By Alabbas F. Alsudani

A rally held by the National State Forces Alliance, led by Ammar al-Hakim, in the run-up to the election.

After 2003, Iraq sought to establish its own democracy after decades of dictatorship. The first milestone was the referendum to ratify the new constitution on 15 October 2005, followed by parliamentary elections two months later — the first in the new era. The 2005 election was considered a major event in the region, positioning Iraq as the only democracy in the Middle East. Subsequent national elections in 2005, 2010, 2014, 2018, and 2021 unfolded in shifting political and social contexts but all of them succeeded in one way or another.

Over the past twenty-two years, four turning points have especially shaped electoral politics and outcomes: the U.S.-led coalition’s presence in Iraq until 2011; the ISIS invasion in 2014; the Tishreen protests in 2019; and the election of 2021 itself. The most relevant factors to the 2025 election are the 2021 election and the Tishreen protests, which serve as a microcosm for the new rising generation of young Iraqis. Debate in the 2021 election centred on the single non-transferable vote system and alleged irregularities. The uneven results of the election triggered a clash between political forces. Groups that suffered losses are trying to restore influence in the 2025 election. William Strauss and Neil Howe stated their “Generational Theory” in 1979: that history moves in recurring cycles of roughly 80-100 years, divided into four turnings of about 20-25 years. Twenty-two years since the regime change have led to a new generation, new domestic interactions, and new political thoughts emerging in Iraq. The current rising soft conflict between sects in Iraq, which will be explained later, highlights the uniqueness of the upcoming election. In parallel, Iraqi public discourse has been energised by the slogan “Do Not Waste It,” popularised by Sayed Ammar Al‑Hakeem, President of the Al‑Hikmah National Movement, who urged citizens to safeguard the democratic process.

What makes Election 25 Unique?

To understand why politicians, clergy, and academics have described Election 25 as “unique”, we must investigate its predictive implications and reflections through Al-Hakeem’s lens.

Legitimacy and Political Stability

Like previous elections, this one is a test of Iraq’s post-2003 democratic experiment and whether the political system retains legitimacy. For instance, analysts are framing voter turnout as a referendum on the health of the political system itself, rather than merely on which party wins. For Al-Hakeem, democracy is the only solution; the alternative is chaos. In a public meeting with an Iraqi tribe, he also presented the idea that the 2005 election aimed to establish democracy, while the 2025 election aims to make democratic stability sustainable.

Power rebalancing within Shia politics / fragmentation

Simplistically, there are three classifications of political Shia in Iraq:

• The right wing – represented by most of the Shia blocs and those who ally with Iran
• The left wing – represented by Al-Tayar Al-Sadri,  led by Sayed Muqtada Al-Sadr.
• The mediators – represented by Al-Hikma National Movement, led by Al-Hakeem.

The 2023 elections caused a clash between Shia blocs. As a reaction to the clash, Al-Hakeem called on all the blocs to ease tensions and “sit to talk.” A suggestion that Al-Tayar A-Sadri declined, after which the Shiite Coordination Framework was born.

In an interview with Ali Alyasiri, the executive director of Wa’doon Project, one of the branches of Al-Hikma, he argues that “Election 25 is a turning point to maintain more balance and to ensure that every bloc obtains back their real weight that was lost because of the mismanagement of the election of 2021.” Additionally, he assured that Al-Hikma intends to call on the Al-Tayar Al-Sadri, which is not participating in Election 25, to unify the Shiite constituency by participating in the process of forming the government.

Furthermore, four months ago, Al-Hakeem stated that restricting arms to the authority of the state is a necessity, and Election 25 is a step toward developing the state’s capacity to control and contain the illegitimate use of force.

Generational Shift

According to Strauss-Howe’s generational theory, generational cycles — each lasting about 20-25 years — are shaped by major political or social events. In this context, Election 25 is expected to determine the direction and values of Iraqi youth for decades. This is a theory that Al-Hakeem adopts, supports, and references in various contexts.

Al-Sadder or the Suni?

There are two main forces to consider in Election 25. On the one hand, Iraqi Sunnis are participating and seeking to revive their influence. Despite internal divisions, ongoing conflicts, and their minority status, some Sunni media figures have loudly asserted their right to the premiership. After 2003, Iraq adopted a political norm: Shia hold the prime ministry, Sunnis the parliament speakership, and Kurds the presidency. According to Shia groups, the challenge to this agreement has raised serious concerns and caused them to reconsider their relationship with Sunni groups. Al-Hakeem, in a meeting on September 28, noted that in 2005 Sunnis did not participate in the election, but Shiite powers still invited them to help form the government and allotted them six ministries. He added that, if the situation were reversed, Sunnis would not do the same. This underscores the significance of Election 25 for Iraqi Shia.

On the other hand, Al-Tayar Al-Sadri announced that they will not participate in the next election, rallying supporters under the banner of “boycotters”. Al-Sadar’s stance will influence only Shia, leading to a decrease in their political representation in parliament compred to the Sunni and Kurds. As a result, Shiite clerics, academics, and prominent figures are advocating for Election 25.

Al-Marjaiyyah’s Stance

The Al-Najaf Marjaiyyah (the supreme religious authority) has distanced itself from involvement in political affairs in recent years. Yet, several clerics and close figures to Al-Marjaiyyah keep highlighting the importance of this election, through explicit statements or subtle hints. For instance, on the first day of Muharram Al-Haram, a sacred month of the year, the representative of the Marjaiyyah, Sayed Ahmed Al-Safi, reinforced the significance of the election via metaphor. Other famous clerics in Iraq regularly encourage people to participate. Others posted photos showing their fingers stained with blue ink, a sign of their participation in the elections.

The Public’s Interaction with “Do Not Waste It”

While the slogan naturally resonates with Al‑Hikmah supporters, it appears to have spread beyond partisan lines. Dr. Mushtaq Albaiati, a teaching fellow in the College of Political Science, Al-Farabi University, said in an interview, “The phrase ‘Do not waste it’ strengthened the sense of awareness among citizens who believe in the democratic process and members of the largest component, the Shiite community, highlighting the dangers of abstention. Hence, I believe it will serve as a motivating factor for their participation.”

Additionally, a survey conducted with the help of the Himam Student Assembly (an Iraqi NGO) targeted 100 independent university students, selected randomly from six different Iraqi universities, representing various components and sects. The results were as follows:

• 29 students had not heard of the phrase ‘Do not waste it’
• 45 students expressed support for the upcoming elections and for the idea of ‘Do not waste it’
• 20 students stated that they would boycott the elections
• 6 students refrained from answering.

Conclusion

Election 25 stands as a decisive juncture in Iraq’s evolving democratic trajectory. Beyond a routine political event, it embodies the accumulated experiences, aspirations, and contradictions that have defined Iraq’s post-2003 political order. The slogan “Do not waste it” has transformed from a partisan message into a public call for renewed civic responsibility, resonating across different segments of society and reviving faith in electoral participation. It reflects a collective realization that political disengagement can only deepen fragmentation and instability.

Within the Shiite political sphere, the contest is not merely over power but over legitimacy and representation. The attempt to unify the Shiite constituency, restrict weapons to the authority of the state, and preserve democratic stability marks a broader effort to restore balance within Iraq’s governance structure. Simultaneously, the rising generation, unburdened by the memories of dictatorship, demands accountability, opportunity, and modern governance rather than ideological division. Their emerging political consciousness represents both a challenge and a hope for the country’s democratic renewal.

In essence, Election 25 is less about the transfer of authority than about reaffirming the principles of participatory governance. Whether Iraq can achieve sustainable democratic stability will depend on the capacity of political forces to transform competition into cooperation and slogans into action. If the spirit behind ‘Do Not Waste It’ endures, this election may become a turning point toward consolidating Iraq’s democracy and strengthening its national unity.

Alabbas F Alsudani is a Chevening awardee and a postgraduate student at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He also holds a BS in Petroleum Engineering, an MSc in Drilling Engineering, and a BA in International Ielations. He serves as an assistant lecturer in the Department of Oil and Energy Economics, NUC, and as the secretary general of Himam Students’ Assembly, an Iraqi NGO.

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