By Cudi Zerey, University of Vechta

Syria’s Shifting Landscape and the Future of the Kurds

Before the 2011 uprising, Syria’s Kurds, the country’s largest non‑Arab minority, faced entrenched marginalization, reinforced by Arabization policies and exclusion from political life under Ba’athist rule (Sary, 2016). A 1962 census left about 120,000 Kurds stateless, a number that had risen to nearly 300,000 by 2011, denying them basic rights such as property ownership and public employment (Human Rights Watch, 1996; Ibrahim & Edelman, 2018). Although a 2011 decree granted citizenship to part of this population, reducing the number of stateless Kurds to an estimated 160,000 by late 2013 (McGee, 2016, 1), many remained effectively without citizenship (Syrianationality, 2015). From 2012 onward, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in Northern Syria, later institutionalized as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) and commonly known as Rojava, established a locally rooted self‑governance model that drew international attention. Its armed wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), became the United States’ principal partner in the fight against ISIS and in securing major detention sites (Loft, 2026; Yacoubian & Todman, 2026).

Syria has entered a new political phase since the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024. Over the past year, the transitional government under Ahmed al‑Sharaa has consolidated its authority across the northern and eastern regions, reshaping the political future of Syria’s Kurdish population (Rodgers, 2026; Al Jazeera, 2026). In early 2026, government forces advanced into Kurdish‑held areas including Raqqa, Deir ez‑Zor, and parts of Aleppo province, effectively reversing more than a decade of Kurdish self‑administration. A limited and fragile ceasefire in mid‑January 2026 opened negotiations over SDF integration and administrative arrangements in Hasakah, though implementation has remained uneven (Security Council Report, 2026). Currently, the ceasefire is being held, with no active fighting reported since late January 2026 and both sides focusing on phased security and administrative integration (Mishra, 2026; Al Abdo, 2026; Frantzman, 2026; Croft, 2026).

These developments stem from the failed implementation of the 2025 integration agreement between the SDF and the new Syrian leadership. The agreement envisioned the integration of Kurdish civil and military structures into the Syrian state by the end of 2025. However, significant divergences emerged: while the SDF advocated decentralization and guarantees of cultural, linguistic, and local administrative rights, Damascus insisted on full centralization and a unified military command (Genc, 2026; Yacoubian & Todman, 2026). Strategic assessments further warned that such centralization would significantly weaken Kurdish bargaining power in the northeast (Tabler et al., 2026). From the Kurdish perspective, such a command structure represented a direct threat to their political project. As the SDF had functioned not only as a security actor but also as the institutional backbone of Kurdish self‑administration since 2012, integration under a centralized command without constitutional guarantees would have risked dismantling Kurdish autonomy. As these divergences deepened, they culminated in open confrontation in early January 2026, when clashes between the transitional government and the SDF escalated (OCHA, 2026).

The transitional government has introduced measures such as granting citizenship to stateless Kurds and formally recognizing Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights (Reuters, 2026), marking formal improvement over the Assad era when these rights were severely restricted. However, independent assessments note uneven implementation (EUAA, 2025; Human Rights Watch, 2026), particularly in areas held by the Syrian National Army (SNA), where Kurds continue to face ethnic profiling, arbitrary detention, and restrictions on movement (UK Government, 2025). Reporting further documents ongoing insecurity, displacement, and a narrowing political space within Kurdish communities amid the government’s consolidation of territorial control (Mamouri, 2026).

Why Europe Must Reassess Its Approach to the Kurdish Question

These developments present Europe with a strategic dilemma: continue aligning with Washington’s shifting Syria policy, or adopt an autonomous, interest‑based approach. The United States — formerly the primary supporter of the SDF — has prioritized its engagement with the al‑Sharaa government (Rodgers, 2026) and hesitated to intervene during the January 2026 government advance. Kurdish leaders increasingly perceive U.S. commitments as inconsistent (Alloush, 2026). Several considerations suggest that Europe may need to recalibrate its approach rather than relying on Washington’s evolving priorities.

First, European security is directly tied to stability in northeastern Syria, where tens of thousands of former Islamic State (IS) affiliates — including European nationals — remain in detention camps previously secured by Kurdish forces. Security assessments warn that weakening Kurdish control increases the risk of IS resurgence (Yacoubian & Todman, 2026; Sharawi, 2025). Although Washington frames its priority as achieving stability across all of Syria, U.S. policy assessments consistently underscore that the SDF has been more capable of maintaining security in the northeast, particularly in its decade-long experience in managing IS detention sites, preventing radicalization, and securing critical infrastructure (U.S. Department of State, 2025; Congressional Research Service, 2025), capacities that Syrian government forces lack after years of limited presence in the region. Recent developments underscore this dynamic: following the government takeover of the al‑Hol camp, authorities began evacuating the facility in mid‑February 2026, with thousands of IS‑linked residents escaping under unclear conditions, raising renewed concerns about monitoring gaps and the risk of militant regrouping (Guilbert, 2026).

Second, Kurdish governance structures reflect principles aligned with European norms, including pluralism, gender equality, and local self‑administration. Academic analysis highlights how Kurdish political frameworks differ sharply from Syria’s emerging centralized and sectarian governance (Hinnebusch, 2025). For European states, these governance traits matter not only in normative terms but because they have historically supported more stable and predictable local administration in northeastern Syria. Kurdish self‑administration has facilitated more structured local governance and coordination mechanisms in areas such as humanitarian access and local security, which external analyses describe as relevant for broader stabilization efforts in northeastern Syria (Smith, 2024). These are areas directly relevant to European security interests and offer practical avenues for engagement.

Third, recent human rights reporting underscores concerns about the transitional government’s constitutional direction. A 2025 analysis by Human Rights First reveals extensive centralization of power and limited protections for minority participation, suggesting that Kurdish representation will be essential to preserving political diversity during Syria’s transition (Human Rights First, 2025). For Europe, this matters because exclusive and highly centralized constitutional arrangements tend to create renewed instability, governance vacuums, and unpredictable displacement dynamics. This dynamic is evident in Turkey, where extensive recentralization under the AKP has weakened local governance, displaced elected administrations, and contributed to administrative instability (Baudner, 2025). These developments directly affect European border management and crisis response capacities. More inclusive representation, including Kurdish participation, increases the likelihood of a governable and predictable Syrian state that can engage effectively with international partners.

Collectively, these factors show that Europe’s interests diverge from U.S. priorities not only in security strategy but also in the political and humanitarian implications of Syria’s transition. A passive transatlantic alignment risks undermining both European security and regional stability. The divergence is compounded by structural constraints within Europe. For several EU member states, particularly Germany, migration pressures and the prospect of future deportations create incentives to maintain workable relations with Damascus. At the regional level, key Gulf actors like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have aligned closely with Syria’s new central government as primary financial supporters, making explicit European backing for Kurdish self‑administration diplomatically sensitive (Triche & Hamzawy, 2025; Shahbazov, 2025). Turkey adds a further layer of complexity. While cooperating with the transitional authorities, Turkey firmly opposes any political model that entrenches Kurdish autonomy and views such arrangements as a direct security threat (Triche & Hamzawy, 2025). Together, multiple major powers support the centralized governance in Damascus, despite comparative evidence that decentralized or federal governance tend to reduce center–periphery tensions and mitigate instability, a pattern repeatedly observed in Syria in 2025 (UK Government, 2025; EUAA, 2025). In this context, Europe can leverage its economic weight by conditioning assistance on inclusive governance, while coordinating closely with the United States to prevent Damascus from relying exclusively on Gulf financing.

Towards an Independent European Strategy in Syria

To respond effectively to Syria’s changing landscape, the EU should articulate a Syria strategy that reflects its own interests rather than following Washington’s lead. So far, the EU’s approach to post‑Assad Syria has centered on humanitarian assistance and cautious, conditions‑based engagement with the transitional authorities (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2025). A more independent strategy would require complementing this with direct political involvement and targeted support for inclusive governance structures.

First, the EU should expand political engagement with Kurdish actors, including those beyond the SDF (Congressional Research Service, 2025; Loft, 2026). Broader engagement with DAANES‑linked civil institutions, as well as with alternative Kurdish political platforms such as the Kurdish National Council (KNC), women’s organizations and local councils, reduces the risk of over‑reliance on one armed actor and strengthens the EU’s ability to support a more representative political process (UK Government, 2025; European Union Agency for Asylum, 2025). The EU cannot enforce Kurdish inclusion unilaterally, but it can work through established diplomatic channels, including the UN‑led Geneva process, EU Special Envoy diplomacy, and coordination with the United States, which remains a key intermediary between the transitional government and Kurdish actors.

Second, Europe should provide targeted stabilization support in Kurdish-majority areas, focusing on civil administration, local governance, and essential services. Such assistance strengthens resilience, mitigates pressures of displacement, and protects communities vulnerable to renewed conflict. European practice shows that this approach can be effective: EU-funded stabilization programs in Syria have previously supported community-level service delivery, energy and health projects, and bottom‑up governance initiatives, and the EU’s 2025 recovery package allocated €175 million to strengthen public institutions, local livelihoods, and essential services across Syrian regions (Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, 2025). Similar EU initiatives in Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan have demonstrated that early support to civil administration and local governance can reduce displacement pressures, improve service provision, and stabilize fragile areas (European Commission, 2026; Barnes-Dacey, 2025).

Third, the EU should advocate for constitutional safeguards within Syria’s transitional process, emphasizing decentralized governance, minority rights, and political representation. While the EU cannot directly shape Syria’s constitutional drafting, it can exert influence by linking financial and stabilization assistance to inclusive political arrangements, by coordinating diplomatic positions with the United States and by supporting UN‑mediated negotiations under Security Council Resolution 2254, which mandates a UN‑facilitated process for Syria’s political transition (UN Security Council, 2015). These instruments allow the EU to signal that constitutional reforms reflecting decentralization and minority protection are prerequisites for sustained European support.

In Syria’s evolving political context, the Kurds remain one of the few actors whose governance model and long-term security contributions align with European interests. They continue to play a central role in containing IS networks and in sustaining pluralistic, community-led governance. For Europe, supporting the Kurds is not simply a moral imperative, but a strategic necessity. Although internal divisions, regional sensitivities, and migration concerns continue to constrain decisive actions, a coherent, autonomous European policy will be essential to shaping a more stable and inclusive post‑conflict Syria.

Cudi Zerey is a postgraduate student at the University of Vechta, conducting research on the evolving relationship between sustainability and the military. He holds degrees in Economics and Sociology (BA), Technical Business Administration (MSc), and Political Science (BA). He serves as a management consultant in public sector consulting, specializing in defense.

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