By Mohammad Javad Mousavizadeh

Why do some democracies thrive while others collapse, even when they share similar laws and electoral structures? While constitutions and economic growth matter, they do not tell the whole story. In Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti’s (1993) seminal work, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, they argue that effective institutions grow out of a robust civic culture. They suggest that a democracy’s performance depends on societal habits of trust, cooperation, and shared responsibility.

Putnam et al. (1993) studied wide regions of Italy, revealing that governments fail where people lack social trust and horizontal networks. Applying this lens to the modern Arab world reveals a familiar pattern: the “uncivic” traits of the Italian South — vertical power, clientelism, and deep social distrust — persist despite institutional reforms, foreign interventions, and even mass uprisings. Ultimately, the problem is cultural and historical, not just a failure of political design. In the opinion of Putnam et al. (1993): Without social capital, a healthy democracy cannot function and must rebuild trust.

The Divide: Civic vs. Uncivic Regions

Putnam et al. (1993) divided Italy into the Civic North/Center and the Uncivic South. Today’s Arab world reflects similar divisions. Some nations, like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain are absolute monarchies. Others, such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia, appear democratic but suffer from institutional failure and uneven democratic development, echoing the patterns of the Italian South (Calabria, Puglia, Sicily).

Putnam et al. (1993) note that the underlying civic culture takes priority over formal rules. The Italian regional governments were introduced with “essentially identical constitutional structures and mandates” (p. 6), but the results were different because the rules were not imposed on the same social contexts. Similarly, even when some Arab states hold elections, they often mirror the Italian South because rules are imposed on a social context in which they do not fit.

As noted above, several Arab states, including those that formally hold elections, exhibit characteristics comparable to those of the Global South for a variety of structural reasons. The region remains entrenched in a “vicious circle” of domination, marked by low levels of social trust and characterized by vertical dependence and what has been described as “amoral familism” (Saleh, 2024, p. 20; Putnam et al., 1993, p. 177). In contrast, effective democratic governance depends on the presence of “horizontal networks of civic engagement” and generalized reciprocity, which facilitate collective action and institutional accountability (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 175). Putnam et al. (1993) also argue that institutional success is determined by social capital and historical path dependence.

1. Vertical Dependence and the “Rentier” Trap

In the uncivic South, political life was historically “organized hierarchically” (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 104), characterized by a reliance on feudal patrons. This mirrors the rentierism central to the Arab world’s economy. According to Harb (2022), the Arab state cultivates a dependency of all classes on “state largesse for its well-being” (para. 9). This creates a causal relationship where the economic reality of oil rents dictates social behavior: because the state provides jobs and benefits, it prevents the emergence of independent “self-organization” (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 123). This verticality is evidenced in Jordan, where Ceyhun (2019) notes an “estrangement” occurring as the traditional “vertical patron-client relationship” between the state and the Transjordanian tribes begins to break down (pp. 2–3).

2. Social Capital and the Dilemma of Collective Action

Putnam defines social capital as the “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks” that facilitate coordinated action (1993, p. 167). While the Italian North solved the “fundamental dilemma of collective action” (Hume, 1739/2025, as cited in Putnam et al., 1993) through horizontal networks, the Arab world remains trapped in a low-trust equilibrium. Saleh (2024) identifies this as “high bonding social capital” — a heavy reliance on the family — coupled with a lack of “structural social capital,” or participation in civic groups (p. 24). This mirrors the “amoral familism” of Southern Italy, where trust exists “only within the immediate family circle” (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 88), leading to the public sphere being viewed with suspicion.

3. Institutional Façades and “Hollow” Elections

Where social capital is low, democratic institutions become “institutional façades” (Harb, 2022). In the Italian South, Putnam found that voting was a “personal transaction” triggered by “personal dependency or private greed, not by collective purpose” (1993, p. 115). Similarly, Ciftci (2010) notes that Arab states control behavior by “providing jobs and benefits,” meaning modernization does not create a “democratically oriented citizenry” (p. 1445). Consequently, while countries like Tunisia or Lebanon hold elections, their interpersonal trust levels (8% and 4% respectively) are as low as the Southern Italian societies where proverbs warn: “‘Damned is he who trusts another'” (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 144).

4. The Hobbesian Solution and Elite Hostility

When mutual trust fails, societies often default to the “Hobbesian solution” — the imposition of a coercive, third-party authority to maintain order (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 165). In the Arab world, this role is filled by the military and security forces, which Ceyhun (2019) identifies as the “most trusted institution” in the absence of civic trust (p. 9). Furthermore, while the Italian North underwent “institutional socialization” that reformed elites from hostility to “pragmatic compromise” (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 37), Arab elites remain defined by a “deep-seated belief” that sees opponents as existential threats. Harb (2022) notes that Arab states use “organs of repression” to cover for deficits in accountability, showing that the intolerance for political difference remains a critical barrier.

5. Quasi-Federalism and Institutional Overreach

Finally, the challenges to decentralization via Italy’s regional system — which functioned as a quasi-federal structure — map onto current-day Iraq. Putnam found that Southern regionalists used the new system to maximize “requests for jobs and patronage” (1993, p. 101). In Iraq, Hadad (2024) argues that the threat to federalism is actually the “political stranglehold of the KDP” over the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), using the structure for partisan gain. This validates Elazar’s (1987) warning that federalism — the combination of “self-rule” and “shared rule” — is “doomed if the political will is absent for genuine power-sharing” (p. 137).

In closing, Putnam et al.’s theory has explanatory power for the current Arab world. It teaches us that democracy cannot thrive without a foundation of social capital. Also, socioeconomic development must combine trust, horizontal networks, and civic engagement to make a democracy. Arab countries like Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and etc. that claim democracy must fight back against the cycles of vertical dependence, clientelism, and amoral familism in order to rebuild trust and foster inclusive civic networks.

Mohammad Javad Mousavizadeh is a graduate student in International Relations at the University of North Georgia. He has written on Middle East issues for The National Interest, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Daily Sabah, e-ir.info and Middle East Monitor, as well as Iranian outlets such as Etemad, Mardom Salari, Shahrvand, and Hamdeli. His work has been featured by research centers and news agencies, including the Atlantic Council, Russia Today, and Al Jazeera.

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References

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