were limited by the respective governments in Tehran and Washington to focus exclusively on Afghanistan, the emergence of this Iran-US dialogue represented a remarkable period of Iran-US relations, when the foreign policy and security interests of the Islamic Republic and the US overlapped.

While the evolution of this unprecedented period of Iran-US cooperation will be the focus of this essay, it is important to note that common interests between Iran and the US in Afghanistan had existed long before the rise of the Taliban and threat of international terrorism. For example, both the US and the recently installed Iranian provisional revolutionary government made efforts to cultivate a dialogue on Afghanistan in 1979, even before the Soviet invasion. During the initial period following the revolutionary transfer of power in Iran, Mehdi Bazargan, Iran's new Prime Minister, was suspicious of

Soviet intentions toward Iran given the vulnerable state of the transitional government in Tehran, as well as the Soviet Union's heavy presence in Afghanistan, Iran's eastern neighbour. In the summer of 1979, Abbas Amir-Entezan, one of Bazargan's aides, reached out to US diplomats in Tehran to request intelligence on developments in Afghanistan and other activities relevant to Iranian national security.[1]

Declassified documents from US President Jimmy Carter's administration indicate that Washington responded positively to Bazargan's offer to establish a collaborative intelligence-sharing channel on Afghanistan. They also demonstrate the necessity of such a channel from the American intelligence perspective. In response to the rapid developments occurring within the newly established, Soviet-backed government in Kabul, a 17 September 1979 Top Secret National Security Council memorandum asked, "What are the Soviets doing in Afghanistan?" In a candid start to the memo, National Security Council member, Thomas Thornton, admitted, "Simply, we don't know."[2] Lacking reliable Afghan sources, it was clear the US needed a partner with superior regional knowledge. Thus, during the summer of 1979, Iran and the US both recognised the potential advantages of sharing intelligence on their mutual Afghan security dilemma. However, declassified evidence – or rather a lack thereof after 6 November 1979 – suggests that communication on an Iran-US Afghan channel came to an end with the advent of the Iran hostage crisis, which also expedited the collapse of the Bazargan-led provisional government in Iran. The hostage crisis poisoned any potential for a normalisation of Iran-US relations during this time, let alone a resumption of intelligence sharing on Afghanistan.

Furthermore, Iran-US mutual security interests in Afghanistan emerged yet again during the secret arms dealings of the Iran-Contra Affair. Iran-Contra was the infamous political scandal that dominated the second term of President Ronald Reagan from August 1985 to March 1987. At the core of the affair was a scheme devised by Reagan White House officials to covertly sell arms to Iran via Israel in hopes of securing the release of American hostages held by Shiite groups in Lebanon. The US then routed the funds from the arms sales to the anti-communist "Contras" in Nicaragua.

Buried among the tens of thousands of government documents on Iran-Contra are references to potential Iran-US cooperation in Afghanistan. While a comprehensive review of the Afghan connection to Iran-Contra is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that declassified US government documents reveal how both Iran and the US pointed to their shared security interests in Afghanistan as a rationale for their secret arms dealings. The memoranda and testimony even confirm that Iran agreed to revert some of the US-supplied weapons to the Iranian-backed *mujahideen*, who

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[1] Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution* (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1985), 69-70.
[2] Thomas Thornton to Zbigniew Brzezinski, memorandum, "What Are the Soviets Doing In Afghanistan?," 17 September 1979, National Security Council, DNSA Collection: Afghanistan.

were fighting the Soviet forces in Afghanistan during this time.[34] Iran-US cooperation in Afghanistan was not the motivation nor the key objective of the Iran-Contra affair dealings. At the time, Iran was concerned with a more pressing challenge on its other border: the Iran-Iraq War, which began when Iraq invaded Iranian territory on 22 September 1980, and lasted eight long, devastating years. From the US perspective, Iran-Contra was intended to secure the release of the American hostages in Lebanon. The Afghan component of Iran-Contra should not be exaggerated given the parties' other pressing priorities. However, it is nonetheless critical to explore how both Iran and the US considered their mutual interests in Afghanistan when participating in the Iran-Contra negotiations.

These brief periods of potential Iran-US cooperation during the twentieth century offer important historical context to the period of concrete cooperation between the two countries in the twenty-first century. How and why Iran and the US found themselves on the same side in Afghanistan, engaging in successful military and diplomatic coordinated efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, will be the focus of the subsequent pages.

This project draws upon various areas of scholarship including literature on the US-Iran relationship, foreign policy determinants of both states, and coverage of the twenty-first century wars in Afghanistan. Separately, these three subjects frequently appear in news headlines and political scholarship alike. However, little attention has been paid to the nexus between the Iran-US relationship and their common security challenges in Afghanistan.

The forty-year estrangement between Iran and the US has inevitably attracted a plethora of scholarly attention. Most of this literature has been written by Western experts, predominantly from the American perspective, which often lacks an understanding and appreciation of Iranian policy decision-making. While a significant number of these authors offer an uncritical perspective on the US role in the deterioration of Iran-US relations, there are some Western accounts on the history of Iran-US relations that move beyond the "Great Satan" and "axis of evil" tenor and provide a more balanced understanding on the dynamics of the Iran-US relationship. Barbara Slavin, a former senior diplomatic correspondent, who has traveled to Iran and interviewed high-profile Iranian officials, for example, argues that both governments have overlooked a series of missed opportunities to repair relations since 1979.[5]

A pair of American authors, Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett, offer a scathing critique of US policy towards Iran and contend that the US should make a Nixon-China-like *détente* overture to Tehran. Not surprisingly, their work is controversial. However, Hillary Mann was one of a few Americans who engaged in diplomatic discussions with Iranian officials on Afghanistan as part of her role at the US delegation to the UN Security Council. I have therefore decided to use the book sparingly where I believe its analysis is useful in understanding the dialogue that transpired between Iranian and

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[3] "Release of American Hostages in Beirut," Top Secret memorandum, 4 April 1986, National Security Council, DNSA collection: Afghanistan. Memo suggests that some weapons being sold to Iran be diverted to Afghan Rebels.

[4] US-Iranian Contacts and the American Hostages, Top Secret internal paper, 20 November 1986, National Security Agency, DNSA collection: Afghanistan.

[5] Barbara Slavin, *Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies* (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 2007).

American diplomats following the September 11 attacks.[6]

These accounts chronicle the possible areas for cooperation between Iran and the US that have arisen throughout their forty-year period of estrangement, including brief references to the focus of this paper: the potential for broader cooperation in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks. However, these authors have neglected the significance of the consistent pattern of shared security interests between Iran and the US in Afghanistan in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

In addition to the aforementioned secondary literature, I draw upon various textual and oral primary sources to gain insight on the issues dominating the debates in the Iranian and American foreign policy development circles. To make sense of American foreign policy towards Iran and Afghanistan, I will use recently declassified US government documents found in the National Security Archives in Washington, D.C. Moreover, this essay will hear firsthand from American government officials who contributed to US policy towards Iran and Afghanistan: Ambassador James Dobbins, who engaged in direct dialogue with Iranian diplomats as representative of the US delegation at the UN-sponsored Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in December 2001, and Gary Sick, principal White House National Security aid for Iran during President Carter's administration. I will also draw from the memoirs of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, an American diplomat born in Afghanistan, who participated in the Bonn Conference alongside Dobbins. Khalilzad's knowledge of Persian allowed him to engage in more conversations with the Afghan and Iranian delegates present at the UN conference. His memoir thus provides further detail on the cooperation between the Iranian and American delegations at Bonn.[7]

As a balance to the aforementioned American accounts, I will also draw upon various textual, Iranian primary sources, such as excerpts from Iranian newspapers and testimony from Iranian diplomats who participated in the formulation of Iranian foreign policy towards the US and Afghanistan: Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian, head of the Foreign Relations Committee on Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), 1997-2005; and Ambassador Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's current Minister of Foreign Affairs, who represented the Iranian delegation at the Bonn Conference where he worked closely with US Ambassador Dobbins. Ambassador Zarif's memoirs provide insight into Tehran's responses to US foreign policy in Afghanistan, as well as the motivations behind Iran's participation at Bonn.

By pairing UN and US government documents with interviews and memoirs of the Iranian and American diplomats engaged in the bilateral dialogue on Afghanistan, this paper seeks to provide a more balanced, comprehensive account of the post-9/11 Iran-US cooperation in Afghanistan, and thus fill an important gap in the historiography on the nexus between Iran-US relations and their external engagement in Afghanistan. To provide a thorough understanding of this period of cooperation, I will first offer

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[6] Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, *Going to Tehran: Why America Must Accept the Islamic Republic of Iran* (New York, NY: Picador, 2013).

[7] Zalmay Khalilzad, *The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey Through a Turbulent World* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2016).

an overview of the coincidence of interests between Iran and the US in Afghanistan, beginning with an examination of the Iranian and American responses to the advent of the Taliban in the late 1990s. Next, I will demonstrate how these security interests materialised into successful military campaigns against the Taliban, followed by a collaborative diplomatic channel on Afghanistan's political reconstruction. The end date of this paper, mid-2002, corresponds with the beginning of the end of Iran-US cooperation in Afghanistan.

A Coincidence of Interests, 1996 - 2001
Beginning with an analysis on the initial policies pursued by Iran and the US in response to the rise of the Taliban in the late 1990s, this section will assess Iranian and American engagements in Afghanistan during the turn of the century. Throughout its investigation, this section will emphasise the relevant internal political developments in Iran and the US, as well as the changing international dimensions, which propelled the two states to eventually engage in a dialogue on Afghanistan as early as 1998.

On 26 September 1996, Taliban forces captured the Afghan capital city of Kabul and declared their establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan a day later. The Taliban is a predominantly Pashtun Islamist group that emerged in Pakistan in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet-supported government in Afghanistan.[8] With financial and military support from Pakistan, the Taliban militia achieved repeated territorial gains during the previous two years of fighting, before seizing Kabul in September 1996.

The advance of the Taliban in Afghanistan yielded different reactions from Iran and the US. The subsequent section will analyze the initial policies pursued by the two states in response to the rise of the Taliban in the late 1990s. In its investigation, it will emphasise the changing international dimensions, which propelled the two states to initiate a bilateral dialogue under the aegis of the UN on the security threats emanating from Afghanistan. This dialogue set the stage for the post-9/11 cooperation that materialised as coordinated military policy against the Taliban in October and November of 2001, followed by effective diplomacy on the political reconstruction of a post-Taliban Afghanistan in December 2001.

American Response to the Rise of the Taliban
On 27 September 1996, the same day the Taliban proclaimed Afghanistan an Islamic Emirate, the US spokesman for the State Department, Glyn Davies, announced, "We hope very much and expect that the Taliban will respect the rights of all Afghans and that the new authorities will move quickly to restore order and security and to form a representative government on the way to some form of national reconciliation."[9] The absence of US representatives in Afghanistan since 1992 forced the official US response, which lacked any policy direction, to rely exclusively on second- and third-hand reports.

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[8] Barnett R. Rubin, *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 25-28.
[9] Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (London, UK: Penguin Books, 2004), 15.

Davies' statement was followed by similarly passive remarks, as well as contradictory statements, by US officials. Immediately after the Taliban's rise to power, Madeleine Albright, then US ambassador to the UN, condemned the Taliban's new edicts as "impossible to justify or defend."[10] Speaking before the UN Security Council a few weeks after Albright's denouncement of the Taliban, Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, defended the Taliban's political legitimacy and argued for engagement: "The Taliban control more than two-thirds of the country; they are Afghan, they are indigenous, they have demonstrated their staying power […] It is not in the interests of Afghanistan or any of us here that the Taliban be isolated."[11]

While the US never officially recognised the Taliban's government in Afghanistan, they did offer engagement on several occasions, with a particular objective to work with the Taliban to "expel all terrorists and those who support terrorism" from Afghanistan.[12] The Taliban's Islamic Emirate was only recognised by Pakistan on 26 May 1997, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates following suit.

Iranian Response to the Rise of the Taliban

The minimal protest raised by the US coupled with Pakistani and Saudi recognition of the Taliban's Islamic Emirate aroused suspicion in Iranian foreign and security policy circles. "The Taliban capture of Kabul was designed by Washington, financed by Riyadh and logistically supported by Islamabad," reported *Jomhuri Islami*, a hardline Iranian newspaper.[13] Already preoccupied with the growing influence of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the region, Iranians became increasingly concerned with what they interpreted as an American endorsement of Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 engendered international competition over the oil and gas market in Central Asia and the Caspian region. Iran hoped to become the transport hub for a pipeline linking the former USSR's energy sources to the Persian Gulf. The US, however, had kept Iran under sanctions since the 1979 hostage crisis and proposed alternative routes, which eventually led to the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline through Turkey.[14] Iran perceived America's passive response to the Taliban's rise along with its aims in the new Central Asian oil and gas market as US engagement with the Taliban in order to promote the construction of pipelines that bypass Iran. The advent of the Taliban in Afghanistan thus exacerbated Iran's already-established concerns of encirclement by the US-Pak-Saudi troika in Afghanistan.

Iran's perception of the Taliban as a threat to its national security also stemmed from the Taliban's anti-Shia and anti-Iran dogma. Since 1996, the Taliban provided sanctuary to *Sepah-e Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP), a Sunni militant group founded in Pakistan,

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[10] Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 338.

[11] Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 335.

[12] "Ambassador Meets the Taliban: We Are the People," US Confidential cable, 12 November 1996, Embassy Islamabad, DNSA: The Taliban File.

[13] *Jomhuri Islami* was formerly affiliated with the Islamic Republic Party, which was disbanded in May 1987. Quote found in Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 202.

[14] Barnett Rubin, "US and Iran in Afghanistan: Policy Gone Awry," MIT Center for International Studies, October 2008.

to counter Iranian-supported Shia activism following the 1979 Iranian revolution.[15] SSP recruited fighters from Iran's minority Sunni population in Khorasan and Sistan provinces. It frequently targeted Iranian interests throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan and is suspected to have participated in the August 1998 massacres against Iranians and their Hazara allies in Mazar-e Sharif, which will be discussed more thoroughly in the subsequent section.

Moreover, when fighting in Afghanistan re-commenced following the fall of the Soviet-backed Afghan government in 1992, the Iranian-supported *Hezb-e Wahdat* (Islamic Unity Party), which held representation in the new Rabbani-led Afghan rebel government, endured a series of attacks by its erstwhile Sunni mujahideen allies. In the wake of these aforementioned new threats facing both Iran and its allied groups in Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic pursued a two-track approach in Afghanistan: cultivate a strong military resistance to the Taliban while concurrently searching for diplomatic solutions to the protracted Afghan conflict. Iran began to broaden its roster of Afghan proxies beyond the Shia mujahideen groups they had helped cultivate during the Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989). Iran extended its support to several disparate militias within Afghanistan's Tajik and Uzbek groups and played a key role in uniting its Shia Hazara groups with its new non-Pashtun Sunni allies into a grand anti-Taliban coalition.

This multi-ethnic, multi-religious coalition comprised of disparate militias from various Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara groups, was called *Jebhe-ye Mottahed-e Eslami-ye Melli bara-ye Nejat-e Afghanistan* (United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan), also known as the Northern Alliance or United Front.[16] With financial and military support from Iran, along with Russia and India, the Northern Alliance became operational soon after Kabul fell to Taliban forces in September 1996. Iran, which posed "the strongest opposition to [Taliban's] ascendancy," continued to collaborate with its local and international allies to advance the Northern Alliance's military capabilities against Taliban forces.[17] Under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Northern Alliance's military forces continued to fight the Taliban on the ground, inflicting heavy losses and achieving steady territorial gains.

On the diplomatic front, Iran hosted an Afghanistan peace conference in Isfahan in December 1997, in which various anti-Taliban Afghan representatives participated. At the conference, Iranian Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharazi, advocated for a diplomatic solution to the conflict. According to Kharazi, this diplomatic process would need to include intra-Afghan negotiations in order to form a broad-based government in Kabul.[18] That same month, Tehran convened the eighth Islamic Summit Conference, where newly elected Iranian President, Mohammad Khatami, echoed Kharazi's promotion of a

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[15] Rashid, *Taliban*, 203. SSP was renamed Ahl-e Sunnah Wal Jamaat in 2003.

[16] Within the Northern Alliance, the Tajik faction was led by Ahmad Shah Massoud's Jamiat-e Islami, the Uzbeks were led by Jombesh-e Melli Islami's Abdul Rashid Dostum, and the Hazaras predominantly came from Karim Khalili and Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq's Hezb-e Wahdat. Some of the alliance's members joined from Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami.

[17] Mohsen Milani, "Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan," *Government and International Affairs Faculty Publications*, paper 106 (2006): 244.

[18] Bruce Koepke, "Iran's Policy on Afghanistan: The Evolution of Strategic Pragmatism," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (September 2013): 8.

diplomatic over military solution in Afghanistan. At the summit, Khatami asserted the necessity to restore "peace to Afghanistan through negotiation."[19] The following section will chronicle the series of events in August 1998 that aligned the Afghan policies of Iran and the US.

August 1998

On 1 August 1998, Taliban forces seized Mazar-e Sharif, the fourth largest city in Afghanistan and interim capital of the Northern Alliance. In the days that followed, the Taliban militia carried out a systematic massacre of male Shia Hazara. Directed by their local Pashtun guides, Taliban militia searched the homes of Mazar-e Sharif and executed hundreds of Hazara men and boys, seemingly to eradicate any potential resistance to Taliban rule. Moreover, it is estimated that over four hundred Hazara women and girls were raped and abducted.[20] With an aim to cleanse the city of Shias, Taliban forces also targeted Iranians during the massacre. Led by Mullah Dost Mohammed, a small Taliban force, along with militants from *Sipah-e Sahaba,* stormed the Iranian consulate and executed ten Iranian diplomats and one journalist. The Taliban never accepted culpability, but following international protests, confirmed the deaths of the eleven Iranians and claimed "renegade Taliban" carried out the attack.[21]

The massacre in Mazar-e Sharif left the Iranian foreign and security policy circles divided on how to respond. According to Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian, head of the Foreign Relations Committee on the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) between 1997 and 2005, the prevailing position in Tehran advocated for "a military invasion of Afghanistan to root out the Taliban."[22] In the days following the attacks, Iran deployed more than seventy thousand additional troops to its border with Afghanistan, but ultimately decided against a military response. According to Mousavian, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei refused to sanction the SNSC recommendation to use military force. Deputy Foreign Minister Mohsen Aminzadeh later expounded on the Islamic Republic's conclusion that military intervention might drag Iran into a long and permanent war in Afghanistan. Rafsanjani reported, "Afghanistan is like a swamp; anyone who has entered has not been able to exit gracefully."[23]

In place of military intervention, the Islamic Republic pointed to the Taliban's serious breaches of international humanitarian law in Mazar-e Sharif in their unceasing pleas to the international community to confront the situation in Afghanistan. According to deputy Foreign Minister Mohsen Aminzadeh, despite the "negligible reaction" from the international community to previous attacks against Iranian interests by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the Mujahideen-e Khalq, Iranian policy makers reasoned the Mazar-e Sharif massacre would surely "attract more attention" and provide Iran with an opportunity "to initiate collaboration with the international community to confront such incidents

[19] Koepke, "Iran's Policy."
[20] Koepke, "Iran's Policy."
[21] Koepke, "Iran's Policy."
[22] Seyed Hossein Mousavian, *Iran and the US: An Insider's View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace* (London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014), 155.
[23] Milani, "Iran's Policy," 244.

in Afghanistan."[24] As will become apparent below, Iran's calculation proved accurate as Iran began to work diplomatically with Afghanistan's five other neighbours – China, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – together with the US and Russia to confront the security problems emanating from Afghanistan.

A day before the Taliban capture and massacre of Mazar-e Sharif, two teams of suicide bombers detonated bombs at the US embassies in the African capital cities of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The two explosions, which struck almost simultaneously on the morning of 7 August 1998, killed 224 people and wounded five thousand more. These attacks were carried out for the first time by international al-Qaeda sleeper cells and directed by Osama bin Laden from Taliban-protected safehouses in Afghanistan.[25]

In formulating a response to the terror attacks, the US first sought to determine the terrorist group responsible for the attacks and ascertain whether or not it had received support from any foreign government. From the beginning of the deliberations, it became apparent that bin Laden, who "contracted with Pakistani intelligence" and "colluded with the Taliban," was the architect of the attacks.[26] Unlike the discussion within Iran's SNSC following the Mazar-e Sharif massacre, there was no serious debate in Washington over the merits of a military versus diplomatic response to the terrorist attacks. Instead, the US launched dozens of cruise missiles on 20 August at suspected targets in Afghanistan and Sudan "intended to disrupt bin Laden's future operations."[27] The targets in Afghanistan were decided based on CIA intelligence indicating bin Laden's attendance at a meeting at the Zawhar Kili camp in eastern Afghanistan. The missile attacks in Sudan targeted a chemical factory in Khartoum and aimed to hurt bin Laden's financial network and prevent his followers from acquiring chemical and biological weapons.[28]

In August 1998, the US thus began to align closely to Iran vis-à-vis its policy towards Afghanistan. Following the attacks in Mazar-e Sharif, Iran's support to the anti-Taliban coalition, the Northern Alliance, significantly increased. Beginning in 1998, Iranian intelligence transferred "plane-loads of arms" to Kuliab, Tajikistan, the location of one of Massoud's Northern Alliance military bases.[29] Massoud also began to frequent Tehran. While a direct pipeline of US aid to the Northern Alliance never emerged during this time, communication lines between Massoud and the CIA had existed since 1996.[30] By the summer of 1999, Washington also relayed to Iran (and Russia) that the US "had no objections to the covert arms *those* countries supplied Massoud."[31]

The White House even vacillated securing a direct line of US aid to the Northern Alliance, albeit towards the very end of the Clinton administration. Five days after the

[24] Milani, "Iran's Policy."

[25] Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 406.

[26] Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 407.

[27] Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 411.

[28] Oriana Zill, "The Controversial US Retaliatory Missile Strikes," Frontline, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/retaliation.html>.

[29] Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 203.

[30] Gary C. Schroen, *First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 2005), 57.

[31] Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 464.

inauguration of President George W. Bush, Richard Clarke advised the new National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice on "pending time sensitive decisions" on al-Qaeda that were deferred to the Bush administration.[32] The memorandum asked:"Should we provide the Afghan Northern Alliance enough assistance to maintain it as a viable opposition force to the Taliban/al Qaeda?"[33] Clarke recommended US support to Massoud's Northern Alliance forces, emphasising, "If we do not […] the Northern Alliance may be effectively taken out of action this Spring when fighting resumes after the winter thaw."[34] Clarke further warned, the US would "make a major error if [it] underestimated the challenges al Qaeda poses."[35] The new Bush administration dismissed Clarke's warnings, claiming he only offered "an assessment of Al Qaeda's history, not a warning of impending attacks."[36] Clarke's recommendation of assisting the Northern Alliance forces against the Taliban was not pursued by the US until the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

Bilateral Dialogue Begins

Beginning in 1998, Iran and the US recognised their aligned interests in Afghanistan and accordingly began to engage in ministerial-level meetings under the aegis of the United Nations 6+2 Group on Afghanistan. Originally proposed by Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the UN 6+2 Group on Afghanistan was formed in October 1997 by Lakhdar Brahimi, then UN Special Envoy for Afghanistan, in order to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Afghanistan and assist in the formation of a broadly representative and multi-ethnic Afghan government. The group was an informal coalition of Afghanistan's six neighbours plus Russia and the US. The 6+2 representatives met in New York with the objective of finding a diplomatic peace settlement in Afghanistan. Also on the sessions' agendas was drug trafficking, combating terrorism, and the extent to which outside powers should support the various Afghan factions.[37]

Before the commencement of these UN-sponsored ministerial sessions, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, outlined the potential benefits of such meetings for the US to Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, in a memorandum on 16 September 1998. In his summary of "what can be accomplished," Inderfurth proposed how the UN 6+2 group can demand an international investigation into the Mazar-e Sharif massacre, press for protection of the human rights of both civilians and combatants in Afghanistan, particularly the Shia, and formulate an international mandate on the dangers posed by Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan-based terrorist organisations. Inderfurth concluded:

"The image of you [Albright] and the Iranian Foreign Minister, across the

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[32] Memorandum for Condoleezza Rice from Richard A. Clarke, "Presidential Policy Initiative/Review – The Al-Qaeda Network," National Security Council, 25 January 2001.

[33] Memorandum, "Presidential Policy."

[34] Memorandum, "Presidential Policy."

[35] Memorandum, "Presidential Policy."

[36] Kurt Eichenwald, "The Bush White House Was Deaf to 9/11 Warnings," *New York Times*, 10 September 2012.

[37] Raji Mohammad Mehdi, *Aqa-ye Safir: Goftegu ba Mohammad-Javad Zarif, Safir-e Pishin-e Iran dar Saze-man-e Melal-e Mottahed* (2013), 158.

table and joined by colleagues from Russia, China, and the Central Asian States would present a powerful message that the world community is steadfastly opposed to Taliban policies."[38]

These 6+2 meetings represented the first communication between Iranian and American officials since the secret Iran-Contra dealings in the 1980s and the first official, high-level government contact between the two states since the 1979 Iranian revolution.

In his memoirs, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javad Zarif, explains how an unofficial goal of these UN-talks "was also to provide a framework for Iran-US cooperation."[39] During these UN sessions, the Iranian and American delegations began to meet on a bilateral, ministerial basis with Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, leading the US team, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kamal Kharazi, leading the Iranian delegation.

Testimony from both American and Iranian diplomats highlights the progress of Iran-US cooperation during these talks, particularly on counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism initiatives in Afghanistan. Zarif commended the UN Afghan group, especially the US, on its contributions to narcotics trafficking. Moreover, Zarif shared how the UN sessions "provided an opportunity for Iran to be present in the [Afghanistan sphere of operations]" and "brought the representatives of Iran and the US […] together regarding Afghanistan."[40] In describing the positive impact of Iran-US communication during these pre-9/11 talks, Zarif claims, "negotiations with America began in this realm, which formed the core of the [post 9/11] Bonn summit [on Afghanistan's political reconstruction]."[41]

A confidential State Department memorandum on 1 March 2000 corroborated Zarif's assessment. In the memo, Inderfurth shares how Iran "took the unexpected step" to formally nominate the US to lead the counter-narcotics initiative and subsequently "thanked the US for starting the process."[42] Inderfurth further relays Zarif's assessment on the importance of such an initiative. "[Zarif's] key point," Inderfurth writes, "is that narcotics trafficking helps fuel the war in Afghanistan and finances terrorism."[43] In his summary on Iran-US cooperation during the UN 6+2 group meetings, Inderfurth concluded, "I was struck by the efforts of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohamed Javad Zarif to signal a positive and open approach to the US"[44]

While the initial 6+2 group meetings in New York primarily focused on the aforementioned narcotics and terrorism initiatives, subsequent meetings in Geneva and Paris began to shift attention to the future of Afghanistan's political system. According to Zarif, this "Geneva initiative provided the framework for the discussion of political developments in Afghanistan which continued after September 11 more seriously."[45]

[38] "Afghanistan: Organizing a Ministerial Six Plus Two in New York," Secret memorandum, US Department of State, 16 September 1998.
[39] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir*, 158.
[40] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir*, 157-159.
[41] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir,* 159.
[42] "Iran Makes Positive Gestures to US on Afghanistan," Confidential memorandum, US Department of State, 1 March 2000.
[43] "Iran Makes Positive Gestures."
[44] "Iran Makes Positive Gestures."
[45] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir*, 159.

The four coordinated terrorist attacks in the US on the morning of 11 September 2001, opened a window for "the most significant of all cases of potential cooperation between [Iran and the US]."[46] Within two weeks, the US officially connected the attacks to bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network, which maintained a significant presence in the Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban's persistent refusal to comply with international demands to dissolve al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and extradite bin Laden elicited retaliation in the form of US-led military action in Afghanistan. Drawing upon testimony from Iranian ambassadors Javad Zarif and Seyed Hossein Mousavian, as well as this author's interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, Zarif's American counterpart at the December 2001 Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, the remaining pages will examine the cooperation that transpired between Iran and the US in Afghanistan between September 2001 and mid-March 2002.

Iran-US Military Cooperation
The final sections of this paper will show how the already-established Iran-US dialogue on Afghanistan materialised into effective military strategies against the Taliban, followed by a collaborative diplomatic channel on Afghanistan's post-Taliban political reconstruction. In its analysis, this section continues to use testimony from Ambassador Zarif and Mousavian to determine Iran's motivations and objectives in its post-9/11 cooperation with the US on Afghanistan. I likewise draw upon my interview with US Ambassador Dobbins to form a complete picture of the cooperation that transpired between Iran and the US during this time. After chronicling this period of military and diplomatic cooperation on Afghanistan, this paper will end by considering the events that occurred between Iran and the US immediately following the Bonn conference, which led to the collapse of the Iran-US collaborative dialogue on Afghanistan.

Following the September 11 attacks, the US joined an existing international coalition comprising Iran, India, Russia and their Afghan allies in the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Moreover, Tehran and Washington used the bilateral channel already established through the UN to continue their sessions on potential cooperation in Afghanistan. Post 11 September, however, these talks intensified and shifted attention to the exclusive objective of coordinating military tactics against the Taliban.

The meetings were held in Geneva and Paris. The Iranian team was comprised of Ambassadors Reza Ziaran, Zargar Yaghoobi, and Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian.[47] The US team was led by Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who speaks Persian and had previously lived in Iran. For precautionary reasons, state representatives from Germany and Italy were also present at the sessions. "In the event the meetings were leaked to the media, both Iran and the US could deny direct contacts between them. Later, the Germans and Italians disappeared and talks became one-on-one," Ambassador Mousavian explained.[48] The respective heads of governments in Tehran and Washington were aware of these meetings,

[46] Gary Sick, personal interview, 9 February 2018.
[47] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir*, 160.
[48] Mousavian, *Iran and the US*, 165.

and expressed no objections, "provided that they were focused on Afghanistan."[49]

During these meetings, the Iranian and American delegations laid the groundwork for the military campaigns against the Taliban launched in October 2001. In support of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Iran "promised the full cooperation of their Afghan ally, the Northern Alliance, in bringing down the Taliban and rooting out the Al-Qaeda terrorism."[50] According to Hillary Mann Leverett, a US representative who also participated in these talks, Iran permitted the use of Iranian territory by US military personnel to conduct search-and-rescue missions, in addition to opening a path for the flow of humanitarian relief supplies into Afghanistan.[51] Moreover, the Iranians offered valuable intelligence on the roles and capabilities of the various Afghan groups, as well as the location of Taliban targets. In describing Iran's contributions to the planning of the October 2001 military campaign in Afghanistan, Crocker stated:

> "During those [discussions], the Iranian thrust was, you know, what do you need to know to know their blocks off? You want their order of battle? Here's the map. You want to know where their weak points are? Here, here, and here. You want to know how we think they're going to react to an air campaign? Do you want to know how we think the Northern Alliance will behave? Ask us. We've got the answers; we've been working with those guys for years."[52]

On 7 October 2001, the US-led coalition launched Operation Enduring Freedom, the official name used by the US government for the war on terror in Afghanistan. A campaign of air operations, involving a combination of cruise missiles and fighter missiles strikes were launched from US and British ships as Northern Alliance troops, assisted by Coalition special forces, fought the Taliban on the ground.[53] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a branch of Iran's armed forces, significantly assisted in the planning of the Northern Alliance operations to free the cities of Herat and Kabul from Taliban control. The capital fell to Northern Alliance forces on 13 November 2001.[54]

The remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda forces retreated south to Kandahar, which was captured by coalition forces on 7 December, closely followed by the fall of its neighbour, Zabul Province, on 9 December. The fall of Zabul Province effectively drew the military campaign to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan to a close.[55] After the Taliban's defeat, Iran arrested around five hundred al-Qaeda members and extradited them to their

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[49] Mousavian, *Iran and the US*.

[50] Mousavian, *Iran and the US*, 166.

[51] Leverett and Leverett, *Going to Tehran*, 76.

[52] Ambassador Ryan Crocker, "Speech on Afghanistan," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 September 2012.

[53] Tim Youngs, "Afghanistan: The Culmination of the Bonn Process," House of Commons Library (26 October 2005): 10-11.

[54] Zachary Laub, Kevin Lizarazo, and Jeremy Sherlick, "The US War in Afghanistan 1999-2019," Council on Foreign Relations, 6 March 2019.

[55] Laub, Lizarazo, and Sherlick, "US War in Afghanistan."

respective countries.[56] In recalling the cooperation between Iran and the US during these military operations in Afghanistan, Crocker expounded: "this was an unprecedented period since the revolution of, again, a US-Iranian dialogue on a particular issue where we very much had common interest and common cause."[57]

Iran-US Diplomatic Cooperation

Following the overthrow of the Taliban, attention shifted to Afghanistan's political reconstruction. International engagement in Afghanistan at this time was particularly concerned with creating a "broad-based government that reflected the various ethnic, political, and religious factors within Afghan society and the extensive exile community."[58] To this end, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1378 on 14 November 2001, which called for a UN-sponsored conference for Afghanistan's political leaders "to establish a new and transitional administration leading to the formation of a broad-based, multi-ethnic government."[59] This resolution led to the convening of the International Conference on Afghanistan at Hotel Petersberg in Bonn, Germany on 27 November 2001. The conference ended on 5 December 2001, with the signing of the Bonn Agreement, which established the post-Taliban interim administration (AIA) led by Hamid Karzai, who also won the subsequent Afghan presidential elections in 2004.[60]

Led by UN Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, the Bonn conference invited twenty-five prominent Afghan leaders along with all external states with influence on the Afghan parties. Representatives from these states lived and worked in the same facility as the Afghans, but were unable to participate in the formal negotiations between the Afghans and UN team. As Ambassador James Dobbins explained, the external representatives "nevertheless [had] ample opportunity to follow the proceedings and lobby the various Afghan factions on the margins of their formal sessions."[61] It was in this context that a diplomatic channel between the Iranian and American delegates emerged.

The US Delegation

A veteran in post-conflict reconstruction, Ambassador Dobbins was a US diplomat who had served as a special envoy to Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia. Although he had no professional experience in Afghanistan or any knowledge of Persian, Dobbins was "perhaps the US government's most knowledgeable expert on state and nation-building."[62] As will become apparent below, central to Dobbins' strategy at Bonn was establishing a dialogue with the Iranians, regardless of the US official policy towards Iran. Assisting Dobbins at Bonn was Zalmay Khalilzad, a first generation Afghan-

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[56] Leverett and Leveret, *Going to Tehran*, 76.

[57] Crocker, "Speech on Afghanistan."

[58] Youngs, "Afghanistan," 12.

[59] UN Document S/1378, 14 November 2001.

[60] "Bonn Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions," Afghanistan, S/2001/1154, 5 December 2001.

[61] James Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran: Reflections from Personal Experience," *Washington Quarterly* (2010): 151.

[62] Zalmay Khalilzad, *Envoy*, 117.

American, who at the time, was serving as an official at the US Department of Defense.[63] According to Dobbins, "Khalilzad was an invaluable addition to the US team because he had firsthand knowledge of [Afghanistan] and could speak to the Afghan and Iranian leaders in their own language."[64]

Before travelling to Bonn, Dobbins received instructions from Washington to support the formation of a broad-based, moderate Afghan regime. His mission was twofold: "to find Pashtun leaders who retained credibility in their community and who had not been contaminated by collaborating with the Taliban, and then to persuade the Northern Alliance leadership to share power with these figures."[65] Even before the Bonn conference began, Dobbins recommended establishing communication with the Iranian delegation. According to Dobbins, "talking with one's adversary is more productive than not."[66] Dobbins also shared this suggestion to his Pakistani counterparts. "Putting Afghanistan back together was going to be hard," Dobbins reasoned, "as long as its neighbours squabbled over its future."[67] Dobbins' extensive experience overseeing international nation-building efforts convinced him that he would not achieve the US mission at Bonn "if Afghanistan's two most powerful neighbours remained at loggerheads."[68]

During my interview with the Ambassador, I asked how the policymakers back in Washington responded to his professional recommendation to directly communicate with his Iranian counterparts. Dobbins explained how he had secured permission to talk to the Iranians from Secretary of State Colin Powell before leaving for Bonn. "I could talk to anyone about anything as long as it contributed to my task," Dobbins shared.[69] From the beginning, the leader of the US delegation thus advocated for establishing a working diplomatic channel between the Iranians and Americans at Bonn. In the days preceding Bonn, Dobbins relayed to conference-convener, Lakhdar Brahimi, that he "hoped to be able to work with the Iranians and asked him to pass along [Dobbins'] expectation."[70]

The Iranian Delegation

The Iranian delegation at Bonn was led by Ambassador Zarif, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs who had served as a member of the Iranian delegation to the United Nations since 1982. Assisting Zarif at Bonn was Mohammad Ibrahim Taherian, the Iranian ambassador to the Northern Alliance. According to Khalilzad, Taherian was one of the most informed delegates on Afghanistan who was prepared to work with the Americans at Bonn.[71] Like Dobbins, Zarif recognised the importance of communication with the Americans: "Relations with America or any country is a tool and must be

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[63] Zalmay Khalilzad, *Envoy*, 119.
[64] James Dobbins, personal interview, 8 February 2018.
[65] James Dobbins, *After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008), 20.
[66] Dobbins, *After the Taliban*, 48.
[67] Dobbins, *After the Taliban*.
[68] Dobbins, *After the Taliban*.
[69] Dobbins, interview, 8 February 2018.
[70] Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran," 151.
[71] Khalilzad, *Envoy*, 121.

employed for national interest," Zarif contended.[72] He strengthened his argument in favour of a dialogue with the Americans by explaining that Iranian jurisprudents do not consider relations with the U.S as neither obligatory nor forbidden. "Of course, in today's interconnected world, two important actors such as Iran and the US are interacting anyway, whether they want to or not."[73] He listed the post-9/11 cooperation between Iran and the US as an example of such interaction.

In his memoirs, Zarif also outlined Iran's motivations at Bonn. He emphasised Iran's principal goal of preventing the political return of Zahir Shah, the former Afghan king who had reigned from 1933 until his cousin, Daoud, deposed him in 1973. Some of the European delegates at Bonn advocated for Zahir Shah to return to Afghanistan and lead the post-Taliban government. According to Zarif, the return of the monarchy in Afghanistan was "a fundamental concern" and "considered a major problem for the Islamic Republic of Iran."[74] Instead, the Iranian delegation's objectives at Bonn were to ensure the installment of a broad-based, democratic government in Afghanistan that recognised the Shia religion and rights of Afghan Shia. Moreover, Zarif stressed the importance of dealing with the Taliban threat more seriously. "For [Iran], the fight against terrorism meant the fight against the Taliban."[75] Before his departure for Bonn, Zarif secured the backing of both the president and foreign minister on engaging with the Americans. Zarif highlighted how "all of this happened during the time of Mr. Khatami's government" which allowed for more "maneuvering and flexibility on these issues."[76] Testimony from both Zarif and his American counterpart, Dobbins, thus identified the alignment of interests between Iran and the US on Afghanistan at Bonn.

The Evolution of the Iran-US Channel

The US team arrived in Bonn two days ahead of the conference's opening. Almost immediately upon his arrival, Dobbins received an invitation from the Iranian delegation to meet. "This did not come as a complete surprise," Dobbins recalled, as he had previously asked Brahimi to relay to Tehran his wish to work with the Iranian delegates at Bonn.[77] Dobbins and Khalilzad met with Taherian before the conference convened (Zarif did not arrive until the following day). During this initial meeting, which lasted approximately one hour, the delegates discussed their respective goals for the conference. It was at this meeting that the Iranians first suggested Hamid Karzai, a Durrani Pashtun, to lead the post-Taliban government of Afghanistan. Despite Iran's close ties to the predominantly non-Pashtun Northern Alliance, the Iranian delegates recognised the importance of including Pashtuns and all other Afghan factions in the leadership of Afghanistan's new government. They shared this awareness with Dobbins and Khalilzad at the pre-conference meeting. "We knew that the Americans tended to

[72] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir*, 153.
[73] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir*, 155.
[74] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir*, 160.
[75] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir*, 162.
[76] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir*.
[77] Dobbins, interview, 8 February 2018.

Karzai," Zarif further explained.[78] The objectives of the Iranian and American delegations at Bonn on the future governance of Afghanistan were thus largely concurrent. This preliminary meeting between Dobbins, Khalilzad, and Taherian laid the foundation for sustained Iran-US cooperation throughout the conference.

The delegates from Iran and the US had coffee together every morning. At these casual morning gatherings, Dobbins, Khalilzad, Zarif, and Taherian would deliberate on the progress achieved at Bonn thus far and the challenges that lie ahead. One morning, after reading the first draft of the conference's resolution, Zarif raised problems with the document "that caused the Americans to become surprised."[79] Zarif asserted to Dobbins, "the text makes no mention of democracy or elections. Don't you think that the new Afghan regime should commit to hold democratic elections?"[80] In his memoirs, Zarif stated the Americans were "embarrassed" that the Iranians had "taught them a lesson on democracy."[81] As the delegates continued to read the document, Zarif also stated that "the draft makes no mention of terrorism. Should the new Afghan regime be committed to cooperate with the international community to combat international terrorism?"[82] In using words like "democracy" and "terrorism," ubiquitous in US political rhetoric, it became apparent to Dobbins that Zarif "was having a bit of fun at [his] expense."[83] Political humor aside, Zarif found several missing elements of the draft on Afghanistan's future governance. All of Zarif's suggestions on democracy and counterterrorism efforts were incorporated into the final Bonn Agreement.[84]

The informal dialogue between the Iranian and American delegates also provided an opportunity to cultivate personal relationships. According to Dobbins, the Iran team was "very professional, quite agreeable, and always delivered on their promises."[85] When recalling his one-on-one conversations with Zarif, Dobbins shared, "Zarif was easy to talk to and quite a humorous interlocutor."[86] Khalilzad especially appreciated the conversations he had with Taherian. "Without these coffees, I never would have come to know the depth of Taherian's knowledge about Afghanistan," Khalilzad recounted.[87] The daily informal get-togethers created an amicable environment for the diplomats to also touch on more sensitive topics like the future of Iran-US relations. "At Bonn [the Iranians] actually told me they wanted to extend the cooperation beyond Afghanistan," Dobbins shared.[88] Zarif and his team thus used the dialogue at Bonn "as a way to test cooperation with the Americans."[89] Although the American diplomats did not reciprocate the Iranians' invitation for broader cooperation while participating in the

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[78] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir*, 161.

[79] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir*, 163.

[80] Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran," 152.

[81] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir*, 163.

[82] Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran," 152.

[83] Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran."

[84] "Bonn Agreement."

[85] Dobbins, interview, 8 February 2018.

[86] Dobbins, interview, 8 February 2018.

[87] Khalilzad, *Envoy*, 120.

[88] Dobbins, interview, 8 February 2018.

[89] Mousavian, *Iran and the US*, 165.

Bonn conference, Dobbins remembers the relations between the Iranian and American delegates as "always cordial and without any tension."[90]

The trickiest moment during the conference appeared early in the morning during the final deliberations on the Bonn agreement. At the negotiation table were representatives of the four main Afghan factions: the Northern Alliance, Rome Group, Cyprus Group, and Peshawar Group.[91] By this point, there was already agreement on Karzai as the interim leader of the new administration and the foundation of an interim constitution. However, there was no consensus on who would hold ministerial positions in the various government agencies. Yunis Qanooni, the Northern Alliance representative, argued that since the Northern Alliance bore the greatest sacrifices fighting the Taliban, his faction should not only retain the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and interior, but also maintain control over seventy-five percent of the total ministerial positions.[92]

Qanooni's demands were unacceptable to the other Afghan factions, who were also lobbying for representation in the broad-based, multi-ethnic government. By four in the morning, the impasse had yet to break. At Dobbins' suggestion, Brahimi assembled the willing (and awake) national envoys in an attempt to convince Qanooni to compromise. The improvised meeting included delegates from the US, Iran, Germany, India, and Russia. After several hours of failed efforts, Zarif gestured for Qanooni to join him in the corner. According to Dobbins, the whispers between Zarif and Qanooni lasted "for no more than a minute" before Qanooni returned to the table willing to give up two ministries.[93] While in the corner, Zarif whispered, "this is the best deal you will be able to get," according to Ambassador Mousavian.[94] The deal was finally brokered just before the closing ceremony of the conference. The new interim government was composed of twenty-nine ministries, with sixteen of the positions retained by members of the Northern Alliance.[95]

Iran's relations with the Northern Alliance thus proved invaluable to the success of the conference. Moreover, the cooperation between the Iranian and American diplomats helped alleviate disputes between the various Afghan factions and paved a productive course that led to the passing of the Bonn Agreement on 5 December 2001, which established the interim administration in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. Most remarkably, the diplomatic dialogue on Afghanistan established in Bonn opened an unprecedented window for broader Iran-US cooperation. The extent to which these collaborative relations continued will be the focus of the final pages of this essay.

Beyond Bonn

The Bonn summit was followed by several international pledging conferences to raise funds for Afghanistan's further political reconstruction. At a donors' conference in

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[90] Dobbins, interview, 8 February 2018.
[91] Raji, *Aqa-ye Safir*, 166.
[92] Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran," 153.
[93] Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran," 154.
[94] Mousavian, *Iran and the US*, 166.
[95] "Bonn Agreement."

Tokyo on 21-22 January 2002, an Iranian official approached Dobbins offering Iran's commitment to continue cooperation with the US on Afghanistan. At the same conference, the Iranians extended a backchannel to Paul O'Neill, US Treasury Secretary, via Sadako Ogata, head of Japan's development assistance agency. Ogata relayed to O'Neill the Iranians' desire to launch a channel "covering all of the issues that divided the two countries."[96] Dobbins and O'Neill relayed the Iranians' overtures to Washington, "where no one evinced any interest."[97] The lack of interest in the White House and State Department alike resulted in the US government offering no private reply to Iran's proposals. However, in a very public response, one week later, President Bush grouped Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, into an "axis of evil" in his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002.[98]

Within Bush's speech, there was no mention of Iran's contribution to the US intervention in Afghanistan. Instead, Bush declared: "by seeking weapons of mass destruction, [Iran] poses a grave and growing danger."[99] Officials in Tehran predictably felt betrayed. In a public television interview, Mohammad Ali Abtahi, Khatami's Vice President, expressed:

"The very least expectation we had at the height of our struggles for real reform was not to be branded like this. Politically it was an odd thing to do. We helped overthrow the Taliban. Instead of opening a path for even greater cooperation, they turned to this slogan: axis of evil. That was Mr. Bush's biggest strategic and political blunder."[100]

Despite Iran's inclusion in the "axis of evil," Tehran extended subsequent overtures to Washington in an attempt to continue the bilateral cooperation on Afghanistan.

At another donors' meeting in Geneva in March 2002, Iranian officials once again approached Dobbins with a proposition. Gathered at a café in the Geneva Intercontinental Hotel, an IRGC general, who had commanded the Northern Alliance operations against the Taliban during the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, proposed: "My government is prepared to participate in an American-led programme of support to the new Afghan Army. Specifically, Iran is prepared to build barracks for and train up to 20,000 troops as part of the larger effort under your leadership."[101] Dobbins admitted he was "struck" after hearing the Iranian general's "unexpected offer."[102] He found the idea "problematic in detail but promising in its overall implications."[103] Although the sharing of training duties between Iran and the US might lead to incompatibilities within the

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[96] Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran," 155.
[97] Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran."
[98] "Bush State of the Union Address," CNN, 29 January 2002.
[99] "Bush State of the Union Address."
[100] Mohammad Ali Abtahi, *Frontline: Showdown with Iran*, October 2007.
[101] Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran," 156.
[102] Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran."
[103] Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran."

new Afghan army, the proposal represented the most extraordinary opportunity for the broadening of Iran-US cooperation in Afghanistan. The proposal for a US-led, joint military programme in Afghanistan was extended by an officer in the IRGC, meaning elements of Iran's intelligence and military branches were unified with Iran's ministry of foreign affairs and office of the president in their objective to expand the cooperation between Iran and the US in Afghanistan. This overture thus demonstrated that the Islamic Republic possessed a coordinated, government-wide policy in support of continued Iran-US cooperation in Afghanistan.

Upon his return from Geneva, Dobbins immediately conveyed Iran's offer to his boss, Colin Powell. "Very interesting," Powell responded, "you need to talk to Condi [Condoleezza Rice]."[104] Rice subsequently scheduled a meeting of the relevant National Security Council members. On the meeting's agenda was Iran's proposal, among other matters of US national security. At the meeting, Dobbins recounted his experience in Geneva with the Iranian officials, but received no questions or comments in response to his report. "After a long pause, seeing no one ready to take up the issue, Rice moved the meeting on to the next item on her agenda," Dobbins affirmed.[105] This was the second major overture on Afghanistan Iran extended to the US to which they received no response. "The US just literally did not respond other than listing Iran as part of the axis of evil," Dobbins shared.[106] When I inquired about why Iran's proposals were never seriously considered by Washington, Dobbins explained how there was still "significant animus" towards Iran, particularly within the Department of Defense.[107] Furthermore, he continued, "Washington's priorities were already shifting to Iraq."[108]

Despite complete US disregard for Iran's overtures, dialogue between the two governments continued, albeit less enthusiastically, during the lead up to the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The Iranians hoped to use the post-9/11 framework established between Iran and the US on Afghanistan as a model for broader regional cooperation. The US consistently ignored Iran's offers, and instead pointed to Iranian behavior vis-à-vis nuclear proliferation, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and human rights violations as obstacles to any kind of Iran-US cooperation.[109] By mid-2002, the Iran-US collaborative channel, which emerged in 1998 and evolved into substantial military and diplomatic cooperation in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, had effectively drawn to a close.

Conclusion

To appreciate the significance of the post-9/11 Iran-US dialogue on Afghanistan, it is important to consider the cooperation in the broader history of overlapping interests between Iran and the US in Afghanistan. While the preceding analysis emphasised the military and diplomatic cooperation that transpired in response to Iran-US mutual

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[104] Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran," 157.
[105] Dobbins, "Negotiating with Iran."
[106] Dobbins, interview, 8 February 2018.
[107] Dobbins, interview, 8 February 2018.
[108] Dobbins, interview, 8 February 2018.
[109] Dobbins, interview, 8 February 2018.

security concerns over the threat of international terrorism, common interests of Iran and the US in Afghanistan have existed long before the rise of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, particularly during the Cold War with the advent of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989), and again, during the secret Iran-US dealings of the Iran-Contra Affair (1985-1987). However, as demonstrated by former White House National Security aid for Iran, "Captain" Gary Sick, the Iran-US post-9/11 dialogue on Afghanistan represented the most unprecedented period of Iran-US cooperation since 1979:

> "This was the most significant of all the cases of potential cooperation between [Iran and the US]. The US was actually benefiting directly and unequivocally from Iranian support and it was being done so in a person-to-person basis, which had not happened since [Iran's] revolution. This was *the outstanding* case. This was *the most obvious* case. And the one which almost everybody finds difficult to understand why the US simply shut off this potential opening with Iran, which was *so big* and *so real* and *so obvious*. On the surface of it, it just doesn't make any sense."[110]

This brief period of Iran-US cooperation on Afghanistan in 2001 led to a series of successful military operations and political achievements in Afghanistan to the benefit of both Iranian and American national security interests. Tehran sought to broaden this cooperation with the US and accordingly extended overtures for further diplomatic and military collaboration on Afghanistan. However, the US, which had already shifted its attention to Iraq, ignored Iran's proposals for sustained cooperation on Afghanistan. The potential for broader cooperation in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks is thus yet another missed area for Iran-US cooperation in the long catalogue of missed opportunities. Common interests between Iran and the US have been overshadowed by the animosity between the two governments since the 1979 Iranian revolution and subsequent hostage crisis. The estrangement preventing further cooperation on Afghanistan has been to the detriment of Iranian, American, and Afghan security interests, while directly advancing the interests of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

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110 Gary Sick, interview, 9 February 2018.

Irreconcilable Difference?
The 1982 Lebanon War, British Jews, and the Political Left

Imogen Resnick

The 1982 Lebanon War is upheld as a sharp turning point in Israeli and Middle Eastern history. Although provoking unparalleled international criticism, the war's critical impact on relations between British Jews and the political Left has been largely ignored within current historiographical literature. Through examination of the British Labour Party and its far-left fringes, and the British women's movement, this paper examines how the 1982 Lebanon War ruptured British political Left attitudes towards Israel. By sparking unprecedented condemnation of Israel within Labour at both a grassroots and parliamentary level, the war reshaped Jewish-Left political relations and – in the Jewish establishment's eyes – amplified the Labour Party's value as a political battleground. The ensuing voracious debate over antisemitism and anti-Zionism also coded Jewish feminists as inherently politically suspicious, forcing them to choose depoliticisation and abandon the women's movement.

On 6 June 1982, Israeli troops crossed the border into Lebanon, hailing the first day of "Operation Peace for Galilee." Although promoted as a mission to defend Israel's northern settlements from Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) shelling, in truth, Defence Minister Ariel Sharon sought to implement a grandiose geo-strategic plan.[1] The "big plan" failed.[2] Instead, Sharon and Prime Minister Menachem Begin ensnared Israel in an eighteen-year military quagmire that provoked widespread international criticism.[3] The war also brought Israel's reputation into serious disrepute through its indirect responsibility for the Sabra and Shatila massacre (16-18 September 1982), involving the slaughter of Palestinian civilians by Christian Lebanese militiamen allied to the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Sharon's incursion provoked unprecedented vocal and significant opposition within Israel, while most of the world's governments condemned Israel's aggressive invasion and occupation.[4] In Britain, the public was fiercely critical: letters sent to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – which normally expressed sentiment in Israel's favour – were overwhelmingly opposed to the invasion.[5]

Lebanon is cited as a turning point in histories of the British political Left's

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[1] Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014), 407.

[2] Shlaim, *Iron Wall*.

[3] Jonathan Rynhold, "Israel's Foreign and Defence Policy and Diaspora Jewish Identity," in Danny Ben-Moshe and Zohar Segev, eds., *Israel, the Diaspora and Jewish Identity* (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2007), 146.

[4] William Frankel, ed., *Survey of Jewish Affairs 1982* (London, UK: Associated University Presses, 1984), 10.

[5] Azriel Bermant, *Margaret Thatcher and the Middle East* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 96.

relationship to Israel.[6] One would therefore expect that the Jewish state's most reviled war would have received at least some attention in modern Anglo-Jewish historiography. On the contrary, Lebanon's divisive impact is typically either ignored or conferred a mere sentence in the records of British Jewish experience.[7] Where the Lebanon War has been given a cursory glance, scholars have relied exclusively on newspaper sources or their own conjecture.[8] Why has the war been neglected? First, Anglo-Jewish scholarship is a small field, a fact compounded by pressure on scholars to ensure their focus is not "too Jewish"; in a numbers-equals-impact game, minorities always lose.[9] Second, within existing historiography, research is overwhelmingly confined to the period 1870-1945.[10] And third, most of this scholarship exclusively considers the experiences of men and elitist communal institutions. This parochial focus has, for example, rendered the war's momentous impact on British Jewish feminists entirely absent from Anglo-Jewish historiography. Historiographical neglect does not, however, equate to historical inconsequence.

This discussion seeks to recover the 1982 Lebanon War's profound impact on the British political Left and Jews within the Left, alongside their redefined relationships with each other, Israel, and Zionism.[11] Through examination of the Labour Party, its far-left fringes, and the British women's movement, it is evident that the war forced a rupture amongst and between Jews and the Left. Within the Left, Lebanon increased pro-Palestinian activities, sparked a surge in anti-Zionist sentiment, and raised new questions about the interconnectedness of antisemitism and anti-Zionism. For the Zionist Jewish political establishment and its pro-Israel allies, the Left's anti-Israel shift increased Labour's value as a political battlefield; for Jewish feminists, the radical feminist Left's newfound anti-Zionism resulted in Jewish women being vetted, pressured to prove their anti-Zionist credentials, and ultimately, de facto exiled from the British feminist movement. Both reactions demonstrate how the Lebanon War inextricably linked British Jews and the political Left, reshaping their perceptions of and relationship with the other. This article unearths and places these siloed narratives into conversation with one another, connecting Jewish, political, social, and feminist histories where their historiographies have traditionally been partitioned – enabling the full scope

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[6] Albeit only two authors offer detailed analysis: June Edmunds, *The Left and Israel: Party-Policy Change and Internal Democracy* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2000), and Paul Keleman, *The British Left and Zionism: History of a Divorce* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2012).

[7] See (or, not see) William D. Rubinstein, Michael Jolles, and Hilary Rubinstein, *The Palgrave Dictionary of Anglo-Jewish History* (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011).

[8] See W. D. Rubinstein, *A History of the Jews in the English-speaking World: Great Britain* (London, UK: Macmillan, 1996), and Colin Shindler, "The Reflection of Israel within British Jewry," in *Identity*.

[9] Tony Kushner and Hannah Ewence, "Whatever Happened to British Jewish Studies? In Search of Contexts," *Jewish Culture and History* 12, no. 1 (2010): 6-7, and Kushner, "Heritage and Ethnicity: An Introduction," *Immigrants & Minorities* 10, no. 1-2 (1991): 3.

[10] Bar Geoffrey Alderman. See *Modern British Jewry* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1992), and *London Jewry and London Politics 1889-1986* (London, UK, and New York, NY: Routledge, 1989). Some skim past 1945, mainly focussing on demographic changes such as Endelman, *The Jews of Britain, 1965 to 2000* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002); Bernard Wasserstein, *Vanishing Diaspora: The Jews in Europe Since 1945* (London, UK: Penguin, 1997); and V.D. Lipman, *A History of the Jews in Britain since 1858* (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1990).

[11] Anglo-Jewry and British Jews are used interchangeably.

of Lebanon's impact to emerge. Through this inter-historiographical approach, my analysis – whilst primarily elucidating an absence within Anglo-Jewish historiography – additionally seeks to demonstrate the efficacy of bridging two disciplines that are too often academically sundered: Jewish Studies and Middle Eastern Studies.

To achieve an in-depth insight into the war's impact, my analysis encompassed a wide range of archival sources, including personal letters, political memos and reports, and minutes of meetings. This method is, admittedly, flawed: documents in archival records are often missing, potentially producing factual and timeline inconsistencies, and the brevity of minutes renders only a partial picture of discussions in meetings. Other primary sources – newspapers, political diaries, and House of Commons debates, alongside periodicals and pamphlets published by Jewish and leftist groups – have been examined for discussion of Israel and the war, along with language indicative of opinion on anti-Zionism, antisemitism, and the representation of Jews (including the use of Holocaust imagery). An interview with a Jewish feminist enhanced insight into how the war impacted the women's movement, while secondary literature is incorporated and critiqued to complement analysis and ground events in historical context.

Before the Rupture: The Left and Israel

The Labour Party had traditionally held deep sympathy for Israel. Close ideological affinity with the incumbent Israeli Labour party – encouraged by personal links between senior British Labour politicians and their Israeli counterparts – fostered a "mutual sense of loyalty."[12] Moreover, Labour and Anglo-Jewry shared a "strong political alliance"; the majority of Jews voted Labour until the 1970s.[13] However, in the decade preceding the Lebanon War, a plethora of socio-political factors caused support for Israel within the British and international political Left to falter.

The 1967 War did not immediately shake Labour's support for Israel.[14] However, in the far Left's eyes, Israel's post-war occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and Golan Heights transformed its image into that of an aggressive imperial power.[15] Israel's expansionist settlement policy served to "widen the circle of sceptics," with enthusiasm for Israel's 1973 victory more subdued than in 1967.[16] Throughout the 1970s, the international political Left increasingly identified with Third World national liberation activities and opposed U.S. intervention in these regions.[17] Significant segments of this movement, strengthened by the UN's 1975 "Zionism is Racism" resolution,

[12] June Edmunds, "The British Labour Party in the 1980s: The Battle Over the Palestinian/Israeli Conflict," *Politics* 18, no. 2 (1998): 112.

[13] Edmunds, "British Labour Party," and Jonathan Rynhlold and Jonathan Spyer, "British Policy in the Arab-Israeli Arena 1973-2004," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 2 (2007): 143.

[14] David Feldman, "Zionism and the British Labour Party," in Ethan B. Katz, Lisa Moses Leff, and Maud S. Mandel, eds., *Colonialism and the Jews* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2017), 209.

[15] Toby Greene, *Blair, Labour and Palestine: Conflicting Views on Middle East Peace After 9/11* (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 38-39.

[16] Keleman, *British*, 163.

[17] June Edmunds, *The Left and Israel: Party-Policy Change and Internal Democracy* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2000), 9, and Edmunds, "The Evolution of British Labour Party Policy from 1967 to the Intifada," *Twentieth Century British History* 11, no. 1 (2000): 34.

touted Israel as inherently racist and steeped in a colonial ideology – Zionism.[18] Israel's close ties with the U.S. further positioned it as "an inhibitor of anti-colonist movements," especially anti-colonial Arab nationalism.[19] However, for the mainstream Left in the 1970s, the 1977 election victory of the right-wing party Likud was the most significant event to dampen enthusiasm for Israel.[20] Western leftists had long admired Israel's socialist ideology; for many disappointed Labour members, Likud's ascension betrayed their identification of Israel as a progressive state.[21]

Domestic factors were also crucial in waning Labour's enthusiasm. Arab political groups began to make headway, with fringe Palestinian clusters operating at annual conferences throughout the 1970s.[22] This coincided with an increasingly right-wing Jewish electorate that sympathised with Thatcherite Conservatism; political re-alignments induced a dramatic decline of Jewish Labour MPs and a growing Jewish "cultural vacuum" in the party's grassroots.[23] Jewish support was steadily replaced by Black and Asian communities, many of which – as noted by the Labour Middle East Council (LMEC) in 1982 – held "strong internationalist and anti-imperialist concerns."[24] These demographic changes were significant for some areas – albeit only within London – with a motion declaring opposition to the State of Israel passed by the Hackney North Labour Party in 1979.[25] However, in The British Left and Zionism (2012), Paul Keleman appears to misread the LMEC's 1982 discussion on Black and Asian activists, overstating their influence in moulding Labour's Palestinian stance:[26] the LMEC acknowledged that it had actually yet to "tap in" to these communities' "sense of solidarity for the Palestinians."[27]

Considering the revolutionary Left's fundamental opposition to Zionism, increasing Trotskyist "entryism" into the Labour party in the late 1970s was likely more influential in shaping opinion on Israel.[28] Groups, such as Militant, saw membership triple between 1976 and 1982, while centrists in 1981 reported regularly seeing the "clenched fist salute" at party conferences.[29] Labour MP Eric Heffer asserted the far Left "consolidated its position" on the National Executive Committee (NEC) from 1978, influencing the deposition of Poale Zion (now the Jewish Labour Movement) member Ian Mikardo.[30]

[18] Edmunds, Left, 9-10.

[19] Edmunds, "Evolution," and Greene, Blair, 38.

[20] Phillip Mendes, Jews and the Left: The Rise and Fall of a Political Alliance (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 123.

[21] Mendes, Jews and the Left, and Feldman, "Zionism," 210.

[22] Edmunds, "Evolution," 32.

[23] Alderman, London, 125, and Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left: Between Solidarity and Delegitimization (New York, NY: Continuum, 2012), 251.

[24] Labour Middle East Council: Discussion Paper for the Third Working Party Meeting (hereafter: LMECDP), 14 July 1982, FAULDS3/2/50, Andrew Faulds Papers, LSE Library Archives and Special Collections, London School of Economics and Political Science (hereafter: AFP).

[25] Alderman, London, 125.

[26] Keleman, British, 168.

[27] LMECDP.

[28] Michael Billig, "Anti-Jewish Themes and the British Far Left," in Patterns of Prejudice 18, no. 1 (1984): 8, and David Webster, "The Labour Party and the New Left," Fabian Tract 477 (1981): 18.

[29] Edmunds, "Evolution," 35, and Webster, "Labour," 13.

[30] Heffer, Never a Yes Man: The Life and Politics of an Adopted Liverpudlian (London, UK: Verso, 199), 172.

Although "New Left" discourse permeated much of the Labour Party[31]– and LMEC membership increased by 15 percent after the 1979 election[32]– international and domestic trends were not influential enough in and of themselves to catalyse a significant pro-Palestinian swing. Although senior Labour officials were "disturbed" by Likud's policies,[33] leadership often espoused more pro-Israel sentiment than the Conservative Party: in 1980, Labour Party Leader James Callaghan deplored the Venice Declaration as a PLO "propaganda victory" that "cannot contribute to peace."[34] Moreover, before the war, most constituency Labour Parties (CLPs) exhibited little interest in producing motions on Israel.[35] Indeed, between 1974 and 1981, only three (out of 3,400) annual conference resolutions on the Middle East were submitted – and two of these were submitted by Poale Zion.[36] And although Labour MP Eric Heffer asserted the Left had "consolidated its position" on the NEC, until the war, this group still included notable pro-Israel supporters such as Tony Benn and Heffer himself.[37]

Nonetheless, it should be noted that in late May 1982, the NEC passed a draft policy advocating the PLO's participation in peace process.[38] The motion did, however, receive strong objections from Labour's International Committee, highlighting sustained senior support for Israel.[39] Moreover, although the motion indicated a pre-Lebanon War policy shift, the change merely signalled Labour's closer convergence with mainstream political opinion: the motion did not approve of Palestinian statehood or consider the PLO to be the Palestinians' sole representative.[40] Given that both these sentiments would be proposed as a direct result of Israel's invasion, the Lebanon War clearly transformed bourgeoning anti-Israeli opinion into tangible pro-Palestinian policy.

The Rupture

The war sparked unprecedented condemnation of Israel within Labour at both a grassroots and parliamentary level. Before Lebanon, Israel was of negligible importance for the vast majority of CLPs. Now, motions criticising Israel's invasion were approved in CLPs around the country.[41] Moreover, whereas anti-Zionist sentiment (such as the aforementioned Hackney North's 1979 motion) was formerly restricted to London CLPs, after Israel's invasion lurid anti-Zionism became cross-regional – one motion in Leeds North-West called for the expulsion of Poale Zion members.[42] Prominent MPs Benn and Heffer resigned from Labour Friends of Israel (LFI); the latter professed Israel's invasion

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[31] Shindler, *Israel*, 244.

[32] Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the LMEC, 10 December 1980, FAULDS3/2/50.

[33] House of Commons (hereafter: HC) Debate, 16 June 1980, vol. 986, col. 1138.

[34] HC Debate, 16 June 1980, vol. 986, col. 1129.

[35] Keleman, *British*, 167.

[36] Keleman, *British*.

[37] Heffer, *Never*, 172, and Keleman, *British*, 167.

[38] *Jewish Chronicle* (hereafter: *JC*) (4 June 1982).

[39] *JC* (4 June 1982).

[40] *JC* (4 June 1982).

[41] *JC* (20 August 1982).

[42] Alderman, *London*, 125, and *JC* (20 August 1982).

had "shaken him to the core."[43] Benn's resignation was particularly notable since he shared intimate ties with Israel. In July, whilst the war was ongoing, his mother had been awarded a fellowship from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.[44] In September, Benn's unparalleled critical stance toward Israel was emphasised by his championing of a major Labour policy development in favour of the Palestinians: an NEC resolution (passed by twenty-two to three) that called for the establishment of a Palestinian state.[45]

Labour's annual September conference clearly confirmed the war as a catalyst for a more pro-Palestinian shift within Labour; forty-six emergency resolutions were submitted to the conference castigating Israel's invasion.[46] Moreover, two momentous resolutions were accepted: one, passed with 3,318,000 votes, recognised the PLO as the Palestinians' "sole legitimate representative";[47] the other, approved by 3,538,000 delegates, committed Labour to supporting a "democratic, secular state of Palestine."[48] The latter did not concede Israel's right to exist, leaving open the interpretation that delegates supported a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – a radical and unparalleled step within Labour and amongst mainstream political parties. Although neither resolution (on account of not being carried by a two-thirds majority) was included in the 1983 Labour manifesto,[49] the millions of Labour members in favour provided a historic blow to Labour and Israel's relationship. Indeed, celebrating this enormous shift, the LMEC cheered the resolutions as a "historic move away from the traditional pro-Zionist emphasis of party policy."[50]

Anti-Zionism, Antisemitism and the Left

The Lebanon War triggered "an avalanche of anti-Zionism" on the Left.[51] This "avalanche" gave "renewed impetus to antisemitism," generating amongst Jews an unprecedented anxiety about the power of events in the Middle East to influence their position in the Diaspora.[52] Julius Gould argues that the Left's anti-Zionism veered into the realm of antisemitism, while Cesarani asserts the war significantly expanded "the myth of Nazi-Zionist collaboration."[53] In fact, Lebanon intensified comparisons of Israel and Nazism amongst both the Left and the Right (a fact ignored in Robert Wistrich's Anti-Zionism): soon after the war, the fascist National Front displayed a poster in London declaring

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[43] Keleman, *British*, 174.

[44] Tony Benn, *The End of An Era: Diaries 1980-90*, Ruth Winstone, ed. (London, UK: Arrow, 1994), 238.

[45] Benn, *End of An Era*, 240.

[46] Edmunds, *British*, 112.

[47] ACC/3121/E4/1043, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London Metropolitan Archives, City of London (hereafter: BDBJ).

[48] Jenni Frazer, "Labour Backs PLO Policy," *JC* (1 October 1982).

[49] Frazer, "Labour Backs PLO," and Jenni Frazer, "Only Jewish Voters," *JC* (3 June 1983).

[50] "Developing LMEC's work in the Labour Party – a discussion paper for the LMEC AGM," 19 November 1982 (hereafter: LMEC AGM DP), FAULDS/3/2/51.

[51] David Cesarani, "The Perdition Affair," in Robert S. Wistrich, ed., *Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism in the Contemporary World* (London, UK: Macmillan, 1990), 53.

[52] Shlomo Avineri, et al., "Antisemitism Today: A Symposium," *Patterns of Prejudice* 16, no. 4 (1982): 29 and 51.

[53] Julius Gould, "Impugning Israel's Legitimacy: Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism," *Anti-Zionism*, 192-193, and Cesarani, "Perdition," 53.

"Beirut '82 – The REAL Holocaust,"[54] while in the House of Commons, Conservative MP Tony Marlow denounced Begin as "the Israeli führer" and decried "Jewish Nazis" in Lebanon.[55] Begin himself used and abused Holocaust analogies during the Lebanon War, describing the PLO as Nazis and comparing PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to Hitler.[56] By presenting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a struggle of Jews fighting anti-Semites, Begin sought to justify Israel's military violence in Lebanon as a moral necessity. The coarse use of potent Holocaust analogies also signifies the morbid political climate induced by the war's brutal nature. However, in the UK, Trotskyist entryism into the Labour Party – coupled with more vocal anti-colonialist voices – drew greater prominence to anti-Zionism on the Left.

Michael Billig purports that most radical left publications were essentially antisemitic because they accepted the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism, but not Zionism.[57] Representatives from several of these publications attended the inaugural meeting of the Labour Committee on Palestine (formed in response to Israel's invasion);[58] the war strengthened connections between Labour Party officials and far-Left groups that propagated – at least according to Billig – antisemitic discourse. Moreover, anti-Jewish tropes used to denounce the war seeped into publications associated with Labour: Labour Leader incorporated language resonating with the antisemitic "blood libel" theme,[59] while the Labour Herald (in a cartoon entitled "The Final Solution") condemned Sabra and Shatila by depicting Begin in Gestapo uniform standing over dead Palestinians.[60] By invoking the Holocaust to specifically denounce Israel (but not other countries), Jewish suffering in Europe was presented as the terms of reference for Israeli actions in the Middle East.[61] "Collective guilt" for the Lebanon War was applied to all Jewry: the Diaspora was judged responsible for Israel's actions.[62]

Ken Livingstone's controversial leadership of the Greater London Council (1981-1986) was also significant for the perception of leftist anti-Zionism in Lebanon's wake. As editor of the Labour Herald, the "Final Solution" cartoon led to Livingstone being reported to the police by the Board of Deputies of British Jews[63]– Anglo-Jewry's most prominent representative body – for "incitement to racial hatred."[64] Poale Zion's Ealing, Richmond, and Wembley branch singled out "miserable mustachioed manipulator" Livingstone as leading the Trotskyite entryists;[65] his villainous description reflected his poor reputation amongst many Jews. Moreover, members accused the far-left of

[54] David Rosenberg, "Holocaust Analogies," *Jewish Socialist* 1 (1985): 21.

[55] HC Debate, 8 June 1982, vol. 25, col. 14, and Reg Robinson, "Verbal Excesses," *JC* (2 July 1982).

[56] Rosenberg, "Holocaust," 21.

[57] Billig, "Anti-Jewish," 9.

[58] Billig, "Anti-Jewish," 9-10.

[59] June Edmunds, "The Left's Views on Israel: From the Establishment of the Jewish State to the Intifada" (PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014): 134.

[60] Edmunds, "Left's Views," 132.

[61] Rosenberg, "Holocaust," 21.

[62] Rosenberg, "Holocaust."

[63] Hereafter: the Board.

[64] *The Times*, 3 July 1982.

[65] Annual report of the Poale Zion Labour Zionist Movement,(hereafter: PZAR), 24 April 1983, SHORE13/6/7, Peter Shore Papers (hereafter: PSP), LSE.

"employing the term Zionism anti-Semitically in order to curry favour with Moslem anti-Semites."[66] Reference to alleged Muslim antisemitism reflected Jews' sensitivity to the political implications of London's evolving demographics: local factors intersected with the Lebanon War to reconfigure perceptions of British anti-Zionism and pro-Palestinian activity.

The Left and Pro-Israel Lobbyists

Poale Zion leadership dubbed Labour's 1982 conference "disastrous" – a sentiment echoed by LFI Chairman Lord Glenamara, who recognised that the "tide of opinion in Labour" was now against Israel.[67] Sam Jacobs, Poale Zion's General Secretary, felt the resolutions passed were understandable because of "outrage felt at the massacre in West Beirut,"[68] emphasising Sabra and Shatila's significance in sharply shifting the Left's perception of Israel. At Poale Zion's 1983 conference, the Islington branch demanded solidarity with the Israeli peace group Peace Now.[69] Support for Peace Now demonstrated their unhappiness with Israeli policy – in contrast to the leadership of the rigidly pro-Israel Board of Deputies, they publicly affirmed that Zionism did not entail embracing every action of the Israeli government. However, Islington's resolution also called for the "withdrawal of all troops from Lebanon,"[70] concealing (and mitigating) Israel's role as the war's instigator: reticence in singling out Israel persisted, even amongst those who criticised Israel's policies. In contrast, the Ealing, Richmond, and Wembley branch sought to undermine non-Zionist Jews that criticised Israel's actions in Lebanon by disassociating them from the community; non-Zionists were besmirched, without evidence, as having "opted out of the Jewish community" and purportedly possessed "no Jewish emotional or other ties."[71] The war's fallout revealed that many Zionist Jews thought non-Zionist Jews were not "real" Jews: their opinion on Israel qua Jews was therefore irrelevant. For much of Anglo-Jewry, the state of Israel remained one of the "main components of Jewish collective identity": rejecting Zionism equated to rejecting one's Jewishness.[72]

The extent of the damage inflicted on Israel's support base shocked both Poale Zion and LFI into increasing their activities. Poale Zion pledged to quash the resolutions passed on the Middle East,[73] while Glenamara asserted that LFI would redouble its lobbying efforts.[74] Their efforts were significant, recognised by the LMEC as early as November 1982 as "a counter-offensive […] to weaken the impact" of Conference's passed resolutions.[75] However, in 1985, the LFI director was jeered off stage at Labour's women's conference; delegates rejected her proposed motion congratulating Israel for Operation Moses – the

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[66] PZAR, 24 April 1983.
[67] PZAR, 24 April 1983, and *JC* (5 November 1982).
[68] Jenni Frazer, "Labour to Unravel Middle East Policy Jumble," *JC* (8 October 1982).
[69] PZAR, 24 April 1983.
[70] PZAR, 24 April 1983 [my emphasis].
[71] PZAR, 24 April 1983.
[72] Yosef Gorny, "The Jewish People at the End of the Twentieth Century Between Two Existential Experiences," *Journal of Israeli History* 15, no. 2 (1994): 193.
[73] PZAR, 24 April 1983.
[74] *JC* (5 November 1982).
[75] LMEC AGM DP.

evacuation of Ethiopian Jews from Sudanese refugee camps – by lambasting Israel for the "massacre" of Palestinians.[76] Three years later, Sabra and Shatila lingered on in Labour's political consciousness, moulding its perception of Israel: clearly, pro-Israel lobbyists were unable to wholly heal the wound that Lebanon had ruptured within Labour.

For the Board, Labour's Israel policy was rarely (and usually positively) discussed in its Erets Israel committee meetings before 1982; after the war, deputies became acutely aware of and concerned about Labour. In November 1982, deputies pondered galvanising the Jewish community to actively influence Labour opinion, while in March 1983, deputies agreed to maintain regular contact with and monitor Labour.[77] The Board's new attitude towards Labour attests to how Lebanon fundamentally ruptured and redefined Labour's relationship with Israel and its Jewish supporters: formerly perceived as the British Jewish establishment's friend, an increasingly hostile approach to Israel transformed Labour into a political foe.

The Feminist Movement

Throughout the 1970s, burgeoning internationalism encouraged greater interest in "Third World" feminists, including Palestinians.[78] At the 1975 UN Decade for Women inaugural conference, an event marking the advent of an "international sisterhood" prioritising Third World women's voices, delegates called for Zionism's "elimination."[79] Zionism's new repellent status – at least according to Third World women – was reaffirmed at the 1980 conference, where American women expressed outrage about Leila Khaled (a convicted plane hijacker) leading the PLO's delegation.[80] Zionism increasingly became a yardstick highlighting Western and Third World women's ideological differences.[81]

British feminists were not unaffected by broader trends within the global feminist debate. Internationalism intersected with domestic developments, including the rising popularity of the National Front, to advance the political mobilisation of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) women in the late seventies.[82] Concurrently, New Marxism induced a shift in feminist discourse: feminists increasingly refracted the world through a prism of oppression – "'identity politics'" – as opposed to class exploitation.[83] Ergo, racism was viewed as a separate force equal to classism, augmenting BME and Third World women's voices within the movement.[84] These developments undoubtedly influenced the pro-Palestinian stance of some feminists; self-described anti-imperialist

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[76] *JC* (21 June 1985).

[77] Erets Israel Committee minutes (hereafter: EICM), ACC/3121/C14A/11, BDBJ, 1 November 1982; EICM, 9 March 1983.

[78] Jenny Bourne, "Homelands of the Mind: Jewish Feminism and Identity Politics," *Race & Class* 29, no. 1 (1987): 5.

[79] Juliet J. Pope, "Anti-Racism, Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism – Debates in the British Women's Movement," *Patterns of Prejudice* 20, no. 3 (1986): 14, and Ellen Cantarow, "Zionism, Anti-Semitism and Jewish Identity in the Women's Movement," *Middle East Report* 154 (1988): 38.

[80] Nelly Las, *Jewish Voices in Feminism: Transnational Perspectives*, Ruth Morris, trans. (London, UK: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 204.

[81] Pope, "Anti-Racism," 14.

[82] Pope, "Anti-Racism," 14-15.

[83] Bourne, "Homelands," 3.

[84] Pope, "Anti-Racism," 14.

feminists praised Palestinian hijackers and sought to promote critical discussion on Zionism at women's conferences.[85] However, until the Lebanon War, the budding Zionist debate lingered on the side-lines: British feminists – faced with glaring gender inequality at home – primarily channelled their energies into domestic campaigning.[86]

The Lebanon War propelled Israel to the forefront of British feminist consciousness. For the first time in the history of the British women's movement, Zionism's incompatibility with feminism was explicitly avowed in two prominent feminist publications – *Spare Rib* and *Outwrite* – exploding a debate that raged throughout the 1980s.[87] Anti-Zionism does not, of course, equal antisemitism; the following analysis of this historic episode is not intended as a critique of anti-and non-Zionist ideology, but a critical examination of the antisemitic sentiment that accompanied it in this instance.

Feminism and Zionism: Irreconcilable Difference?

In a similar vein to far-left Labour publications, *Spare Rib* likened Israel to Nazism: a Jewish Israeli writer urged feminists to condemn the "Holocaust" in Lebanon, alleging her mother affirmed "what Israel is doing now is what the Nazis did" to her.[88] *Spare Rib* sought to legitimise – via a Jewish woman's voice – a moral equation between Israel's operation and the Holocaust. By employing a Jew to invoke the efficacy of the Holocaust, *Spare Rib* implied Diaspora Jewry had a moral responsibility to denounce Israel's actions and Zionism. Although this assertion is not in itself antisemitic – indeed, many Jews would concur that the Diaspora has a duty to speak out against injustices committed by Israel – the insensitive Holocaust analogy it is packaged in serves to generalise and consequently undermine the Holocaust's devastation. As contended by David Rosenberg in the Jewish Socialist, the utilisation of Holocaust comparisons fell prey to depicting "what the Jews suffered in a European context" as the terms of reference for Israeli atrocities; *Spare Rib* left open an interpretation that Diaspora Jewry was collectively responsible for Israel's actions.[89] Since feminists now asserted that Zionists did not belong in the women's movement, this conflation of Israel and Diaspora Jewry – coupled with the misuse of Holocaust analogies – aggravated an atmosphere piling pressure on Jewish women to "prove" their anti-Zionist credentials.[90]

In *Outwrite*, writers speciously claimed that Jews had "lived in harmony" with Muslims before the Israeli state's establishment.[91] Furthermore, a Jewish writer ignored Jewish suffering under Islamic rule by asserting that Middle Eastern Jews had been accorded "much more" respect in Arab countries than in Israel.[92] Arguably, Jewish

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[85] Dena Attar, interview, 9 March 2018, London.

[86] Mail correspondence with Dena Attar, 26 April 2018.

[87] Roisin Boyd, "Women Speak Out against Zionism," *Spare Rib* 121 (1982): 23, and "Statement from Outwrite," *Outwrite* 5 (1982): 2. For late-1980s debate, see Bourne, "Homelands," and Danielle Harway, et al., *A Word in Edgeways: Jewish Feminists Respond* (London, UK: JF Publications, 1988).

[88] Boyd, "Women," 23.

[89] Rosenberg, "Holocaust," 21.

[90] Las, *Feminism*, 172.

[91] *Outwrite* 4 (1982): 2.

[92] *Outwrite* 4 (1982): 3.

women lent credence to *Outwrite*'s ideological historical duplicity; their voices could protect the journal from any ensuing accusations of antisemitism. Moreover, this author only referred to Israel in quotations ("Israel"), signifying her (perfectly legitimate) refusal to recognise Israel's validity as an established state. However, in contrast, non-Jewish writers did not feel the need to qualify their opinion, suggesting she felt the need – or even felt pressured – to prove her anti-Zionist credentials as a Jew.[93] Her overcompensation indicates that, in the war's wake, a burden of proof was implicitly imposed upon non and anti-Zionist Jewish women to demonstrate an 'acceptable' political position on Israel. This burden was not discerned by their non-Jewish peers, evidencing that Jewish women were coded – though not necessarily consciously – as politically suspicious.

Many Jewish women were deeply disturbed by *Spare Rib* and *Outwrite*'s historical deception and perceived antisemitic coverage of the War. Their anxiety was only heightened when both publications refused to publish Jewish feminists' letters on the grounds their critiques were Zionist.[94] Moreover, while *Outwrite* claimed it was committed to combating antisemitism, its editors excluded Jewish women from a list of intra-movement marginalised groups.[95] This suggested that although *Outwrite*'s non-Jewish editors recognised the historic existence of antisemitism, they believed its contemporary impact on British Jewish women was negligible – if not non-existent. Dena Attar, a non-Zionist Jewish feminist who was highly active in the women's movement at that time, felt that non-Jewish feminists were simply unable to discern – and therefore dismissed – the antisemitism that Jewish women felt attacked by.[96] Attar further questioned how the *Spare Rib* collective could have rebuked Jewish feminists' letters as "Zionist" when she knew many letters' authors (including herself) were explicitly not Zionist.[97] Arguably, both publications employed "Zionist" as a smear to silence (Jewish) critics and to deflect from allegations that they published antisemitic articles – material which their non-Jewish editors did not recognise as antisemitic.

Linda Bellos, the only remaining Jewish (and black) member of the *Spare Rib* collective, resigned after being pressured to share the task of editing correspondence with non-Jews.[98] Whereas *Spare Rib* would not have questioned Bellos' ability (as a black woman) to detect racism, the collective felt her Jewishness undermined, rather than enhanced, her ability to recognise antisemitism.[99] In addition to coding Jewish women as inherently politically suspicious, the incident – coupled with the publications' discriminatory censorship – set a precedent that unless Jewish feminists unequivocally renounced Zionism, their perceived ties to Israel impaired their ability to distinguish between anti-Zionism and antisemitism.

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[93] *Outwrite* 4; see "Statement from *Outwrite*," *Outwrite* 5 (1982): 2, and "The Fight to Save Beirut," *Outwrite* 5 (1982).

[94] See Bev Gold, "Reply to Jenny Bourne's Piece in Spare Rib," *Edgeways* 16, and Dena Attar, "An Open Letter on Antisemitism and Racism," *Trouble and Strife* 1 (1983): 13.

[95] "Statement," *Outwrite*.

[96] Attar, interview.

[97] Attar, "Open," 14.

[98] Jan Shure and Barbara Lantin, "Dig in the Rib for Israel," *JC* (20 May 1983).

[99] Shure and Lantin, "Dig in the Rib."

Further complicating matters, *Spare Rib*'s editorial committee – which now, after Bellos' resignation, had no Jewish women involved – was racially divided over censorship. BME editors clearly framed the Zionist debate, in line with international trends, as a division between Third World and Western women. One writer, specifically addressing "British Zionist" women, excoriated charges of antisemitism against Third World women since a "Black and Third World peoples' holocaust" was ongoing.[100] As well as implying that BME and Third World women could not be antisemitic, by stressing that the ongoing nature of a "holocaust" against Third World people was more important than the Holocaust, the author grotesquely diminished the Holocaust's impact in order to dismiss modern antisemitism. Another writer, erasing BME and Mizrahi Jews, dismissed antisemitism as a "white women's issue"; white Jews were deemed indistinguishable from white non-Jews, meaning antisemitism was not considered a problem – and definitely not a form of racism – worth discussing.[101] Indeed, in a new post-Lebanon environment, antisemitism was dismissed as a distraction from Zionist critiques.

The debate eventually burst beyond the confines of articles: Jewish feminists were accused of sending bomb threats to *Spare Rib* and *Outwrite*, while "Women for Palestine" picketed a meeting of Jewish feminists alleging it was a cover for Zionist activities.[102] Lebanon transformed the movement into an environment in which cadres of committed Jewish feminists felt silenced and unsafe: *Spare Rib* and *Outwrite*'s damning verdict on Israel resulted in many Jewish women's de facto expulsion from the feminist movement.[103] In exile, "Jewish feminist" identity politics blossomed: new groups and a national newsletter emerged, alongside Britain's first Jewish feminist magazine – *Shifra* – which sought to redefine Jewish feminism and provide space for Jews alienated by the movement.[104] In its first editorial, a short paragraph was included that, in vague language, defended the rights of Jews to a homeland – albeit not at the "expense" of Palestinians. Although the editors accepted that Jewish feminists "have a particular relationship to Israel," after this brief acknowledgement *Shifra* did not include a single article addressing Zionism or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[105] Neither the editors nor the readers were willing – or able – to define the meaning and scope of this relationship.

By refusing to take a coherent political stance, *Shifra* created a space for Jewish women to evade addressing the very issue which had driven them out of the mainstream women's movement. Lebanon transformed Zionism into a point of irreconcilable difference: forced to define their politics on Zionism, Jewish feminists turned away from confrontation and chose depoliticisation. Depoliticisation reflected the extent to which discord over Zionism threatened *Shifra*'s internal unity. Abstention was also a reclamation of Jewish identity not defined by Zionism and certainly not defined by non-Jews; Jewish women transformed their political identities through depoliticisation. However, their retreat arguably also reflected that they had simply lost the argument

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[100] "Sisterhood is Plain Sailing," *Spare Rib* 132 (1983): 25.

[101] "Sisterhood," 25."

[102] Gail Chester, "Notes on the Impossibility of Passing," *Edgeways* 13, and Pope, "Anti-Racism," 22.

[103] Harway, et al., "About this Pamphlet," *Edgeways* 1; Chester, "Notes," and Gold, "Reply," 16.

[104] "Editorial," *Shifra* 1 (1984): 2; "Editorial," *Shifra* 3-4 (1986): 2.

[105] "Editorial," 2.

within a now conclusively anti-Zionist radical Left.

In the late 1980s, the women's press agreed to publish a Jewish feminist anthology; however, the publishers later stipulated that the anthology's editors affirm an "acceptable" stance on Zionism in its introduction.[106] The Jewish women – who regarded the condition as a form of antisemitic vetting – rejected the condition. Consequently, the publishers refused to publish the anthology.[107] The incident echoed key themes that emerged in the war's wake – inherent suspicion of Jewish women; pressure on Jews to declare an "appropriate" stance on Zionism; anti-Zionist Jews as "good" Jews – but it also underlined that Jewish women's depoliticisation disguised their failure to claw back any political ground after Lebanon.

Conclusion

In 1989, the historian David Cannadine pronounced Anglo-Jewish history "bland and lukewarm […] neither very interesting nor very exciting."[108] Evidently, Cannadine was – along with most Anglo-Jewish historians – oblivious to the Lebanon War's heated social and political ramifications for relations between British Jews and the political Left, many of which are highly relevant for the present-day political climate.

Although Labour's rosy relationship with Zionism had been declining for a decade, the unprecedented brutality of Israel's invasion – including its connection to the massacre of thousands of Palestinians – irrevocably ruptured the Labour-Israel alliance. The destruction and death wreaked on Beirut precipitated a wave of pro-Palestinian sentiment amongst the political Left, hammering the nail into the coffin of friendly Labour-Israel relations. Benn and Heffer's LFI resignations underscored how the IDF's aggression rapidly deteriorated Israel's credentials in the eyes of the Left: Israel was, for the first time, rendered indefensible. Lebanon also strengthened a prospering far-left anti-Zionism, an ideology which increasingly influenced segments of the Labour party during the war; some hues of this anti-Zionism promoted political antisemitism via Holocaust analogies. Just as the media portrayed critical Jews as Israel's moral redeemers ("good Jews"), some sections of the far-left depicted Jews as having a specific moral responsibility (because of the Holocaust) to denounce Israel: Jews that did not were "bad Jews" and guilty of Israel's crimes. For the pro-Israel Board of Deputies, and much of the Anglo-Jewish community, Labour's new anti-Israel sentiment was of deep concern. Although Labour had been steadily losing the Jewish vote, arguably, Lebanon fundamentally transformed Labour's image in the eyes of the Zionist Jewish establishment: Labour was now a foe tainted by its anti-Zionist fringes.

Lebanon also irrevocably ruptured the women's movement. Lebanon dirtied Zionism, and feminists unprecedently avowed Zionism's incompatibility with feminism. Jewish women were pressured to prove themselves as "good Jews" by denouncing Zionism; failure

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[106] Attar, interview.
[107] Attar, interview.
[108] David Cannadine, "Cousinhood," *London Review of Books* (July 1989), accessed 22 February 2018, https://www.lrb.co.uk/v11/n14/david-cannadine/cousinhood>.

to do so rendered them incapable (in the eyes of non-Jews) of distinguishing between antisemitism and anti-Zionism. Viewed in conjunction with the far-left's abuse of Holocaust analogies and non-Jewish feminists' dismissal of antisemitism as a white woman's issue, within the British Left the Lebanon War exposed and strengthened a sinister undertone of antisemitism which non-Jews did not recognise. This hostile environment led to Jewish women's exclusion from the feminist movement, and their turning-away from the Zionist debate. In choosing depoliticisation, they refashioned their political identities but also tacitly acknowledged that they had lost the argument with anti-Zionists.

There are striking parallels between today's political climate and the aftermath of the Lebanon War: the present-day Labour Party has been besieged by allegations that its' far-left touts antisemitism. This atmosphere has seemingly lessened Jewish support for Labour.[109] Moreover, the incompatibility of Zionism and feminism continues to be affirmed in many feminist circles, both local and transnational.[110] However, this analysis cannot and does not pretend to propose an ahistorical, unmodified link between the Lebanon War and present-day politics. Future scholarship should consider how historical developments after Lebanon have reshaped antisemitism and anti-Zionism in the Left and women's movement, alongside the response of British Jews.

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[109] *Guardian*, 4 May 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/04/labour-antisemitism-scandal-blamed-for-tory-win-in-barnet>.
[110] Emily Shire, "Does Feminism Have Room For Zionists?," *New York Times*, 7 March 2017.

Social and Spatial Constructions of European Migrants in Morocco

Timo Schmidt

This research explores how European migrants negotiate feelings of belonging in a multicultural setting in Morocco, namely the Kasbah des Oudayas, both as a place and socially as a neighbourhood. Using qualitative research methods, it studies belonging at the intersection of spatial belonging (attachment to a place) and social belonging (attachment to a group of people). In doing so, it focuses on (i) the role of migrants' perceptions of authenticity, (ii) modern repercussions of French colonial urban planning, and (iii) the role of gossip as a social instrument used in community building. It concludes that although Europeans have developed a sense of belonging with the Kasbah des Oudayas as a place, they do not share this sentiment with their neighbourhood at a social level. This phenomenon is largely rooted in the migrants' perception of the social order as being dualistic, with a general sense of community only existing, at best, in a state of mutual surveillance.

The Kasbah des Oudayas, located in the north of Morocco's capital Rabat, is both a space of continuity and transition. Unlike the modern urban structures in Salé, emerging on the opposite site of the adjacent Bou Regreg river, it retains a traditional outer appeal. Upon entering the Kasbah des Oudayas (KdO) one can only imagine the rich history saturating its narrow, blue-painted corridors. However, while residing inside the historic site, one also takes notice of the local-global nexus inside the KdO. Its approximately three thousand Moroccan residents saw the number of European residents quadruple to roughly 150 during the past decade, not to mention the increasing number of tourists passing through its gates every day.[1] In front of local stores and cafes, residents and visitors mingle – leading to a surging cultural exchange between people of various social backgrounds, nationalities, economic statuses, and ages. This spectacle is arguably more than a mere product of a residential area turned tourist attraction; it is also an exposition of continually shifting power relations, modern and urban influences, the interplay between the private and public sphere, and the ongoing exchange of cultural capital.

Inside the KdO, features of Almohad architecture – such as the Bab el-Kébir gate (Figure 1.2) – give memory to its initial purpose of protecting the Caliphate from hostile outsiders during the twelfth century, most prominently the Berghouata Berber tribe. However, with an increase in national diversity, spurred by the influx of European residents inside the KdO during modern times, the purpose and social structure of this historic site have grown vastly more complicated. It is precisely these phenomena that render the KdO fertile ground for research on how Europeans create a feeling of

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[1] Although no official figures exist for the number of tourists passing through the Kasbah des Oudayas, it is clear that tourism is generally on the rise in Morocco, and in Rabat specifically. The share of overnight hotel stays in Rabat, for instance, has increased by twenty-one percent between 2000 and 2014. J. Steenbruggen, "Tourism Geography: Emerging Trends and Initiatives to Support Tourism in Morocco," *Tourism & Hospitality* (2016).

Figure 1.2. Bab el-Kébir (Edwin Lord Weeks 1878)

belonging with the KdO as both a place and socially as a neighbourhood. In doing so, it contributes to the broader literature on migration by shifting attention from studying the integration of third-country nationals in Europe – the primary focus in migration literature – to the integration of Europeans abroad. By comparison, the latter type of analysis has featured in only a select few studies, such as those exploring "lifestyle migration," Europeans in Morocco, and "postcolonial imagination" through migration.[2]

Based on fieldwork taking place over the course of five months, this paper demonstrates i) how the feeling of social belonging on the part of European residents is nurtured through the spatial features of the KdO; ii) how expressions of a dualistic social structure rooted in colonial urban planning continue to influence the social order of the KdO; and iii) how processes of community building and boundary maintenance are shaped by gossip[3] as an information-communication and social control instrument. Aside from advancing the literature that deals with belonging at the intersection of

[2] M. Benson and K. O'Reilly, "Migration and the Search for a Better Way of Life: A Critical Exploration of Lifestyle Migration," *Sociological Review* (2009); B. Le Bigot, "Les Migrations Hivernales des Européens vers le Maroc: Circulations et Constructions des Espaces de Vie," *Autrepart* (2016); M. Peraldi and L. Terrazzoni, "Anthropology of Europeans in Africa: Colonial Memoirs and New Migratory Adventures," *Cahiers d'études Africaines* (2016); and Mari Korpela, "A Postcolonial Imagination? Westerners Searching for Authenticity in India," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (2010).

[3] Gossip, as explained later, is covered primarily because it emerged as an important issue during interviews with respondents. This is particularly the case among female respondents.

spatial belonging (attachment to a place) and social belonging (attachment to a group of people), this paper adds to the theoretical discussion of social order and integration, boundary maintenance, and post-colonial space.

A Brief History of the Kasbah Des Oudayas

To better capture the resourcefulness of the KdO as a research site in the present day, I will provide a brief review of its historical developments, particularly since colonial times, which will help inform the subsequent analysis. To begin with, in her book *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco* (1980), American sociologist Janet Abu-Lughod writes: "Natural segregation on economic and cultural grounds was buttressed by laws which, while they did not speak specifically of apartheid, guaranteed that, in the words of the French, 'the two races' would remain separate."[4] Indeed, much ink has been spilled about Moroccan urban planning under colonial administrator Louis H-G Lyautey (Figure 1.3) following the signing of the Treaty of Fez in 1912. Until the 1930s, with the help of various French architects, most notably Henri Prost, General Lyautey turned the city of Rabat into a spatially and socially fragmented topography, separating the new and modern *ville européenne* (European city) from the old and traditional *medina* (old city). As Wagner notes, this colonial practice, also called "association," allowed for the preservation of "le patrimoine marocain," which can be translated to Moroccan heritage.[5] By preserving the city's authentic appeal, Wagner writes, "the European was now able to gaze on 'traditions.'"[6] The KdO constitutes a key site of this Moroccan heritage, which serves as a "moiré de lieu" (place of memory) for the Almohad origins of Rabat. Fast-forward to 2016, the KdO continues to be subject to the European "gaze," as the many foreign visitors roam its corridors. However, the continuous influx of Europeans to the city of Rabat, along with the ongoing exchange of cultural capital with locals, has arguably reshuffled the social order of residents living inside the historical site.

Tracing the literature on the KdO as a locus in urban city planning leads to previous scholars who have identified various historical and cultural characteristics that give insight into the spatial and social makeup of present-day Rabat. The vast majority of this body of literature is concerned with the study of the city as a colonial and post-colonial space.[7] The aforementioned sociologist Abu-Lughod stands out with her historical account of the city, giving insight into both its origin and its development under the French Protectorate. In doing so, she captures the dynamic processes shaping the history of the Kasbah des Oudayas, starting with the site as a fortification of the Almohad caliphate, to being a "quasi-independent republic engaged in piracy and war" with Christian Spain in 1666, and its shift into a hub for trade and artisanry in 1900.[8]

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[4] Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1980), 151.

[5] L.Wagner and C. Minca, "Rabat Retrospective: Colonial Heritage in a Moroccan Urban Laboratory," *Urban Studies* (2014): 3012.

[6] Wagner and Minca, "Rabat Retrospective," 3014.

[7] Jacques Caillé, *La Ville De Rabat Jusqu'au Protectorat Français. Histoire Et Archelologie* (Vanoest: 1949); Allan M. Findlay and Ronan Paddison, *Planning the Arab City: The Cases of Tunis and Rabat* (Oxford, UK: Pergamon, 1986); Ali Sedjari, *La Revanche Des Territoires* (Rabat: L'Harmattan-Gret, 1997); and Wagner and Minca, "Rabat Retrospective."

[8] Abu-Lughod, *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco*, 73.

Other scholars, such as Garbach, manage to further underline the historical dimension of the Kasbah by drawing attention to the city's original name: in the twelfth century, the territory of Ribat el-Fath (present-day Rabat), which symbolically stands for "protection from conquest," was limited to the outer walls of the Kasbah.[9] The original scale of Ribat el-Fath is therefore but a memory manifested in the Kasbah des Oudayas.

Over time, particularly during the French Protectorate, the city subsumed the Kasbah in its dualistic spatial order, placing French influence over the city's makeup against the background of its traditional appeal (Figure 1.4). In this vein, Abu-Lughod has used the term "urban apartheid" to capture the influence of the French Protectorate under which Rabat developed into a caste city, separating its residents into neighbourhoods based on ethnicity and class.[10] Her research, alongside other works,[11] views the fragmented neighbourhoods as largely homogeneous spaces that developed under Lyautey's notion of "association." This is a logical approach, considering the distinct environment of the *ville Européenne* with its wealthy European residents and that of the old *medina* with its local, often lower-class inhabitants. My research, however, will move beyond this approach and study the KdO from the perspective of a heterogeneous, socially mobile, and ethnically diverse neighbourhood. This relatively unexplored dimension adds a framework of mobility and change to existing scholarly works. A resourceful study relevant for this research is that undertaken by geographer Allan Findlay, who analysed social space in post-colonial Rabat taking into account the factor of mobility in the structuring of social order.[12] His conclusion is in line with that of other studies, noting that class dominates over ethnicity in the creation of a social structure in post-colonial Rabat: "The status quo has been maintained within the divided city centre of Rabat, although this is so for class rather than ethnic reasons."[13]

The rapid growth of Rabat throughout the Protectorate, coupled with the centralisation of administrative and commercial functions in the city, resulted in heightened in-migration after Morocco's independence in 1956. With most of the French and Spanish colonists having left the city after the end of the French Protectorate, the following three decades saw an increasing population share of native "Rabatois" and immigrants from other cities who were keen to take up work that was left vacant by the departing Europeans.[14] Several years after the French Protectorate, by the 1970s, a growing concentration of workers employed in the tertiary sector had transformed Rabat from an administrative city to a minor industrial centre.[15]

A common methodological pattern emerging from these scholarly works is the evidently strong relationship between spatial and social structures governing life in

[9] Jamila Garbach, "Rabat: From Capital to Global Metropolis," in *The Evolving Arab City: Tradition, Modernity and Urban Development* (London: Routledge, 2008): 100.

[10] Abu-Lughod, *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco.*

[11] Marcello Balbo and Francoise Navez-Bouchanine, "Urban Fragmentation as a Research Hypothesis: Rabat-Sale Case Study," *Habitat International* (1995); Wagner and Minca, "Rabat Retrospective."

[12] Allan Findlay, Anne Findlay, and Ronan Paddison, "Maintaining the Status Quo: An Analysis of Social Space in Post-Colonial Rabat," *Urban Studies* (1984).

[13] Findlay and Paddison, *Planning the Arab City*, 51; Garbach, "Capital."

[14] Findlay and Paddison, *Planning the Arab City*, 24.

[15] Findlay and Paddison, *Planning the Arab City*, 25.

Rabat. My research sets out to use the distinct topography and historical developments of the KdO within the city of Rabat to further analyse this relationship, with a particular view towards the feeling of belonging negotiated by the Kasbah's European residents.

Figure 1.3 General Louis H-G Lyautey in Morocco (1925)

Figure 1.4 Kasbah des Oudayas during the French Protectorate (1951)

Methodology

The primary sources used in this paper derive primarily from interviews and participant observation undertaken throughout early-November to mid-December 2016. This production of data took place exclusively inside the KdO, with residents of the site. All foreign interview respondents except one (Canadian) are Europeans from Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and France who already lived in the KdO for between as little as four months to as much as seventeen years. In total, I conducted twelve interviews: nine with women (all foreign), three with men (one foreign, two local). The two interviews with locals helped to reflect on the meaning of social order from an insider's perspective and were sometimes more technical than the interviews with non-local residents. In all cases, the purpose of the research was explained and permission to interview and record was granted before the start of the interview. The names of all respondents have been changed for the purpose of ensuring their anonymity.

Interviews were semi-structured and undertaken in English with the help of an interview guide, which was adjusted throughout the research period in order to narrow down the scope of research. The interviews took typically between forty-five to sixty minutes, with three interviews going more in-depth taking roughly two hours each. The aim was to learn about the respondents' experiences living inside the Kasbah des Oudayas and in particular their perception of the site as a shared "home" with locals.

Another component that complements the primary sources is participant observation. This part of the research has taken place in the form of spending extensive time with locals as well as Europeans while living in the KdO for five months. In addition, I went to various locations inside the KdO that stimulated interaction between foreigners and locals given their popularity: this included a gated community near the

Café Maure, the shopping street (*Rue Jamaa*), the terrace facing the Bou Regreg river, as well as the upper and middle gate from which one can enter the site (see Figure 1.5). The observations made throughout each two-hour window complemented my general perceptions of living in the KdO, and fostered an understanding of how interactions between locals, non-local residents, and tourists take place.

Figure 1.5 Map of the Kasbah des Oudayas

Theoretical Discussion
Place-belongingness and Politics of Belonging

There have been avid discussions on the relationship between place-belongingness and the politics of belonging. Geographer Marco Antonsich highlights the difference between both these notions: "A personal, intimate, feeling of being 'at home' in a place (place-belongingness) [...] a discursive resource that constructs, claims, justifies, or resists forms of socio-spatial inclusion/exclusion (politics of belonging)."[16] John Crowley has provided a more concise definition, describing the politics of belonging as "the dirty work of boundary maintenance."[17] Other scholars have attempted to find a more holistic approach to the study of belonging: Probyn promotes an approach focused on affective community-making grounded in physical proximity instead of common identity;[18] Antonsich critically questions whether communities of belonging can feel at home and create emotional attachments to a place without creating a common identity with

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[16] Marco Antonsich, "Searching for Belonging – An Analytical Framework," *Geography Compass* (2010): 644.

[17] J. Crowley, "The Politics of Belonging: Some Theoretical Considerations," in A. Geddes and A. Favell, eds., *The Politics of Belonging: Migrants and Minorities in Contemporary Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 30.

[18] E. Probyn, *Outside Belonging* (London: Routledge, 1996), 13.

their surrounding community;[19] Nira Yuval-Davis further analyses this post-identity community of belonging, suggesting that "the 'sociology of emotions' should come to terms with the 'sociology of power.'"[20] These approaches, used in social scientific inquiry, suggest that a central concept in the study of belonging is that of intersectionality, which analyses individuals' loci at the intersection of place-belongingness and the politics of belonging. Rather than focusing on one category of belonging, such as ethnicity or class, research in this area has developed toward accounting for the plural dimensions which place an individual in a wider socio-spatial setting. Pollini has set the groundwork to conceptualise this phenomenon in his work on "polycentric belonging," writing that "belonging cannot be treated like a 'zero-sum game.'"[21] Following this literature, my research will also study belonging at the intersection of different dimensions, placing emphasis on the interactions between belonging in spatial terms to a place (e.g. the Kasbah des Oudayas) and in social terms to a group of people (e.g.. its residents).

Likewise, it is important to highlight that scholars have explored various so-called "points of attachment" in the construction of a social order: these include ethnicity and class;[22] auto-biographical factors (memory), relational factors (personal and social ties), cultural factors (language);[23] social locations, emotional attachments, ethical and political value systems, meaning the ways in which others judge systems of "belonging,"[24] as well as everyday life situations that encourage the formation of identity collectives.[25] A discernible pattern in these works is what Cuba and Hummon sum up by noting, "social participation in the local community is essential for community identity."[26] While the body of literature introduced in this section provides a pool of analytic categories to work with, the challenge going forward is to account for this complexity, while at the same time not compounding the analysis of my respondents' social experiences with too many points of attachment in the context of belonging. Accordingly, research by Y. Yun-Kim proves resourceful for highlighting other – and for my study, more relevant – factors that foster social participation with local communities: these include the objective to mature through new relationships with others, to create functional or pragmatic relationships,

[19] Antonsich, "Searching," 658.

[20] N. Yuval-Davis, F. Anthias, et al., "Secure Borders and Safe Havens and the Gendered Politics of Belonging: Beyond Social Cohesion," in *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2005), 528.

[21] Gabriele Pollini, "Socio-Territorial Belonging in a Changing Society," *International Review of Sociology* (2005): 510.

[22] Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Boston: Little Brown, 1969).

[23] Yuval-Davis, Anthias, et al., "Secure Borders."

[24] N. Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging," *Patterns of Prejudice* (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2006).

[25] T. Fenster, "Gender and the City: The Different Formations of Belonging," in L. Nelson and J. Seager, eds., *A Companion to Feminist Geography* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005); A. Amin, "Take the White Out of the Union Jack," paper delivered at the Conference on Politics and Ethnicity, Merton College, Oxford (2005); and G. Valentine, "Living with Difference: Reflections on Geographies of Encounter," *Human Geography* (2008).

[26] L. Cuba and D.M. Hummon, "A Place to Call Home: Identification with Dwelling, Community, and Region," *The Sociological Quarterly* (New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing, 1993): 122.

to learn about host cultural practices, and to help ease loneliness.[27]

In and Out Group Forming Within the Global-local Nexus

It is important to recognise that social participation in the KdO is restrained by its socially mobile climate, namely constant reshuffling of residents with various backgrounds coming in and out of the site. It is, therefore, a crucial step to consider how mobility and change affect this research when analysing the social fabric inside the KdO. Sociologists have already attempted to study such socio-spatial settings in culturally diverse societies.[28] A key question underlying these works is whether mobility hinders the development of a sense of belonging, partly due to the temporary nature of social participation. A review of the literature reveals several opposing arguments: Savage et al. introduce the concept of "elective belonging," where newcomers to a community may choose to develop different forms of belonging with a community (e.g. emotional belonging or functional belonging) based on their own needs and resources.[29] In turn, this concept "deliberately avoids polarising immobile locals against rootless cosmopolitans," as it provides a lens through which to study how either group of people create a sense of belonging on their terms.[30]

Similarly, Gustafson's monograph on immigrants in Berlin and Paris concludes that extensive travel as practiced by the cosmopolitan did not produce uprootedness, indicating that belonging can exist across different territories.[31] These views oppose those of other scholars, who argue that mobility is negatively associated with belonging to a place or a group of people.[32] These scholars commonly point towards the length of residency, which arguably dictates the strength of relational ties. Yet, principal to the works of the latter stream of scholars is the assumption that host communities are socially cohesive, making newcomers a threat to the existing social order and therefore difficult to accept. However, in a neighbourhood as diverse as the Kasbah des Oudayas, where residents are constantly being reshuffled, it is important to distance myself from such assumptions.

Also, research exploring belonging in the context of interculturality and mobility can hardly ignore the "contact hypothesis," which links increased interaction between individuals of various ethnic backgrounds to a narrowing of previous differences in their attitudes.[33] The theoretical framework proves relevant for this paper, as it provides the analytic tool to study the interaction between locals and foreigners as they become loaded with power relations that produce myriad outcomes of assimilation.[34] According to this strand of literature, cultural boundaries may recede throughout this process; however,

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[27] Y.Y. Kim, *Becoming Intercultural: An Integrative Theory of Communication and Cross-Cultural Adaptation* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), 122.

[28] M. Savage, G. Bagnall, et al., *Globalization and Belonging* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004); D. Morley, "Belongings: Place, Space and Identity in a Mediated World," *European Journal of Cultural Studies* (2001); and P. Gustafson, "Mobility and Territorial Belonging," *Environment and Behavior* (2009).

[29] Savage, et al., *Globalization*, 6

[30] Savage, et al., *Globalization*, 103.

[31] Gustafson, "Mobility."

[32] A. Buonfino and L. Thomson, *Belonging in Contemporary Britain* (London: Commission on Integration and Cohesion, Wetherby, 2007), 16; Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson, *The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994), 155.

[33] Norbert and Scotson, *Established*, 124.

[34] Yuval-Davis, "Belonging," 209.

some more ineradicable dimensions, such as ethnic boundaries, can solidify processes of in- and out-group forming. The seminal work by Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson in *The Established and the Outsiders* (1994) picks up on this point, demonstrating that outsiders are commonly subordinate to the established groups due to the aforementioned boundaries.[35] At the other end of the spectrum, the concept of "community-in-difference" describes a community wherein boundaries are seen as rather permeable, allowing for more porous communities to develop. To avoid confirmation bias of either one of the two outcomes of boundary maintenance, the intersection of both approaches will serve as a guiding line when exploring what separates the local host community from the European migrants in this research.

Gossip as an Information-Communication and Social Control Tool
This final part of the literature review is concerned with gossip as a communicative and social-control tool used by a community or an individual. As mentioned in the introduction, the choice to include gossip in this analysis comes from the information respondents provided during interviews and the high level of significance they attributed to the concept. Reifying the notion that gossip as an interactional genre is often gendered feminine, it was particularly female respondents who engaged in this discourse.[36] Here, it is important to point out the distinction between gossip used by a community *or* an individual, as it separates two different schools of thought in their approach to the study of gossip. On the one hand, M. Gluckman proposes a functionalist approach where gossip serves as a public opinion that, in effect, enforces conformity to community standards.[37] On the other hand, Paine sees gossip as a form of information-communication, rather than a group-binding and boundary-maintaining mechanism.[38] In short, as Gilmore writes: "for the functionalists it is the community that gossips; for the transactionalists it is the individual and not the community that gossips."[39] My research incorporates both approaches by (i) acknowledging that gossip is charged with power relations, a view that resonates with Gluckman's definition of gossip as a form of "privileged communication" and (ii) treating gossip as a "genre of informal communication [...] intended to forward and protect individual interests," a view that resonates with Paine.[40] As such, I move beyond similar definitions, such as "word-of-mouth" communication, which are typically used in marketing and behavioural

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[35] Norbert and Scotson, *Established*, 157-158.
[36] N. Besnier, "Information Withholding as a Manipulative and Collusive Strategy in Nukulaelae Gossip," in *Language in Society* (London: Queen Mary University of London, 1989).
[37] M. Gluckman, "Gossip and Scandal," *Current Anthropology* (1963).
[38] Robert Paine, "What Is Gossip About? An Alternative Hypothesis," *Man* (1967).
[39] David Gilmore, "Varieties of Gossip in a Spanish Rural Community," *Ethnology* (1978): 89.
[40] Gluckman, "Gossip," 33; Paine, "What Is Gossip About?," 278.

economics to capture their impact on economic decision-making and social learning.[41]

Finally, the reviewed body of literature on gossip gives prominence to the role of trust. As sociologist Robert D. Putnam writes in *Bowling Alone* (2000), for instance, "dense social ties facilitate gossip and other valuable ways of cultivating reputation – an essential foundation for trust in a complex society."[42] Tying these findings together with the earlier discussion on belonging and boundaries, it can be discerned that gossip acts itself as a point of attachment facilitating dense social ties. This train of thought raises the question whether, vice versa, being on the outside of gossip generates a lack of trust and feeling of exclusion from a community. In both cases, the relationship between gossip and trust is rooted in the practice of boundary maintenance, which is closer to Gluckman's functionalist approach. With regard to the information-communication approach utilised by the transactionalists, such as Paine, gossip can also be used in an informative and benign manner in the form of surveillance and protection. Gilmore also calls this type of gossip "idle talk" or "recreational gossip."[43] Although gossip, trust, belonging, and attachment have been discussed in social scientific inquiry, these concepts have thus far attracted only limited attention about the nodes that link these together. Therefore, based on the theoretical discussion above, this paper aims to contribute to this literature by analysing these concepts through an integrated approach in the context of the social order governing the KdO.

Place-Belongingness
The European Gaze on Tradition
As suggested earlier, part of this research explores the points of attachment Europeans create with the KdO as a place, or, in other words, what motivates Europeans to live in the KdO. The focus here is on how perceptions of the KdO's spatial make-up nurture a feeling of belonging vis-a-vis European residents, and in particular, which factors facilitate or hinder this process. All respondents share a similar view that the attractiveness of the KdO is rooted in its authentic and traditional appeal. These perceptions link to the aesthetics of the site on the one hand, and the closeness it offers to local Moroccans on the other. Karin, an older resident who lived in the KdO on and off for fourteen years, stated in an interview that "everybody wants a house in the Oudayas [...] it's a hotspot for Europeans with old houses, close to the people." Other respondents see the KdO as a "symbol of the city" and a "not just white-only place,"providing the opportunity to stay in a traditional Moroccan neighbourhood. Some younger interviewees enjoy the liberal atmosphere in the KdO, where they can host the occasional party. These interview excerpts point towards the appeal of a hybrid lifestyle, whereby Europeans enjoy the virtues of a more liberal social order while being simultaneously able to exercise the aforementioned "European gaze" on tradition, a practice that was already fostered by

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[41] Glenn Ellison and Drew Fudenberg, "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (1994).

[42] R. D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

[43] Gilmore, "Varieties," 98.

Lyautey's urban planning during colonial times.[44]

Drawing from these characteristics, Europeans can tailor their experiences living in the KdO according to their own needs: it provides Karin with the freedom to withdraw from her work life in the Netherlands within a visually aesthetic and traditional setting, it gives Paul the possibility to go to the beach in less than three minutes to meet other foreigners and enjoy surfing lessons, and it helps Fiona to practice her Darija language skills through interaction with Moroccan vendors on Rue Jamaa. This makes the KdO *as a place* a popular destination for Europeans who search for a (temporary) home abroad – it offers a little bit of everything. However, the perceived attractiveness of the KdO, and the associated influx of Europeans presents a double-edged sword for the Moroccan residents. While tourism has increased the influx of foreigners willing to spend money on souvenirs and refreshments inside its walls, residents from abroad have raised housing prices drastically over the past two decades, which has pressured Moroccans into finding housing elsewhere. According to Rachid, a tour guide who grew up in the KdO, this has caused conflict between locals and non-locals. These findings raise the question of whether the benefits enjoyed by European migrants – a calm and liberal atmosphere within a visually aesthetic and traditional setting – come at the cost of social tensions with local residents over time.

Place-belongingness and Feeling "at Home"

For Tara, a French-Algerian woman, the motivation to move to the KdO is less the traditional appeal of the site as a whole, but rather the house she visited when looking for a new apartment. During the interview she stated that she felt at home in her apartment, but not outside. She fell in love with the rich history of the building, which was built in 1423. It offers a panoramic view over the Bou Regreg river and an underground tunnel that was used by pirates throughout the seventeenth to nineteenth century. Her connection to the house resonates with Marco Antonsich's understanding of place-belongingness, namely the "personal, intimate, feeling of being 'at home' in a place."[45] A number of other respondents indicated this feeling, including Karin, who found her house to be "more quiet, more authentic, more natural"; Fiona, who feels at home in her apartment because she feels safe there; and Paul, who referred to living in his apartment as "living in a postal [*sic*] card." Creating these connections with a place is part of the home-making strategies that Europeans use to feel at ease in unfamiliar surroundings. However, as scholars have already pointed out, these strategies are not "an isolated and individual affair."[46] This view was also raised during my interview with Karin, who acknowledged that the presence of co-ethnics enriched her experience living in the KdO: "I miss Alexandra. She is living here but now she is gone. That is one of the nice aspects for me to go to Rabat." In this context, the presence of a "familiar face" prevents feelings of loneliness and isolation, which stand in stark contrast to the notion of place-belongingness.[47]

[44] Wagner and Minca, "Rabat Retrospective," 3104.

[45] Antonsich, "Searching."

[46] E. Probyn, *Outside Belonging* (London: Routledge, 1996), 13.

[47] D. Dorling, D. Vickers, et al., *Changing the UK. The Way We Live Now* (Sheffield: University of Sheffield, 2008), 23.

The experiences of Zoe and Lyn, two French women in their late twenties who lived in the KdO for two-and-a-half years each, highlight how the spatial setting of the KdO influences the feeling of being "at home." Both live in the lower part of the KdO, right below Café Maure and adjacent to the Andalusian garden (Figure 1.6). Their apartment is unique insofar that it is located in a gated part of the KdO, which is inhabited by no more than twenty-five people. According to the residents living inside this gated part, they can feel a shared sense of privacy despite the adjacent Café Maure being a public and highly visited space. During the interview, Zoe noted that this feeling has produced a "small community within a community," where people are connected through neighbourly ties. One such neighbour named Sara, who is a married Moroccan woman in her mid-thirties, quickly established a strong bond with Zoe and Lyn due to the geographic proximity of their homes. Other respondents who live elsewhere in the KdO also shared stories of neighbourly relations. However, most of them were broadly defined as what one respondent called "functional friendships," which centre on the principle of reciprocity. In the case of Zoe and Lyn, however, the nature of relations to Moroccan neighbours were friendly and not functional. At one point during the interview Zoe said, "I always feel a lot of solidarity in this district," a view that was not expressed by respondents outside the gated part of the KdO, suggesting that the enclosed spatial setting has eased the process of

Figure 1.6 Moroccans showing a camel to European tourists at the entrance of Café Maure (2016)

"creating a home" for the respondents. This phenomenon further demonstrates the need to pay greater attention to the interactions between place-belongingness (spatial) and politics of belonging (social), a link that will be closer analysed in the following part of this paper.

Politics of Belonging
European Perceptions of Social Order

> "There is an Oudaya mentality. But not a community. I thought it was very open. There are Moroccans, foreigners, young people, surfer. This is like an island where you can find everyone. And there is this mentality. Okay, we are in Morocco, we are in Rabat, but really we are actually in the Oudayas." – Michaela

The quote above represents a sentiment that is shared by other European residents living in the historic site, such as Fiona, who affirmed in her interview that "the Oudayas is particular [...] it is different from all other things." After having heard similar adjectives used to describe the social environment of the KdO, such as "special," "unique," and "different," I tried to trace the origins of this rationale. In particular, I focused on the question of whether European residents saw themselves as part of this "unique" social environment. In this vein, the interviews with my respondents revealed that Europeans had vastly different levels of engagement with their social surrounding, which had a significant impact on their perception of it.

Three discernible patterns emerged from my interviews. First, some respondents, including Karin, Fiona, and Paul, chose to keep their distance from locals and mainly engaged in interactions for pragmatic reasons. These ranged from buying gas bottles and running daily errands to sharing recipes for couscous with neighbours. While this allowed Karin to be on good terms with locals, she also admitted that she did not actually *know* any people, except her housekeeper Ajiba, with whom she kept a "functional friendship." Both Paul and Karin viewed the social order of the KdO as loose and incoherent, with a lack of clear social links between the residents. Secondly, other respondents, such as Zoe and Lyn, who live in the gated community of the Oudaya, make a strong effort to integrate with their social environment. Being able to create and maintain more meaningful relations with Moroccans on an ongoing basis, Zoe and Lyn reportedly felt a stronger sense of community. Thirdly, the last group of respondents, including Michaela and Tara, first made attempts to integrate themselves socially but soon gave up on their efforts. During interviews, it became clear that, after time, they came to view the social fabric structuring the KdO as impermeable, with little room for newcomers to integrate. Tara summarised this change in perception in simple terms: "At first, they act open [...] but then they *are* not open."

These different stories reflect that perceptions of the social environment are not only rooted in Europeans' aspirations to integrate socially but also in their individual capacities to do so. As pointed out earlier, some European residents chose to move to the KdO because of its aesthetics and a specific house they wanted to live in, rather than the KdO's social setting. However, for the second and third group of respondents (as categorised above), the distinction is not as clear given that all respondents pursued a similar interest to integrate, yet experienced different outcomes. The following analysis will elaborate on this phenomenon by looking at the politics of belonging that steer the motivation of residents towards one direction or the other – namely integration into or separation from the community.

Social Bonds and Boundaries

As pointed out in the preceding literature review, creating social ties is a multidimensional process that is facilitated by a variety of so-called "points of attachment." Previous scholars identified these points of attachment as largely based on the likeness between two people, such as autobiographical or cultural similarities.[48] However, some respondents suggested that the different behaviours and customs of locals could both motivate and hinder their engagement with the community. Respondents also viewed language as playing a significant role in deciding the success of integration or lack thereof. Michaela, for instance, tried to learn Darija through lengthy conversations with Said, an orange juice seller on Rue Jamaa. She turned her limited language competencies into a vehicle for engaging with local Moroccans. Other respondents, such as Paul, instead framed their lack of language competencies in Darija as an obstacle: "I don't speak Darija which is a pity. That makes it difficult for me to have encounters with the local people here."

In the same vein, Tara (being a Muslim herself) visited the local mosque during Ramadan since she hoped this practice would enable her to create meaningful relations with residents of the KdO through religion. However, despite her efforts, Tara concluded, "in the Oudaya you cannot integrate [...] the people here can't change that mentality." In the case of Tara, utilising shared traditions and practices, such as the prayer during Ramadan, did not ease her integration process. The story of Zoe and Lyn reflects how certain political projects can nevertheless achieve exactly that. They set up a cultural centre early on during their stay in the KdO, which offered several courses in French, the arts and maths to young children. By doing so, they provided a platform that created a sense of belonging for both themselves and the local residents of the KdO. This practice resonates with Yuval-Davis's work, which states, "the politics of belonging comprises specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging in particular ways to particular collectivities that are, at the same time, themselves being constructed by these projects in very particular ways."[49]

Finally, a decisive factor in the creation of ties between locals and Europeans is the prospect of gaining (mutual) benefits through a relationship. "If you want to have a good relationship here with people you need to do them favours," says Tara. This adds a highly functional dimension to the discussion on the politics of belonging. For some respondents, being part of the KdO ultimately meant being generous and hospitable when a local Moroccan came "knocking [on] the door" (Tara). In some cases, this even involved giving a small financial donation. Although respondents unanimously said they did not feel a sense of responsibility towards the KdO community, they still recognised the value of doing favours if someone knocked on their door. Kindness would, eventually, be met with kindness: for some respondents the practice of "knocking [on] the door" resulted in an exchange of stories and the occasional invitation for tea or a plate of couscous. Fiona, for instance, noted that she too started to knock on her neighbours' doors if she needed small favours. As suggested, these examples are nevertheless no overarching recipe for social integration and are often rooted in pragmatism. As Tara

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[48] Dorling and Vickers, et al., *Changing the UK*, 23.
[49] Yuval-Davis, "Belonging," 197.

points out, "there are some people who will laugh with you only for 100 dirham [...] you have to draw clear borders."

Dualism in The Kasbah Des Oudayas

> "The Oudaya is a very specific social environment. It is very unique I would say. It is normal if somebody wouldn't feel that much at ease here because there is this divide between Europeans and locals." - Paul

During the early phase of my research, I expected my findings to refute the idea that a dualistic social order, rooted in colonial urban planning – as outlined in the historical review of the city earlier in this paper – still found its repercussions in the present-day social setting of the KdO. My observations in Café Maure as well as in Rue Jamaa seem to support this argument, given the vastness of friendly interactions between local Moroccans and Europeans, many of whom resided in the KdO side by side. During my interview with Brahim, a soup chef who had grown up in the KdO, I was repeatedly reminded about the "openness" that Moroccans practised towards Europeans. According to him, locals not only enjoyed the company of Europeans but hosting Europeans for a couscous dish on a Friday would even elevate their (the locals) own status. I had a similar experience during my guided tour with Rachid: whilst guiding me through the historic site, he showed great enthusiasm about introducing me to his Moroccan friends. On several occasions, he pointed to me and said, "he lives here in the Oudaya [...] he is my friend." While it is unclear whether these expressions of appreciation were honest in nature, the socially diverse and highly mobile environment of the historic site seemed, at first, to have blurred the rigid lines between "us" and "them."

As introduced during the discussion of theoretical literature, the concept that describes the narrowing of differences through increased interaction between individuals of various ethnic backgrounds is called "contact hypothesis."[50] It is through interaction that socio-cultural boundaries recede and pave the way for a new, more diverse kind of community. Yet the evidence derived from interviews with European KdO residents hardly confirmed the premises underlying the contact hypothesis: Fiona noted, even if many foreigners reside in the KdO, people always retain their identity. She stated, "this neighbourhood stays the same," while according to Paul, "a Westerner will never truly know what these people feel. And I will never be one of them." Moreover, Michaela affirmed, "I think it's kind of [a] separation of two communities here," and Karin mentioned, "I don't want to get that close to them. There is us and there is the other." Strangely, these shared views stand in stark contrast to the "openness" that Brahim and my tour guide Rachid felt towards European residents, which raises the question as to why some European residents perceive a dualistic social order where others, including locals, do not.

The interviews revealed that one critical reason behind these two diverging views is the perceived sense of ownership locals claim over the KdO. European residents

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[50] Elias and Scotson, *Established*, 124.

expressed that the "us versus them" mentality surfaced when locals aimed to claim authority over the KdO as a place, and ultimately over the people residing inside it. Asking how this ownership was expressed during daily encounters, I was told that locals who were born in the KdO often referred to themselves as "Oudaya people" – i.e. those who truly belonged to, and could, therefore, claim ownership over, the Oudaya. This mentality was expressed strategically: in other instances, particularly during the practice of knocking on the door and asking for money, foreigners were included in the social category comprising "Oudaya people." During these encounters, Paul told me, the locals express solidarity along the lines of "we are a family here, a community [...] you shouldn't do this [...] or you should give us money." According to my respondents, reasoning that there is a group of "Oudaya people" has two purposes, each concerned with the politics of belonging inside the KdO: first, it helps to legitimise one's own social standing in the wider social hierarchy of the community; secondly, it creates a chauvinistic sense of ownership over the foreign other. Several other quotes from the interviews mirror this mentality:

"People here think the Oudaya belongs to them." – Zoe

"I think it's a kind of separation of two communities here." – Fiona

"I understood I had to buy my place in the Oudaya if I want to stay here and have good relations with the people." - Tara

Gossip
Gossip as an Information-Communication Tool
During the previous part of this paper, I explored several social markers and boundaries, which are maintained and reproduced, but also contested and challenged by social agents inside the KdO. However, one unexpected factor that gave specific insight into the construction of the social setting in the KdO turned out to be *gossip*. Although a discussion on gossip was initially not meant to be part of this research, interviews with my respondents revealed that it was a significant aspect of their lives in the KdO. As pointed out in the literature review, theorising the relationship between gossip and community has produced differing views: on the one hand, scholars such as Paine argue that it serves as an information-communication tool;[51] on the other hand, a camp of scholars surrounding Gluckman view gossip as a group-binding and boundary maintenance mechanism.[52] My research in the KdO has produced examples concerned with both schools of thought, which are presented below and followed by a discussion on the impact gossip has on the construction of a community of belonging.

Both my own experiences living in the KdO as well as the interviews with European residents gave insight into the value gossip has as an information-communication tool.

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[51] Paine, "What Is Gossip About?"
[52] Gluckman, "Gossip," 33, and Paine, "What Is Gossip About?"

The encompassing reach of gossip networks became, clear to me when half a dozen local Moroccans asked whether my family had enjoyed their stay *prior* to their arrival. "Does your family want to see the Oudaya? [...] I can show them and make a good price," promised Oudman, a local tour guide with whom I had not previously shared any information about my family's visit. This casual form of gossip is unlike the kind of gossip used to make a judgement, often accusatory, about some specific person or affair. Nor is it aimed at protecting the "values of a group," which, according to some scholars, are asserted in gossip.[53] In this case, the process of disseminating information instead serves the purpose of creating a personal benefit (i.e. making money through a guided tour with the family). In other words, this exchange of news is much closer to the "genre of informal communication [...] intended to forward and protect individual interests."[54]

Some European residents also reported stories where gossip brought people closer together. Michaela shared with me that news of her arrival to the KdO after extended stays abroad would quickly circulate among local residents: "they ask me how my stay in Italy went, which is nice [...] they are informed." Similarly, Karin explained that locals would share information about her: "they know me [...] they know I'm the Dutch who is living here." In these instances, gossip assumes the role of a social catalyst between Europeans and locals. It provides information to locals, which allows them to engage in the lives of other residents to the degree that, if not overstepped, is perceived as "caring." Although these examples point towards gossip being primarily used as an information-communication tool, European newcomers to the KdO quickly become aware of the power relations embedded in the practice of gossiping. The following section provides further insights that suggest the two differing schools of thought, as outlined above, may be treated as complementary rather than conflicting.

Gossip as a Social Control Tool

During my interviews respondents repeatedly expressed their awareness about the use of gossip as a social-control tool. They view the communication networks that facilitate the flow of information about them as a surveillance-type form of communication strategy. "They are like cameras. They don't need cameras because they have people," concludes Fiona after a discussion about the security inside the KdO. Some respondents choose to live with this lack of privacy; however, others feel subjugated by it to the extent that they leave the historic site. This type of social control reflects what M.J. Herskovits hypothesised when arguing that gossip can turn into "a 'wary' or informal and indirect sanction."[55] Tara, for instance, notes, "Some friends of mine who lived here left the KdO. There is no intimacy. You live *for* other people." This mode of "being watched and heard" has reportedly discouraged even local Moroccans to move to the KdO. Women, in particular, find it difficult to escape gossip, which they perceive as a limit to their personal freedom: in this regard, two respondents share a story with me about a female

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[53] Gluckman, "Gossip," 33, and Paine, "What Is Gossip About?," 314.
[54] Paine "What Is Gossip About?"
[55] M.J. Herskovits, "The Significance of the Study of Acculturation for Anthropology," *American Anthropologist* (1937): 122.

Moroccan neighbour, who secretly attends parties hosted by Europeans, where she enjoys the occasional alcoholic beverage. For the Moroccan neighbour, preventing this information from permeating among the local residents is crucial. She is afraid it could reach her husband and relatives and, result in the aforementioned sanctions.[56]

However, gossip may also positively serve European residents living in the KdO, as the example of Tara shows. During interviews, the French-Algerian resident told me that early on during her stay she experienced racism against her Algerian heritage. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed analysis of the politics behind the strained relationship between Moroccans and Algerians, and I will, therefore, focus on the story of Tara itself. Upon her arrival, she made it known to locals that she was the daughter of a rich landlord, which elevated her social standing within the wider community. After several weeks, during which this piece of information circulated among residents of the KdO, Tara was soon met with a more civil and respectful form of interaction. In this case, she consciously used gossip as a social-control tool to control her own social location vis-à-vis that of local Moroccans: "People here think I'm the daughter of my rich Jewish landlord. Because of that, I can do whatever I want." After a brief pause, she adds, "people here are scared of strong characters."

Furthermore, gossip networks in the KdO serve the purpose of enforcing compliance with community standards. They may do so, as theorised by previous scholarship, in the form of assembling "basic information on peers [...] a technique for summarising community opinions."[57] This construction of public opinion about an individual may affect his or her standing in the community and can, therefore, turn into a social-control instrument influencing behaviour. Concerned with this development is an example from Karin, who reports having lent her apartment/house/flat for half a year to a Dutch woman who invited "all kinds of guys," which in turn "led to a lot of gossip." This eventually forced Karin to re-establish her social standing within the community upon her return to the KdO. According to her, this sort of gossip "is very bad for my reputation [...] for a week I had to chase away all the guys from the Oudayas." For both Tara and Karin, gossip was used as a form of influence over the opinion of other residents of the KdO. This suggests that Europeans too can play an active role in the bending of information-communication channels towards their own benefit, a practice that thus far has lacked theoretical consideration in social scientific inquiry.

Gossip and the Language of Inclusion and Exclusion
Previous examples from the KdO demonstrate European residents' awareness of their surrounding gossip channels and even indicate some degree of influence over these networks. However, it remains ambiguous as to whether Europeans can actively "perform gossip" as part of the community. It is worth noting here that scholarship has previously studied gossip as a language of inclusion and exclusion. In his influential work "Gossip and Scandal," Gluckman writes that gossip is primarily performed among close

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[56] Herskovits, "Significance of the Study," 122.
[57] J.F. Szwed, "Gossip, Drinking, and Social Control: Consensus and Communication in a Newfoundland Parish," *Ethnology* (1966): 435.

friends within the community, demonstrating its status as "a privilege that demonstrates and reiterates belongingness to a certain group."[58] Gossip is, therefore, not only a social catalyst but an indicator of the power relations that constitute the social fabric of a given community. In light of this background, I restructured my interview questions in order to explore how Europeans participate in gossip networks, which revealed that the majority of respondents shared similar views: they expressed a strong awareness of gossip but admitted they were mostly unable to trace and participate in it.

Awareness of gossip as a language of inclusion and exclusion has encouraged Europeans to forge social ties with certain groups or families who enjoy a higher social standing within the community of the KdO. According to some respondents, being friends with these families means that "your life is calm." As sociologists Elias and Scotson showed in their study *The Established and the Outsiders*, being associated with the established groups of a community eases the integration process for outsiders.[59] Lyn and Zoe highlight that this phenomenon works both ways in the KdO: "If you have a problem with the people at the terrace, the people around my door know about this problem [...] and then you are not their friends anymore." Although my research produced insights that point towards the existence of a well-functioning and active gossip network among the local population, European residents do not view this network as an indicator for a strong sense of community. During my interview with Tara, for instance, she tells me: "Here is a network of people always seeing and speaking about everything. That is one thing that we as foreigners do not see [...] because we don't participate in it."

Conclusion

To conclude, this paper has advanced the approach of studying belonging at the intersection of spatial belonging (attachment to a place) and social belonging (attachment to a group of people). The main question, namely how Europeans create a feeling of belonging with the Kasbah des Oudayas as both a place and socially as a neighbourhood, has been answered through the three interrelated sections of this paper.

First, this paper revealed that European residents are attracted to the Kasbah des Oudayas due to its diverse blend as a neighbourhood with a liberal environment as well as its traditional and "authentic" appeal, which is largely based on the perceived "closeness to the people." European residents also indicated that their association with place-belongingness resonates more with their respective homes rather than the Kasbah des Oudayas at large. In other words, Europeans are indeed able to create a "personal, intimate, feeling of being 'at home' in a place"; however, this is mostly the case with enclosed spaces within the Kasbah des Oudayas (e.g. apartment, gated community). Hence different degrees of place-belongingness corresponded with varying awareness levels of social order in the Kasbah des Oudayas.

Adding to this, the second part of this research illustrated that Europeans perceive the social order of the Kasbah des Oudayas as dualistic based on the separation between themselves and local Moroccans. This perception resonates with two factors, namely

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58 Gluckman, "Gossip and Scandal," 33; Paine, "What Is Gossip About?," 313.

59 Elias and Scotson, *Established*.

that i) the dualistic urban and social structure that governed Rabat during colonial times and that continues to have repercussions in modern times ii) Moroccan residents claim ownership over the Kasbah des Oudayas, which in turn creates a perceived chauvinistic sense of ownership over non-locals. This emphasises the need to study the interaction between place-belongingness and the politics of belonging more broadly in scholarly literature, rather than treating these concepts as two separate analytic components. Not least, it demonstrates that the success or failure of constructing social ties with the local community depends on social bonds and boundaries. Alongside language competencies and shared cultural practices, this includes the functional value of a relationship.

Third, as part of the process of community building and boundary maintenance, European residents of the KdO share an awareness of gossip being used both as an information-communication and social-control tool. On the one hand, gossip facilitates the flow of news about residents, both local and European, which in turn generates a feeling of "being heard and seen." On the other hand, this feeling serves as a social catalyst for local residents to engage more easily with the lives of Europeans. In addition, this research has highlighted that gossip can be used as a social-control tool, enforcing compliance with cultural or community standards. While it plays a significant role in the production of in-and out-groups inside the KdO, however, it should not be treated as a signifier for community identity; contrary to some of the literature reviewed here, respondents have expressed concerns over the suitability of this practice as an indicator for a strong sense of community.

As Marco Antonsich points out, one of the critical questions of the present debate around place-belongingness and the politics of belonging is whether a "community of belonging" can exist beyond a "community of identity."[60] In the case of the Kasbah des Oudayas, a tentative conclusion emerges: although European migrants have been able to develop a sense of belonging with the Kasbah des Oudayas as a place, they lack a similarly strong sentiment with their neighbourhood at a social level. As this research has revealed, this phenomenon is primarily rooted in their perception of the social order as being dualistic, with a general sense of community only existing, at best, in a state of mutual surveillance.

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[60] Antonsich, "Searching," 13.

Qashqadarya Arabic Dialect:

A Survey of Linguistic Features Based on Four Folktales[1]

Carolina Zucchi

In Central Asia live several communities of ethnic Arabs who have inhabited the region for centuries. Of these, the Arabs living in the Qashqadarya region, in the southeast of Uzbekistan, are among the few who have preserved the knowledge of an Arabic dialect. The dialect of Qashqadarya, as well as the few other varieties spoken in Central Asia, is relevant for the study of Semitic linguistics as it could potentially display archaic features of Arabic, having been separated from the mainstream Arabic-speaking world for centuries. This article offers an introduction to the main cultural traits of this community of Arabs, and an overview of their dialect's main linguistic features. The survey is based on four folktales from the monograph The Qashqadarya Arabic Dialect of Central Asia *(2008) narrated by two local informants. This study aims to contextualise Qashqadarya Arabic in the field of Arabic dialectology and to investigate the impact of the neighbouring languages on the dialect. The findings point to possible genetic connections between Qashqadarya Arabic and dialects spoken in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, and to the intermixture of Turkic, Iranian, and Semitic features in the speech of this community.*

Introduction[2]

Several communities of ethnic Arabs live in villages and rural areas scattered throughout Central Asia, among the Iranian and Turkic peoples who inhabit this area. They claim descent from Arabian tribes,[3] refer to themselves as "Arab,"and are also called so by the rest of the local population in the region.[4] Based on historical evidence, they are likely the descendants of Arabs who first settled in Central Asia either at the time of

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[1] I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Orhan Elmaz for his guidance and encouragement and the Laidlaw Scholarship Programme in Research and Leadership for the training and generous support, which allowed me to start investigating this field.

[2] The Library of Congress (ALA-LC) transliteration system will be employed for Russian words. Transliteration of Modern Standard Arabic and Tajik words follows the Deutsches Institut für Normung (DIN) standard, while the official Latin alphabet in use in Uzbekistan will be employed for Uzbek words. As for examples in Qashqadarya Arabic, the original transliteration system used by Guram Chikovani – essentially an expansion of the DIN standard – has been retained. A description of this transliteration method is provided in: Guram Chikovani, *Kashkadar'inskiĭ Arabskiĭ Dialekt T͡sentral'noĭ Azii* (Tbilisi: Institut Vostokovedeniia Imeni G.V. T͡sereteli: Tbilisskiĭ Institut Azii i Afriki, 2008), 12-15.

[3] Bernard Dupaigne, "Les Arabes Arabophones d'Afghanistan," in Jean Pierre Digard, ed., *Le Cuisinier et le Philosophe: Hommage à Maxime Rodinson* (Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1982), 89; Irina Anastas'evna Amirian͡ts, "Ėtnicheskoe Razvitie Sredneaziatskikh Arabov," in Roza Shotaevna Dzharylgasinova and Lada Sergeevna Tolstova, eds., *Ėtnicheskie Prot͡sessy u Nat͡sional'nykh Grupp Sredneĭ Azii i Kazakhstana* (Moskva: Nauka, 1980), 226.

[4] Chikovani, *Kashkadar'inskiĭ Arabskiĭ Dialekt*, 103; Amirian͡ts, "Ėtnicheskoe Razvitie Sredneaziatskikh Arabov," 213.

the early Islamic conquests or at a later stage.[5] Within these communities, few groups have preserved the knowledge of an Arabic dialect, including the Arabs living in the Qashqadarya region, situated in the southeast of Uzbekistan. Qashqadarya Arabs are settled in some areas in the villages of Jeynau and Qamashi, both situated in the Qarshi district,[6] where they have been living in close contact with ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks and, to a lesser extent, Turkmen.[7] The study of their dialect is especially relevant in the field of Semitic linguistics as, being a peripheral one which has survived in an area separated from the mainstream Arabic-speaking world for centuries, it could potentially display archaic features of Arabic lost in other modern dialects. The scope of the present article is to introduce the main cultural traits of this community and to offer an overview of the linguistic features of their Arabic dialect as displayed in four selected folktales. Through linguistic evidence, this study aims to investigate the interconnectedness of this community with other ethnic groups in the region – by commenting on the influence of the other languages spoken in Uzbekistan on the dialect – and possible genetic relationships between Qashqadarya Arabic and other Arabic dialects. The four texts selected for analysis, namely "hayāt dilmurōd" (henceforth referred to as T1), "farasīn zīnak u zoka saḫbak" (T2), "walt čüpōn u matala" (T3), and "walad vai bintin ḫušrūia" (T4),[8] are local folktales narrated orally by two different Arab informants living in this area. They were collected by the Georgian scholar Guram Chikovani between 1980 and 2000, and published in the collection *The Qashqadarya Arabic Dialect of Central Asia* (in the original Russian title: *Kashkadar'inskiĭ Arabskiĭ Dialekt T͡sentral'noĭ Azii*).[9] They present a number of widespread Middle Eastern and Central Asian folkloric motifs. Jointly, they form a corpus of roughly 2500 words.

Much less scholarly attention has been paid to the study of the Qashqadarya dialect compared to the other variety of Arabic spoken in Uzbekistan – Bukhara Arabic – due to a somewhat unfortunate publishing history. Although the ethnographic study of the nomadic Arabs living in Uzbekistan was initiated in the nineteenth century by Russian

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[5] Elena Georgievna T͡sareva, "Kovrodelie Arabov I͡uzhnykh Raĭonov Uzbekistana, Konet͡s XIX–Nachalo XXI Veka (po Kollekt͡sii͡am MAE i REM)," in Mikhail Anatol'evich Rodionov, ed., *Obrazy i Znaki v Tradit͡sii͡akh I͡uzhnoĭ i I͡ugo-Zapadnoĭ Azii,* vol. 61 (Sankt-Peterburg: MAE RAN, 2015), 276.

[6] Chikovani, *Kashkadar'inskiĭ Arabskiĭ Dialekt*, 7.

[7] Balkis Khalilovna Karmysheva, "Sredneaziatskie Araby," in Sergeĭ Pavlovich Tolstov, ed., *Narody Sredneĭ Azii i Kazakhstana*, vol. 2, (Moskva: Akademii͡a Nauk SSSR, 1963), 583.

[8] Chikovani, *Kashkadar'inskiĭ Arabskiĭ Dialekt*, 56-87. The texts were selected based on the closeness of their folkloric motifs to tales appearing in the collection *One Thousand and One Nights*. The present article, indeed, forms part of a broader project studying both the folklore and the dialect of Qashqadarya Arabs. The project included evaluating previous claims that some of the folktales told by this community are versions of tales appearing in the *Nights*. The whole study, comprising an original translation of the four texts into English and a comparative analysis of folkloric motifs, formed part of the author's unpublished dissertation, "Dialect and Folklore of the Qashqa-Darya Arabs of Uzbekistan: An Analysis of Four Selected Folktales," (Undergraduate diss., University of St. Andrews, 2017).

[9] Guram Chikovani, *Kashkadar'inskiĭ Arabskiĭ Dialekt T͡sentral'noĭ Azii* (Tbilisi: Institut Vostokovedenii͡a Imeni G.V. T͡sereteli: Tbilisskiĭ Institut Azii i Afriki, 2008).

scholars,[10] the linguistic study of their Arabic dialects started much later. The first to remark that varieties of Arabic were spoken in the Qarshi district of Uzbekistan at this time was Afanasiĭ Grebenkin.[11] Nevertheless, it was only in 1929 that Natal'ia Burykina and Mariia Izmaĭlova, two students of the Soviet Arabist Ignatiĭ Krachkovskiĭ, by chance came across speakers of an Arabic dialect and recognised its potential relevance for Semitic linguistics.[12] This led to several Soviet expeditions to Uzbekistan during which ethnographer Isaak Vinnikov and linguist Georgiĭ Ts̓ereteli collected extensive speech samples, mainly in the form of folktales or anecdotes. It is at this stage that two linguistically different dialects were distinguished and defined as "Bukhara" and "Qashqadarya Arabic." Between 1935 and 1943, the expeditions mainly concentrated in the Bukhara region,[13] leading to several publications on Bukhara Arabic by both Vinnikov and Ts̓ereteli.[14] These works, which together provided a relatively large corpus, created the basis for the study of what came to be known as "Uzbekistan Arabic" (a category including both the Bukhara and the Qashqadarya dialects) for the following decades. As for the variety of Qashqadarya, Vinnikov's expeditions to Jeynau and Qamashi started only in 1943.[15] Of the extensive dialectological material collected by him, only a few short samples were published,[16] while the rest was meant to be included in an extensive monograph comprising of several recorded texts.[17] This work, unfortunately, is at present still unpublished and has only recently been discovered in the St. Petersburg branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences Archive.[18] Ts̓ereteli visited the Qashqadarya region too, but the speech samples he published are also extremely scarce.[19] Therefore, the possibility that additional archival material collected by him also exists and is still unpublished, cannot be ruled out. Due to the insight this material could offer into

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[10] Mariia Aleksandrovna Ianes, "Vklad I. N. Vinnikova v Istoriiu Izucheniia Arabskogo Naseleniia Uzbekistana," *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta* 9, no. 3 (2008): 281.

[11] Amir'iants, "Ėtnicheskoe Razvitie Sredneaziatskikh Arabov," 214.

[12] Ianes, "Vklad I. N. Vinnikova," 281.

[13] Ianes, "Vklad I. N. Vinnikova," 285.

[14] Vinnikov and Ts̓ereteli published more than one hundred folktales told by Bukhara Arab informants and transcribed in their dialect. The most substantial publications are the following two monographs: Georgiĭ Vasil'evich Ts̓ereteli, *Arabskie Dialekty Sredneĭ Azii: Bukharskiĭ Arabskiĭ Dialekt* (Tbilisi: Akademiia Nauk Gruzinskoĭ SSR, 1956), and Isaak Natanovich Vinnikov, *Iazyk i Fol'klor Bukharskikh Arabov* (Moskva: Nauka, 1969).

[15] Ianes, "Vklad I. N. Vinnikova," 285.

[16] Only fifteen speech samples (mainly anecdotes of the Nasreddin type) were published in the following chapter: Isaak Natanovich Vinnikov, "Obrazts̓y Govora Kashka-dar'inskikh Arabov," in Grigoriĭ Shamilevich Sharbatov, ed., *Semitskie Iazyki, Sbornik Stateĭ* (Moskva: Akademiia Nauk SSSR: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoĭ Literatury, 1963), 176-185.

[17] Ianes, "Vklad I. N. Vinnikova," 288. With this material Vinnikov planned to publish and started to prepare a monograph titled "Arabs of Uzbekistan," containing seventy local folktales related by Arab informants and a glossary of the dialect.

[18] Ianes, "Vklad I. N. Vinnikova," 290. Although according to Ianes there were plans of publishing it around 2008, it does not appear to have seen the light of day yet.

[19] Ts̓ereteli only published nine short speech samples in the following article: Georgiĭ Vasil'evich Ts̓ereteli, "K Izucheniiu Iazyka Sredneaziatskikh Arabov: Obrazts̓y Rechi Kashkadar'inskikh Arabov," in *Trudy Instituta Iazykoznaniia* (Tbilisi: Akademiia Nauk Gruzinskoĭ SSR [Seriia Vostochnykh Iazykov], 1954), 251-271.

the traditional customs and dialect of this community at a stage preceding their full integration in Uzbek society, the value of obtaining access to such sources for the fields of both ethnography and linguistics could not be stressed enough.

The next expeditions to the Qashqadarya region for the collection of dialectological material were carried out by the Georgian scholar Guram Chikovani, the Rector of the Free University of Tbilisi until 2016. After completing his education at Tbilisi State University and at the Tsereteli Institute of Oriental Studies (Georgian Academy of Sciences) in Tbilisi with a specialisation in Philology, Chikovani pursued the study of both varieties of Arabic spoken in Uzbekistan. He produced a number of publications mainly on Qashqadarya Arabic, based on his expeditions to the region. He is the only scholar, at present, who has published a comprehensive grammar of this dialect,[20] contained in the monograph *The Qashqadarya Arabic Dialect of Central Asia,* from which the four texts for this study have also been selected. Besides this descriptive grammar section, the monograph comprises seventy annotated folkloristic texts transcribed in Qashqadarya Arabic – mainly folktales or anecdotes and a few autobiographical accounts – and their translations into Russian. Therefore, it constitutes the most extensive corpus presently available in this dialect and is a valuable source for the study of the folklore of this community. According to Chikovani, his expeditions to the Qashqadarya region took place in 1980, 1986, and 2000, to the villages of Jeynau and Qamashi, where he lived in close contact with his informants. The texts were recorded during gatherings organised specifically for the collection of dialectological material, during which a group of male Arabs would reunite and one informant would narrate some of their traditional tales or anecdotes in his dialect.[21] So far, most of the conclusions drawn on the linguistic features of Qashqadarya Arabic have been based on the few speech samples published by Vinnikov and Ṯsereteli in the 1960s. The present article aims to provide a novel contribution by turning to a much less studied and more extensive corpus.

After Chikovani's visits to Central Asia, more recent expeditions to the village of Jeynau have been conducted between 2004 and 2007, by the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography of the Russian Academy of Sciences, aiming to collect ethnographic material and information regarding the Qurʾān of ʿUṯmān discovered in the village of Katta Langar.[22] This led to the creation of an online exposition on the customs of the Arabs of Jeynau,[23] but information regarding most of the material collected, regretfully, remains unpublished. Once again, this could offer valuable insight into the community's traditional culture.

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[20] Chikovani, *Kashkadar'inskiĭ Arabskiĭ Dialekt*, 17-52.

[21] Guram Chikovani, personal interview, July 2017.

[22] Ĩanes, "Vklad I. N. Vinnikova," 288.

[23] Efim Anatolʹevich Rezvan, Tatʹĩana Fedorova, Vĩacheslav Makarov, Kristina Gerṯsovskaĩa, Sergeĭ Duzhnikov, and Andreĭ Melʹinkov, virtual exposition, "Jeynov – My prishli," in *Ékspoziṯsii i Kollekṯsii, Kunstkamera*, accessed 1 April 2018, <http://www.kunstkamera.ru/index/exposition/exhibitions1/arhiv_01/jeynov_we_arrived/>.

Qashqadarya Arabs: Main Cultural Traits

Research on the Arabs of Uzbekistan has not reached a unanimous conclusion on the circumstances of their migration to Central Asia; however, it seems most likely that they either came at the time of the early Arab conquests in the late seventh century or that they belonged to a group from Syria and Mesopotamia deported by Tamerlane in the fourteenth century.[24] After roaming the region between the south of Uzbekistan and the north of Afghanistan as a nomadic population for centuries, they gradually started becoming sedentary due to contact with neighbouring farming populations.[25] There is evidence that at the beginning of the twentieth century that some of them still led a nomadic way of life,[26] and that five families of Arabs from Qashqadarya moved to Afghanistan to escape the Soviet domination between 1929 and 1933.[27] Although Arabs were recognised as a distinct ethnic group by the central Soviet administration in official censuses, those of Central Asia belonged to one of the many minorities to which no extraterritorial cultural autonomy was recognised.[28] As a consequence, cultural activities and the usage of their traditional dialect were not endorsed by the local administration, which tried to accelerate the assimilation of minorities into the rest of the population,[29] encouraging identification with an Uzbek national identity.

On the other hand, thanks to the relative seclusion from the rest of the local population that they maintained before Uzbekistan fell under Soviet rule and the fact that intermarriage with other ethnic groups was rarely practiced, Qashqadarya Arabs preserved some of their characteristic customs.[30] Their traditional female costume, comprising of facial jewellery and elaborate headgear, their technique of carpet production,[31] and their wedding and burial rituals[32] distinguish them from the neighbouring Uzbek and Tajik populations. It has also been argued that their traditional clothing and jewellery might present elements of Bedouin culture.[33] By the time of the latest academic expeditions to the area in 2007, Qashqadarya Arabs still practiced some of their traditional occupations, namely karakul sheep breeding and carpet weaving, in addition to working in cotton fields.[34] Their folklore, however, based on the texts collected by Chikovani, mainly presents Uzbek or Persian motifs rather than traits which can be directly associated with an Arab heritage. The acquisition of such motifs might have been accelerated by the attested presence in the region of multilingual *baxshi*

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[24] Vincent Fourniau, "Les Arabes d'Asie Centrale Soviétique: Maintenance et Mutation de l'Identité Ethnique," *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 59 (1991): 84.

[25] Amir'i͡ant͡s, "Ėtnicheskoe Razvitie Sredneaziatskikh Arabov," 220.

[26] Fourniau, "Les Arabes d'Asie Centrale Soviétique," 87.

[27] Dupaigne, "Les Arabes Arabophones d'Afghanistan," 90.

[28] Fourniau, "Les Arabes d'Asie Centrale Soviétique," 87-88.

[29] Fourniau, "Les Arabes d'Asie Centrale Soviétique," 88 and 93.

[30] Amir'i͡ant͡s, "Ėtnicheskoe Razvitie Sredneaziatskikh Arabov," 227.

[31] Marii͡a Aleksandrovna I͡anes, "Materialy Muzeĭnykh, Bibliotechnykh i Arkhivnykh Sobranii Sankt-Peterburga kak Istochnik po Istorii i Ėtnografii Arabov Basseĭna Kashkadar'i (Uzbekistan)," (PhD diss., Sankt-Peterburgskiĭ Gosudarstvennyĭ Universitet, 2010): 8.

[32] Amir'i͡ant͡s "Ėtnicheskoe Razvitie Sredneaziatskikh Arabov," 224.

[33] Amir'i͡ant͡s, "Ėtnicheskoe Razvitie Sredneaziatskikh Arabov," 222-224.

[34] Rezvan et al., virtual exposition, "Jeynov – My prishli."

singer–storytellers, still active and performing *dostons* drawn from the Uzbek folkloristic heritage in private evening gatherings, in bazaars, and at weddings.[35]

For the purposes of this study, it is also worth mentioning that, according to Soviet ethnographers, in the first half of the twentieth century Qashqadarya Arabs were already all at least bi- or trilingual. Although, according to Vinnikov, in the 1940s Tajiks occupied some of the residential quarters of Jeynau,[36] T͡sereteli claimed that only a few Arabs in Qashqadarya could speak Tajik, while they were all fluent in Uzbek, which they used in their everyday life.[37] Chikovani confirms that, at the time of his expeditions, Qashqadarya Arabs were all fluent in Uzbek, the language used for education, everyday communication, and bureaucracy, and only knowledgeable to a lesser extent in Tajik.[38] No information regarding their possible knowledge of the Turkmeni language or their level of fluency in Russian is available. According to Chikovani, the only form of Arabic his informants knew was their dialect, and they could recite the Qur'ān by heart without being able to read it.[39] Nevertheless, the ethnographer Amir'i͡ant͡s claimed that in 1974, a few newspapers in Arabic were sold in Qarshi for an audience of elderly Arab locals.[40]

Already in the 1980s ethnographer Boris Gamburg found that only relics of the traditional culture of the Arabs of Jeynau were still surviving, and that their use of their Arabic dialect had become limited to the domestic sphere.[41] The disappearance of these traits was certainly accelerated in Soviet times, when the younger generation's close interactions with other ethnic groups increased drastically through their access to educational institutions and service in the Soviet army.[42] The gradual loss of their dialect is confirmed by some autobiographical accounts told by Chikovani's Arab informants claiming that, while the elder generation was fluent in their Arabic dialect, the youth were not able to speak it anymore.[43] Based on the same accounts collected between 1980 and 2000, the Arabs themselves did not seem, at the time, to be actively engaged in an effort to preserve their traditional language. Two informants, indeed, admit that their children were not able to speak the dialect,[44] implying a choice not to transmit the language to the younger generation. However, if these accounts, the precise date of collection of which is unknown, had been recorded before the fall of the Soviet Union,

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[35] Sharustam Shamusarov, "Fol'klornye Svi͡azi Ti͡urkskikh Narodov T͡sentral'noĭ Azii i Sredneaziatskikh Arabov," *Vostok: Afro-Aziatskie Obshchestva: Istorii͡a i Sovremennost'* 1 (2009): 66.

[36] Vinnikov, "Obrazt͡sy," 176.

[37] Georgiĭ Vasil'evich T͡sereteli, *Arabskie Dialekty v Sredneĭ Azii, Doklady Sovetskoĭ Delegat͡sii na XXIII Mezhdunarodnom Kongresse Vostokovedov, a Semitologii* (Moskva: Akademii͡a Nauk SSSR, 1954), 25.

[38] Guram Chikovani, "Linguistic Contacts in Central Asia," in Éva Ágnes Csató, Bo Isaksson, and Carina Jahani, eds., *Linguistic Convergence and Areal Diffusion: Case Studies from Iranian, Semitic and Turkic* (London, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 127.

[39] Chikovani, interview, July 2017.

[40] Amir'i͡ant͡s, "Ėtnicheskoe Razvitie Sredneaziatskikh Arabov," 217.

[41] Boris Zalmanovich Gamburg, "Ėtnicheskie Osobennosti Kashkadar'inskikh Arabov (Sel. Dzheinau)," T.G. Emeli͡anenko, ed., *Nauchnyĭ Zhurnal, Rossiĭskiĭ Ėtnograficheskiĭ Muzeĭ: Ėtnicheskie Tradit͡sii v Kul'ture* 1, no. 3 (2013): 47.

[42] Amir'i͡ant͡s, "Ėtnicheskoe Razvitie Sredneaziatskikh Arabov," 227-228.

[43] These autobiographical accounts constitute some of the speech samples included in Chikovani, *Kashkadar'inskiĭ Arabskiĭ Dialekt*, 146 and 170-171.

[44] Chikovani, *Kashkadar'inskiĭ Arabskiĭ Dialekt,* 146 and 170-171.

the informants could have been trying to feign a higher level of identification with the Uzbek national group by emphasising their abandonment of their traditional customs. According to ethnographer Fourniau, indeed, it is likely that the Arabs of Uzbekistan tried to hide their knowledge of their Arabic mother tongue in official Soviet censuses because of pressure received from the local republican administration.[45] Due to these pressures for the assimilation of minorities into the Soviet Uzbek society, which possibly influenced both the Arabs' accounts and the ethnographers' work during this period, it is difficult to determine what role the knowledge of their Arabic dialect played in the community's self-identification as an Arab ethnic minority at that point in time.

Linguistic Analysis

Before proceeding to the linguistic analysis of the four chosen texts, we should briefly consider the classification of Qashqadarya Arabic. This dialect has often been grouped together with the one spoken in the Bukhara region under the label of "Uzbekistan Arabic."[46] As a consequence, conclusions reached based on a Bukhara Arabic corpus have often been applied to Qashqadarya Arabic, too, and dialect differences between them have occasionally been disregarded. In order to avoid confusion and in light of the recent discovery of two more Arabic varieties spoken in Balkh, Afghanistan, and Khorasan, Iran, which belong to the same dialect group, it is preferable to refer to each dialect either by its specific denomination or as part of the wider category of "Central Asian Arabic dialects." According to recent comparative research, Qashqadarya Arabic is likely to be a more modern dialect type compared to the varieties of Bukhara and Afghanistan, and to be closer to that of Khorasan.[47]

The following section will include a linguistic commentary on selected features of Qashqadarya Arabic as displayed in the four selected texts. Whenever providing examples in Qashqadarya Arabic from the texts, their reference number followed by a dot and the paragraph number will be given within parentheses. A translation into Modern Standard Arabic will be occasionally added whenever deemed helpful to facilitate comprehension and comparison of lexical items across different Arabic dialects, mainly in the discussion of the phonology. The analysis is limited to linguistic features the examples of which could be detected in the chosen texts and is divided into two sections. The first one aims to contextualise the dialect in the field of Arabic dialectology. Here, linguistic features characteristic of other Arabic dialects, and which therefore allowed a comparison of Qashqadarya Arabic with them, were selected for analysis. These features have been grouped into the categories of phonology, morphosyntax, and lexicon for purposes of

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[45] Fourniau, "Les Arabes d'Asie Centrale Soviétique," 94.

[46] The label "Uzbekistan Arabic" applied to a Bukhara Arabic corpus only has been employed even in pivotal works treating Central Asian Arabic dialects, such as Kees Versteegh, "Word Order in Uzbekistan Arabic and Universal Grammar," *Orientalia Suecana* 33-35 (1986): 443-453, and Jonathan Owens, *A Linguistic History of Arabic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

[47] Ulrich Seeger, "On the Relationship of the Central Asian Arabic Dialects with a Previously Unpublished Text from South Khorasan," in "Zum Verhältnis der zentralasiatischen arabischen Dialekte," trans. Sarah Dickins, *Academia* 6-7, accessed 18 April 2018, <https://www.academia.edu/10319772/On_the_Relationship_of_the_Central_Asian_Arabic_Dialects>.

clarity. The following section, aiming to investigate innovations derived from contacts with non-Semitic languages and the impact they had on the dialect, revolves around those linguistic features which seem likely to have been influenced by adstrate languages.

Comparison with Other Arabic Dialects: Phonology

The transcription method adopted by Chikovani poses some limits to the phonological analysis of the speech of Qashqadarya Arabs. With extreme frequency different realisations of a word appear in the speech of the same informant, as in: *siyyātənna* (T1.2), *šiyaténna* (T1.3) and *šiyātənna* (T1.3), "their (f.) clothes" (lit.: "their (f.) things," MSA ʾašyāʾuhunna) where sound /š/ shifts to /s/ and the length of the vowels varies. Occasionally, words appear to be arbitrarily split (as in: *tatūl hāgu* (T1.6) "you will reach it," which also figures as *tatilhagum* (T2.6) or joined together (as in: *abūy walada faras […] anta* (T2.1), "the father gave the horse to his son," which presumably should be: *abū i walada faras […] anta*, where i is the Qashqadarya equivalent of MSA ʾilā). The latter is probably an attempt to indicate that the words were pronounced as a unit by the informant, although the joining symbol "‿" and dashes are also employed in other cases. For these reasons, which raise doubts on the reliability of the method used, remarks on the phonetic aspects of the dialect will be limited to a few essential points.

In light of this premise, the occasional appearance of Arabic emphatic consonantal sounds such as /ṣ/ and /a/, which according to Chikovani are retained in a weakened form,[48] seems dubious. T͡sereteli, whose transcription method Chikovani adopted with minor changes, affirms that in his transcription emphatic symbols are used "mainly for etymological purposes."[49] Moreover, in the few recordings of Qashqadarya Arabic speech available on Chikovani's website, the informants do not seem to pronounce emphatic consonants even when they are transcribed.[50] These arguments, and the fact that these sounds do not exist in Uzbek or in Tajik, whose pronunciation has largely influenced the dialect, make the possibility of a retained emphatisation seem unlikely.

The Modern Standard Arabic emphatic sound /q/, the main distinguishing trait between Bedouin and sedentary dialects, appears with two different realisations in the analysed material. This sound is most frequently realised as a voiced velar stop /g/ as in: *gāl* (T4.1, MSA *qāla*) "he said" and *ingalabat* (T2.2, MSA *inqalabat*) "she returned," a trait associated with Bedouin dialects[51] and, in the Iraqi context, with the *gələt* ones.[52] However, in several instances the /q/ pronunciation is also preserved in Arabic words, as in: *i-foq* (T1.4, MSA ʾilā fawq) "to the top" and *qatalta* (T3.5, MSA *qataltahā*) "you (m. s.) killed her"). This clashes with Jastrow's finding, based on an analysis of Vinnikov's

[48] Chikovani, *Kashkadarʾinskiĭ Arabskiĭ Dialekt*, 19.

[49] T͡sereteli, "K Izuchenii͡u I͡azyka," 254.

[50] Guram Chikovani, *Jeinau*, 2000 November 5-8, online audio recording and transcription, gchikovani, accessed 1 April 2018, <http://www.gchikovani.ge/index.php/audio-and-video-recording/kashkadarya-dialect/23-kad-audio>.

[51] Judith Rosenhouse, "Bedouin Arabic," in Lutz Edzard and Rudolf de Jong, eds., *Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics*, accessed 15 March 2019, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1570-6699_eall_EALL_COM_0037>.

[52] Otto Jastrow, "Iraq," in Lutz Edzard and Rudolf de Jong, eds., *Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics*, accessed 15 March 2019, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1570-6699_eall_EALL_COM_vol2_0056>.

corpus, that only the /g/ pronunciation appears in Qashqadarya Arabic, while both realisations are found in the dialect of Bukhara.[53] The realisation of this phoneme as voiceless (namely as /q/, /'/ or /k/) is generally associated with sedentary dialects.[54] More specifically, its realisation as /q/ is particularly common in those of Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.[55] However, considering that the voiceless uvular stop /q/ exists both in the Tajik variety of Persian and in Uzbek, the main adstrate languages Qashqadarya Arabs came in contact with, there is a possibility that the dialect presented only the /g/ pronunciation at the moment of their migration to Central Asia, and that the sound /q/ was only acquired due to contact with these languages.

Moreover, the tendency for diphthong /aw/ to be realised as /ō/, as in: *yōm* (T1.6, MSA *yawm*) "day," and the preservation of the /ǧ/ phoneme, as in: ǧīt (T1.5, MSA ǧi'tu) "I came," which in western Bedouin and sedentary dialects tends to be realised rather as /ž/ or /g/, are features typical of eastern Bedouin dialects.[56] Finally, interdental sounds are lost, which is a feature usually associated with sedentary Arabic dialects rather than with Bedouin ones, where they tend to be retained.[57] One example is the Arabic phoneme /ṯ/ which turns into /s/, as in: *salč* (T1.5, MSA *ṯalǧ*) "snow" and *kisīr* (T4.5, MSA *kaṯīr*) "much," in line with Jastrow's finding that Modern Standard Arabic interdentals are always realised as sibilants in Qashqadarya Arabic.[58] This feature, however, is once more likely to have been influenced by the Tajik pronunciation, in which interdentals appearing in Arabic loanwords are always realised as sibilants.

Comparison with Other Arabic Dialects: Morphosyntax
With regard to the main morphological characteristics, I will initially turn to the conjugation of the first person of the imperfective, considered to be the main distinguishing feature between eastern and western Arabic dialects. Examples from the texts show a closer similarity to the patterns *aktib* for the first person singular (*amid* (T1.5) "I leave"; *ma aḫōf* (T1.5) "I am not afraid of") and *niktib* for the first person plural (*nil'ab* (T1.1) "we play"; *nuzbaha* (T2.2) "we will kill him"; *nōḫusa* (T3.2) "we take her"), both characteristic of eastern Arabic dialects, than to respectively *nəktəb* and *nkətbu*, found more frequently in western ones.[59]

As for the distinction between Bedouin and sedentary dialects, several features appearing most commonly in the eastern Bedouin ones, following Vicente's classification,[60] could be detected. Among these are the -ūn/um ending for the second and third person

[53] Otto Jastrow, "Dialect Differences in Uzbekistan Arabic and Their Historical Implications," in Olivier Durand, Angela Daiana Langone, and Giuliano Mion, eds., *Alf Lahga wa Lahga: Proceedings of the 9th Aida Conference* (Wien: LIT Verlag, 2014), 207.
[54] Ángeles Vicente, "Génesis y Clasificación de los Dialectos Neoárabes," in Federico Corriente, Ángeles Vicente and Farida Abu Haidar, eds., *Manual de Dialectología Neoárabe* (Zaragoza: Instituto de Estudios Islámicos y del Oriente Próximo, 2008), 43.
[55] Vicente, "Génesis y Clasificación," 57.
[56] Vicente, "Génesis y Clasificación," 51.
[57] Rosenhouse, "Bedouin Arabic."
[58] Jastrow, "Dialect Differences," 207.
[59] Vicente, "Génesis y Clasificación," 41.
[60] Vicente, "Génesis y Clasificación," 50-53 and 57-58.

plural in the conjugation of the imperfect (*tatilhagum* (T2.6) "you (m. p.) will reach"; *ibkūn* (T1.5) "they (m.) remain") and the appearance of the -*īn* ending for the second person feminine singular in the imperfect (*tidrīn* (T1.2) "you (f. s.) know"). Moreover, the construct state is retained, as displayed by the feminine singular noun *mōra* (*il-mōra* (T3.6), "the wife"), in which the final sound /a/ turns into /t/ when followed by a personal pronoun, as in: *morta* (T3.6) "his wife". Another feature is the second person masculine singular pronoun, which takes the form of -*k*, (*abūk* (T1.5) "your (m. s.) father"). Finally, no instances of the use of *b-/bi-*, or any other prefixes carrying a present tense meaning (including prefix *m-*, in all likelihood of Persian influence, which appears in Bukhara Arabic)[61] were found in the conjugation of the imperfect, although the prefix *ta-* appears relatively often carrying what seems to be a future meaning (*hamzīk bint ta-ilgia* (T1.1) "he shall find that girl"). A possible connection could be with prefixes *tə-* and *də-* also expressing a future meaning in some Iraqi dialects, namely the Jewish one spoken in the areas of Arbīl and 'Aqrah and the varieties spoken in Mosul.[62]

Some additional features could be associated, not only with eastern Bedouin dialects, but more specifically with Iraqi *gələt* dialects. These include the third person singular masculine pronominal suffix -*a* (*isma* (T1.1) "his name"), as pointed out by Jastrow,[63] and the third person plural masculine ending in the conjugation of the perfect -*aw* (*šafaw* (T1.5) "they saw"),[64] also appearing in Naǧdi Arabic.[65] Verb form IV was also identified in the verbs "to give" (*ma nṭaha* (T3.1) "he did not give her") and possibly "to show" (*wōraha* (T2.5) "he showed her"; *wōraha* (T1.2) "show (m. s.) it!"). Although it is unclear whether it is productive in Qashqadarya Arabic, retaining this verb form is a rare feature for Arabic dialects. In the Iraqi context, it is only productive in rural *gələt* dialects.[66] Finally, another feature typical of this dialect group is the gender distinction in the second and third person plural,[67] retained both in verbs (feminine plural ending -*anna*: *daḥalánna* (T1.3) "they (f.) entered"), and in pronominal suffixes (endings -*um* in *maġsadum* (T1.6) "their (m.) aim"; -*kum* in *maġsadukum* (T2.6) "your (m. p.) aim"), and -*ənna* in *šiyātənna* (T1.3) "their (f.) things").

The appearance of an -*in(n)-* particle acquiring several different functions throughout the analysed texts is particularly worth noting. In several cases, this -*in* (or, occasionally, -*en/-i*) suffix is used to connect a noun to its adjective (*bintin ḫušrūya* (T3.1) lit.: "the girl-*in* beautiful") or it appears between a noun and an adverb/verb to build relative clauses (*lumalatin itfur* (T1.4) "the rumal [which allows] to escape," lit.: "the rumal-*in* he escapes"; *bintin zēn tšūfa* (T1.2) "the girl whom he loves," lit.: "the girl-*in* he sees her favourably"). This suffix usually precedes the noun – although the word order can occasionally be subverted – and carries a definite meaning.[68] This is confirmed

[61] Georgiĭ Vasilʹevich Tsereteli, "The Verbal Particle m/mi in Bukhara Arabic," *Folia Orientalia XII* (1970): 291.

[62] Jastrow, "Iraq."

[63] Jastrow, "Dialect Differences," 208.

[64] Jastrow, "Iraq."

[65] Bruce Ingham, *Najdi Arabic* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1994): 24.

[66] Jastrow, "Iraq."

[67] Jastrow, "Iraq."

[68] The definiteness of the nouns in all the previous examples is confirmed by the context of the folktales from which they have been taken, where all these characters and items have been previously mentioned.

by the addition of the indefinite article *fad* to convey indefiniteness, as, for instance, in *fad ġarabtin balanda* (T1.4) "a tall tree". The suffix *-in* tends to turn into *-an* whenever it is merged with the masculine singular pronominal suffix *-a*, as in: *wazīr sayal min bintan i‿ sġīra* (T3.8) "the minister asked his little daughter" (where *bintan* results from the merging of *bint+a+in* and *i* seems to be employed solely to break the consonant cluster, with no grammatical function).[69]

The second function of this morpheme in the analysed texts is to connect verbs to pronominal suffixes. It appears in a few cases following the pattern "active participle+-*in(n)*-+personal pronoun with subject function" and carrying a perfective meaning (as in: *ğaybinni* (T3.6) "I brought"; *šayfinkūnāt* (T1.6) "you (m. p.) have seen"; *šayfinni* (T1.2) "I have seen"). In a few more cases, the morpheme is attached to a perfect verb instead (as in: *ğītínnak* (T1.2) "you (m. s.) have come"; *inhazamtinnak* (T3.5) "you (m. s.) have fled"), or to an imperative (*ğibinnak* (T4.7) "bring over (m. s.)!"; *inṭinnak* (T4.5) "give (m. s.)!"). In both of these cases, the *-in(n)-* infix does not appear to alter the original meaning of the verb. Whenever a third person pronoun is attached to it, it appears to retain its object function rather than acquiring a subject one, as confirmed by the examples: *makē͏ʸnat šayfinna* (T2.1) "she was not seeing him" and *šufinna* (T3.5) "look (m. s.) at it!".

This morpheme occurs with similar functions – not only in all four Central Asian Arabic dialects[70] – but also in a number of others spoken throughout the Arab world. Miller, who surveyed this feature in depth based on the findings of several other dialectologists, distinguishes between three main types of *-in(n)-* morphemes occurring across Arabic dialects: a "noun-modifier linker," a "participle-suffix linker," and a "participle-modifier linker" where the *-in(n)-* particle is not followed by a suffix.[71] In Central Asian Arabic, as shown by the previous examples, the morpheme appears with the first two functions only, just as in Gulf Arabic, the Baḥārnah dialect of Bahrain, the Daṯīnah dialect in Yemen, that of the ʿAnizah Bedouins from the Syrian coastal region, the Šukriyyah dialect of eastern Sudan, the one spoken by the Banī Ḥarūṣ tribe in northern Oman and Zanzibar, and the one of the Arabs of Maiduguri in Nigeria.[72] In a few more dialects, the particle acquires slightly different functions. Miller found that in Judeo-Arabic and in Naǧdi it is a participle-modifier, meaning that whenever the linker is attached to a participle, it is not followed by a suffix.[73] Moreover, Holes noted that in all Omani dialects, excluding possibly those spoken in the areas of Masqaṭ and Ṣalālah, which were not included in his study, an *-in(n)-* particle is obligatorily added between an active participle and an object pronoun, while he does not mention the function of noun-modifier linker.[74] Finally, in a few other dialects, this feature only seems to appear with the noun-modifier function, as in Andalusian Arabic and in the dialects

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[69] Once again, the meaning of bintan is confirmed by the context, as the minister's daughter has been previously mentioned in the folktale.

[70] Seeger, "On the Relationship," 3.

[71] Kerith Miller, "The Morpheme /-in(n)-/ in Central Asian Arabic: A Comparative Study," *Perspectives on Arabic Linguistics, XXIV–XXV*, Texas 2010 and Arizona 2011 (2014): 110-111.

[72] Miller, "The Morpheme /-in(n)-/," 113.

[73] Miller, "The Morpheme /-in(n)-/," 113.

[74] Clive Holes, "Towards a Dialect Geography of Oman," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 52 (1989): 448.

of Cyrenaica listed by Miller.[75] Owens mentions allomorphs of this morpheme, namely the *-an* nominal suffix also appearing in Spanish and Sudanic Arabic dialects and the *-u/-un* one of Tihāmah in Yemen.[76] The usage of the infix in Qashqadarya, Bukhara, and Afghanistan Arabic, however, presents a peculiarity so far not documented in any other dialect; namely that, in verbal constructions, the object pronouns acquire a subject function. Furthermore, in Qashqadarya Arabic the morpheme occasionally follows imperative or perfect verbs. Apart from Central Asian Arabic dialects, the appearance of a similar infix in conjunction with verbal forms other than participles is rare and – to my knowledge – it has only been noticed in Omani Arabic, where it sporadically appears and accompanies any verb type.[77]

The appearance of this feature in Central Asian Arabic dialects has been investigated by several scholars and a number of hypotheses have been put forward on its possible origin. According to different arguments, it has been associated with a Persian-type *ezāfe* construction,[78] an ergative-type language such as the Kurdish dialects of the Sulaymani type,[79] Uzbek influence[80] or derivation from *tanwīn* case markings.[81] The most convincing hypothesis, however, was advanced by Jonathan Owens and points to a pre-diasporic feature common to several varieties of spoken Arabic which could have coexisted with, and not derived from, case markings.[82] Indeed, the usage of this morpheme across Arabic dialects substantially differs from that of *tanwīn* in Modern Standard Arabic, as its primary function is not to mark indefiniteness. Its appearance in Central Asian Arabic therefore points to an early split of the speakers of the dialect from the main Arabic-speaking area. Clive Holes suggested that the modern dialects presenting this morpheme may have branched off from the varieties spoken by the Arabian tribes of ʼAzd and ʻAbd al-Qays. These tribes were originally respectively from western and eastern Arabia, but their migrations in various directions throughout the peninsula had already started before the coming of Islam.[83] Descendants from both tribes would have been recruited from their tribal quarters in Baṣrah to form the Arab troops which first invaded Central Asia in the seventh century.[84] If the ancestors of Qashqadarya Arabs had belonged to this group, they would have been likely to speak a language influenced by several varieties of Arabic, which provides a plausible explanation for the mixture of

[75] Miller, "The Morpheme /-in(n)-/," 113.

[76] Owens, *A Linguistic History of Arabic*, 102.

[77] Clive Holes, "A Participial Infix Construction of Eastern Arabia – An Ancient Pre-Conquest Feature?," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* (2011): 89.

[78] Robert R. Ratcliffe, "Bukhara Arabic: A Metatypized Dialect of Arabic in Central Asia," in *Linguistic Convergence and Areal Diffusion*, 145.

[79] Gernot Windfuhr, "Central Asian Arabic: The Irano-Arabic Dynamics of a New Perfect," in *Linguistic Convergence and Areal Diffusion*, 121.

[80] Guram Chikovani, "The Verb in the Arabic Dialects of Central Asia," in Youssi Abderrahim, et al., eds., *Aspects of the Dialects of Arabic Today, Proceedings of 4th Conference of the International Arabic Dialectology Association* (AIDA) (Rabat: Amapatril, 2002), 181.

[81] Vladimir Grigorʻevich Akhvlediani, *Bukharskiĭ Arabskiĭ Dialekt* (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1985), 36-37, as cited by Andrzej Zaborski, "Árabe de Asia Central," *Manual de Dialectología Neoárabe*, 429.

[82] Owens, *A Linguistic History of Arabic*, 104-105.

[83] Holes, "A Participial Infix Construction of Eastern Arabia," 85-86.

[84] Holes, "A Participial Infix Construction of Eastern Arabia," 87.

linguistic features displayed in the dialect. It is hoped that further research in this field and an analysis of a larger corpus will reveal more on the open questions regarding the origin and usage of this morpheme. The association of the infix with a verb other than a participle and the subject function acquired by object suffixes, peculiar to Central Asian Arabic, so far remain unexplained.

Comparison with Other Arabic Dialects: Lexicon

In the analysed four texts, all verbs, some common adjectives (among others: *kul* (T1.1, MSA *kull*) "all"; *gilə* (T1.1, MSA *qalīl*) "little"; *kisīr* (T1.5, MSA *kaṯīr*) "much"), and only a few nouns have been clearly preserved from Arabic. Due to the overlap between the Arabic and Persian lexicons, in the case of nouns it is often impossible to determine whether they have been retained from an early stage or rather borrowed from Tajik, as in the case of *lūlū* (T2.3, MSA *lu'lu'*) "pearl."

A number of terms distributed across most Arabic dialects were also observed. *Zēn*, spread throughout most of the Arabic-speaking world with the meaning of "beautiful" or "good,"[85] and an isogloss of Bedouin dialects[86] appears frequently both as an adjective (*ḥōyitin zēn* (T1.6) "the good house"; *fad bintin zēna* (T3.2) "a beautiful girl")) and as an adverb meaning "well, favourably" (*i‿ hama bint zēn šafaha* (T1.1) "he liked that girl," lit.: "he saw that girl favourably"). An additional term is the pan-dialectal verb *šāf*, meaning "to see,"[87] also illustrated by the previous example.

Moreover, verbs figuring in dialects spoken throughout the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Syria are particularly frequent. These also often appear in the Sudanese dialect area. *ʿAyyan*, which in the analysed texts carries the meaning of "to look around" (*ʿayyanat* (T1.4) "she looked around"), is found with the meaning of "to see" or "to look" in some dialects mainly spoken in Anatolia, the areas of Baghdad and ʿAqrah in Iraq, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. It also appears in the other varieties of Central Asian Arabic and in the Sudanese dialect area.[88] "To show" is expressed by the verb *wōr* (*wōraha i‿ bint* (T1.2) "show (m. s.) it to the girl!"), which most resembles the variants *waṛa/wera* only documented in Maltese, Anatolian, and Nigerian Arabic. The similar form of *warra*, however, is more commonly found throughout Arabic dialects. Its reflexes appear mainly in dialects spoken in North Africa, but also in the Levant, throughout the Arabian Peninsula excluding Oman, and in the Sudanese area. The same form also appears in Bukhara Arabic.[89] *Sawa*, used with the meaning of "to do" (*ʿirs sawa* (T2.6) "he celebrated his wedding," lit.: "he did the wedding"), resembles reflexes of *sawwa*, which are mainly spread throughout the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Khuzistan, the Levant, the Syrian northeastern region, and the Turkish region close to the Syrian border. They have also been documented in Sinai, the Sudanese area, and other Central Asian

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85 Peter Behnstedt and Manfred Woidich, *Wortatlas der arabischen Dialekte: Verben, Adjektive, Zeit und Zahlen* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), vol. 3, 530.

86 Peter Behnstedt, "Árabe Beduino," *Manual de Dialectología Neoárabe*, 91.

87 Behnstedt and Woidich, *Wortatlas*, vol. 3, 330.

88 Behnstedt and Woidich, *Wortatlas*, vol. 3, 334–344.

89 Behnstedt and Woidich, *Wortatlas*, vol. 3, 357–358.

dialects.[90] It is worth adding that, in the context of the Arabian Peninsula, all the lexical items mentioned so far appear, among others, in the central Arabian Naǧd Šammari and Dōsiri dialects. *Dawwar*, the most common word for "to search for" in dialects spoken mainly in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and the East Mediterranean, is found with the same meaning in the analysed material (*tuffoh dawwarān boġdōd ġada* (T3.6) "he went to Baghdad to look for an apple"). It also appears in other Central Asian varieties and in Sudanese Arabic.[91] The verb for "to call, summon," *sayah* or *sayaḥ* (*walad il-čumčuga sayaḥaha* (T2.5) "The boy called the sparrow"), also found in Bukhara Arabic, resembles reflexes of *ṣāḥ* or *ṣayyaḥ*, used with the same meaning in dialects spoken in the eastern Mediterranean, but also in Oman, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait, in the Dōsiri dialect in Saudi Arabia, and mainly in Iraq.[92] The terms for "to give," namely *anṭa* or *anta* (*bintkum iˌ fahadna tintūna* (T3.2) "marry off (lit.: "give") your daughter to one of us"), most resemble variants of *'anṭa* which are characteristic of Bedouin dialects[93] and found in Saudi Arabia (including in northern Naǧdi), in the 'Ahl al-Šimāl dialect of Kuwait, in several varieties spoken in Iraq, the Khuzestan province, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. It also appears in varieties spoken by a few tribes in the Sudanese and Turkish dialect areas, and in all other Central Asian dialects.[94] In the Iraqi context, this form is typical of *gələt* dialects.[95]

Some verbs of motion correspond to forms found relatively rarely throughout the Arabic-speaking world. *Madd* is the most frequent verb used with the meaning of "to leave" (*iˌ samā farrat, maddat* (T1.3) "she fled to the sky, she left"). Similar forms have been documented carrying the meaning of "to leave, to set off" in the Naǧd Šammari, Dōsiri, and Šarārāt dialects of Saudi Arabia, in the region of Ǧazīrah in Syria, in al-Balqā' in Jordan, in some Bedouin dialects in Oman, in Sudan, and in Chad.[96] Another example is ġad, which carries the general meaning of "to go" (*iˌ madīna iˌ buḫōra ġadaw* (T1.5) "they went to the city of Bukhara"). Variants of ġad or ġda figure in other Central Asian varieties and sporadically in North Africa, the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula, and Gulf dialects,[97] including the Baḥārnah ones of Bahrain.[98]

As for the nouns, the term ǧufūr, which in Qashqadarya Arabic is used meaning "well, waterhole" (*taḫat ǧabala fad ǧufūr hast* (T4.7) "beneath the mountain there is a well"), most closely resembles reflexes of ǧafar attested only in Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Oman, the Dōsiri and al-Ḥasā' dialects of Saudi Arabia, the dialect of the Ruwālah tribe, Iraqi, the Suḫneh and Ḫawētnah dialects in Syria, and Bukhara Arabic. It could also be related to *ḥafar*, appearing in Jordanian, South Sudanese, and Chadian Arabic.[99] Turning

[90] Behnstedt and Woidich, *Wortatlas*, vol. 3, 238 and 240-241.
[91] Behnstedt and Woidich, *Wortatlas*, vol. 3, 214-216.
[92] Behnstedt and Woidich, *Wortatlas*, vol. 3, 392-394.
[93] Behnstedt and Woidich, *Wortatlas*, vol. 3, 409; Behnstedt, "Árabe Beduino," 91.
[94] Behnstedt and Woidich, *Wortatlas*, vol. 3, 406 and 409.
[95] Behnstedt, "Árabe Beduino," 91.
[96] Behnstedt and Woidich, *Wortatlas*, vol. 3, 29 and 35-37.
[97] Behnstedt and Woidich, *Wortatlas*, vol. 3, 14 and 18-19.
[98] Holes, "A Participial Infix Construction of Eastern Arabia," 89.
[99] Peter Behnstedt and Manfred Woidich, *Wortatlas der Arabischen Dialekte: Materielle Kultur* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), vol. 2, 345-347.

to question words, "who" is expressed by *min* (*uzuka il-min?* (T3.5) "whose ring is it?"), a form similar to those appearing in a number of Bedouin dialects, namely in Gulf varieties, those of the southern and southeastern parts of Saudi Arabia including the Dōsīri one, several Omani dialects, and those of eastern Yemen.[100] It also appears in Levantine[101] and Egyptian Arabic.[102] The word for "what" is *eš* or *ieš* (*eš sōr i hāza?* (T1.1) "What happened to him?"; *inta ieš ǧibtinnak iehāna?* (T3.3) "What have you brought here?"), which most resembles ēš, appearing in Levantine varieties[103] and in central-eastern Yemen,[104] but is also comparable to the suffix š- found in Bedouin Gulf dialects and in the šāwi dialects spoken in Iraq,[105] in certain parts of Jordan, and in Syria.[106]

Innovations due to Contacts with Adstrate Languages

Due to the interaction of its speakers with neighbouring Uzbeks, Tajiks, and possibly Turkmen and Afghans, the dialect of Qashqadarya Arabs is characterised by an intermixture of Semitic, Turkic, and Iranian features. The impact of non-Semitic languages is visible mainly in the frequent lexical borrowings, but it has also caused phonetic changes and syntactic innovations. This section will discuss some of the main linguistic innovations which could be detected in the four analysed texts.

A few consonants figuring in both Uzbek and Tajik that are non-existent in Modern Standard Arabic, namely /č/ and /p/, appear in the dialect of Qashqadarya Arabs. These phonemes do not only figure in loanwords from adstrate languages, but occasionally in Arabic words too, as in the case of *wač* (MSA *waǧh*) appearing in the example *wačin ḥōyit* (T1.6) "the side of the wall," where /ǧ/ has shifted to /č/. Moreover, the Arabic long vowel /ā/ is occasionally pronounced as IPA /ɔ/ – indicated with symbol "ō" in Chikovani's transcription – as, for instance, in the verb *sōr* (T2.3, MSA *ṣāra*) "it occurred".

The almost complete loss of the Arabic definite article *il-* (still, however, retained in a few instances, such as *il-bint* (T1.5) "the girl") and the development of an indefinite article *fard/fad/fat*, as in: *fad yōm* (T3.1) "one day," is another feature which could have been influenced by Tajik and Uzbek. Indeed, both of these languages share the use of an indefinite article, the omission of a definite one, and the use of the numeral for "one" to express indefiniteness (*yak* in the case of Tajik and *bir* in the case of Uzbek). In Qashqadarya Arabic too, the indefinite article is related to the numeral for "one," namely *fadhat/fadhate*.[107] However, the indefinite article *fad* – related to the Modern Standard Arabic word *fard*, "single" – is also used in both the *gələt* and the *qəltu* varieties of Arabic spoken in Iraq;[108] therefore, this may point to a potential connection with Iraqi. This

[100] Behnstedt, "Árabe Beduino," 82.

[101] Peter Behnstedt, "Árabe Levantino," *Manual de Dialectología Neoárabe*, 164.

[102] Federico Corriente, "Árabe Egipcio," *Manual de Dialectología Neoárabe*, 241.

[103] Behnstedt, "Árabe Levantino," 164.

[104] Peter Behnstedt, "Árabe Yemení," *Manual de Dialectología Neoárabe*, 116.

[105] Farida Abu-Haidar, "Árabe Iraquí," *Manual de Dialectología Neoárabe*, 198.

[106] Behnstedt, "Árabe Beduino," 70 and 82.

[107] Chikovani, *Kashkadar'inskiï Arabskiï Dialekt*, 29.

[108] Jastrow, "Iraq."

feature also appears in other Central Asian Arabic dialects and similar considerations on the possible influence of Turkic and Iranian languages have thus been advanced by Jastrow in the context of Bukhara Arabic.[109]

Compound verbal constructions which, despite being composed of Arabic words, reproduce the syntax of Tajik or Uzbek expressions, are also common. An example is the verb *zēn šaf* (*iˍ hama bint zēn šafaha* (T1.1) "he loved that girl" (lit.: "he saw that girl favourably")), a calque of the Uzbek *yaxshi koʻrmoq* meaning "to love, be fond of," but literally "to see favourably". Furthermore, the verb *sawa*, "to do," acquires a function similar to that of *kardan* in Persian and *qilmoq* or *etmoq* in Uzbek in being associated with a noun for the construction of compound verbs. One example is *amr sawa* (T3.8) "he gave an order," which reflects the Persian *amr kard* "he ordered". It might have been the influence of compound verbs from these languages, which also led to the frequent use of a "coupling" narrative strategy, namely of two verbs used jointly to convey one core meaning, as in: *ġadaw-madaw* (T4.1) "they set off" (lit.: "they went-left").

Word order is flexible, but, in most cases, it follows the pattern "subject-object-verb" (as in: *walad iˍ fad balad mad* (T2.3) "the boy left for a country"), typical of both Tajik and Uzbek. Another common pattern is "noun-adjective," which is characteristic of both Arabic and Tajik, although, "adjective–noun," typical of Uzbek,[110] can occasionally be found, too (*fad nāb mōra* (T1.2) "an old woman"). This flexibility in word order is reflected in the number of possible genitive constructions: the most common seems to be the one following the pattern of an Arabic ʾiḍāfa, namely "possessed+possessor" (*abu dilmurād* (T1.1) "Dilmurad's father"). However, the one following the pattern "possessor+possessed" with a pronominal suffix referring back to the possessor, of Turkic influence and used in Uzbek,[111] is not infrequent (*dilmurōd morta* (T1.6) "Dilmurad's wife," lit.: "Dilmurad wife-his").

Other features of clear Persian influence include the use in the present and past tense of the word *hast*, meaning "he/she/it/there is" in Persian. In Qashqadarya Arabic, this word is employed as an invariable copula carrying the meaning of "there is/there was" (*hannaka fad ğufūr hast* (T2.3) "there is a well over there"). However, in the past tense, the active participle of the Arabic "to be" verb is also used with the same function, as in: *fad nāb mōra kēyna* (T1.2) "There was an old woman." Another feature is particle *ki*, used occasionally to introduce indirect speech (*walad gāl-ki (…)* (T4.4) "the boy said that (…)") or as a connective carrying the meaning of "when" (*dilmurād hama bint kiˍ šāfaha kul yōm kōr ma sawa* (T1.1) "When he saw that girl, Dilmurad would not do any work all day"; *dilmurād walada ḫams kiˍ daḫal, umma abu ḫazuwāt* (T1.5) "When Dilmuraďs son was five years old, his mother [and] his father took him"). The particle *ke*, is indeed used in Tajik with these same functions, in addition to creating relative clauses.

A few Turkic suffixes also appear in Qashqadarya Arabic. The Turkic particle *-ak*, used in Uzbek to create nouns based on other nouns or adjectives,[112] appears in a couple of instances; although its exact function is unclear as it does not seem to modify the

[109] Otto Jastrow, "Uzbekistan Arabic: A Language Created by Semitic-Iranian-Turkic Linguistic Convergence," in *Linguistic Convergence and Areal Diffusion*, 135.

[110] Ratcliffe, "Bukhara Arabic," 143.

[111] Ṭsereteli, *Arabskie Dialekty v Sredneĭ Azii*, 35.

[112] Chikovani, *Kashkadar'inskiĭ Arabskiĭ Dialekt*, 201.

core meaning of the phrase (*farasīn zīnak u zoka saḥbak* (T2.1) "The good horse and he, the owner"). In addition to this, the Turkic interrogative particle -*mi* (*inti ma tidrīn-mi hama bint išqoʿa?* (T1.2) "Don't you know where that girl is?") is frequently used in questions. This feature was also identified by Jastrow in Bukhara Arabic.[113]

Turning to the lexicon, several nouns and a few adjectives from both Tajik and Uzbek have been borrowed by Qashqadarya Arabic. It was not possible to determine which one of these two languages had the strongest impact due to the overlap of lexical items between them, namely the many Persian words borrowed by Uzbek. An example is the word *čüpōn* (T3.1) "shepherd," which may have been acquired either from the Uzbek *cho'pon* or Tajik *chūpon*. Loanwords seem to either be very specific terms or words of everyday use, as, for example, *čumčūga* (T2.3) "sparrow" from Uzbek *chumchuq*, or *sawdagār* (T4.2) "merchant" from Tajik/Uzbek *savdogar*. In no instance was an influence of Russian or of any other language noticed.

Conclusion

This article has introduced the core cultural traits of Qashqadarya Arabs. Drawing from four folktales, it has provided a linguistic survey of the dialect of this community, the study of which has been much neglected, especially compared to that of the Arabs living in the Bukhara region. Through comparative linguistic analysis, some of the Arabic elements retained in this language variety have first been pointed out in an attempt to identify connections with other Arabic dialects. Next, this survey has outlined some of the elements likely to have been acquired through contact with adstrate languages, commenting on the convergence of Turkic, Persian, and Semitic features which characterise the dialect.

The analysis demonstrated that Qashqadarya Arabic, despite the speakers' bi- or trilingualism, has retained most of its morphological features from Arabic. Of the phonological and morphosyntactic features which could be associated with other Arabic dialects, most of them seem to be shared with eastern Bedouin dialects. More specifically, there are often possible connections with Iraqi *gələt* dialects – a similarity first pointed out by Jastrow based on the few speech samples published by Vinnikov –[114] and with Arabian dialects. This clashes with previous claims that Uzbekistan Arabic belongs to the *qəltu* group and displays several features of sedentary dialects.[115] This conclusion might, nevertheless, have been based on an analysis of a Bukhara Arabic corpus only, despite the use of the label "Uzbekistan Arabic". The analysis of the lexicon also confirmed possible connections of Qashqadarya Arabic with dialects spoken throughout the Arabian Peninsula (the Naǧd Šammari and Dōsiri dialects being the ones which appeared most frequently), and to a lesser extent Iraq and Syria. Therefore, this study supports the likelihood of an original migration of the ancestors of Qashqadarya Arabs from Mesopotamia or the Arabian Peninsula to Central Asia, a hypothesis initially advanced by Ṫsereteli in 1956.[116] More specifically, the mixture of Iraqi and Arabian

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[113] Jastrow, "Uzbekistan Arabic," 136.
[114] Jastrow, "Dialect Differences," 211.
[115] Kees Versteegh, *The Arabic Language*, second ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 286.
[116] Amirĩ̂anĉ̃, "Ėtnicheskoe Razvitie Sredneaziatskikh Arabov," 215.

features, besides the appearance of the -in(n)- morpheme, could also support Holes' hypothesis that at least some of the Arabs settled in Central Asia may have moved there in the seventh century as part of troops stationed in Baṣrah, but whose tribes originally came from Arabia, therefore having been exposed to different linguistic varieties.[117] More comparative studies of this dialect with the other Central Asian varieties, in particular with the most recently discovered ones of Balkh and Khorasan, might help to shed more light on such genetic connections with other Arabic dialects.

Indeed, as the debate on the possible origins of the -in(n)- morpheme shows, Qashqadarya Arabic, as well as the other Central Asian Arabic dialects, can prove pivotal not only for the study of Arabic linguistics, but also for the field of historical Afro Asiatic studies. This feature's geographical distribution across very distant dialect areas and its fundamental difference with Classical Arabic case markings are central to Owens's hypothesis that, at an early stage, two varieties of proto-Semitic might have coexisted, namely one with case markings – from which Classical Arabic could have branched off – and one without.[118] This morpheme in particular, therefore, certainly deserves further comparative study.

As for the adstrate languages that Qashqadarya Arabs have come into contact with, only the influence of Uzbek and Tajik was visible in their dialect. Somehow surprisingly, the informants' possible knowledge of the Russian language, at least based on the four analysed texts, does not seem to have impacted their speech in any substantial way. While the morphology is where most Arabic elements have been retained, the phonology, lexicon, and syntax of the dialect have been heavily influenced by both Turkic and Persian elements, due to the Arabs' fluency in Uzbek and Tajik. Moreover, considering that they led a nomadic way of life until relatively recent times, and that earlier migrations from Afghanistan to this region cannot be ruled out,[119] Qashqadarya Arabs are also likely to have been exposed to the Dari variety of Persian at an earlier stage. Owing to the overlap of features between Uzbek and Tajik, it was not possible to determine which of these languages had a stronger impact on the speech of this community.

Due to the quick disappearance of Qashqadarya Arabs' rich cultural traits and to the endangered status of their dialect, new ethnographic and linguistic material in this field will soon not be available anymore, although the urge to preserve their traditional culture might not necessarily be perceived by the community itself. Therefore, in an effort to preserve and document the dialect, the collection of new speech samples in the region is urgent. It is also particularly important to gain access to the wealth of unpublished material available on this community and on their language. The extensive material collected by Vinnikov (and possibly T͡sereteli) in the 1930s, could potentially reveal more on its linguistic features as their informants might have had a proficiency in the dialect that current speakers have already lost.

[117] Holes, "A Participial Infix Construction of Eastern Arabia," 87.
[118] Owens, A Linguistic History of Arabic, 106, 111, and 267.
[119] Zaborski, "Árabe de Asia Central," 411.

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
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