By Zahra Alipour, Independent Iranian Journalist

Activist groups in Iran play varied and significant roles in shaping the country’s shifting social and political paradigms. Each group engages with the concept of Iran and its governance from a distinct subjective position and framework. But concerning Israel’s recent attack on Iran, which of these dynamics was central?

Analysis of speeches made by Israeli and American officials during the recent war indicates that a particular segment of politically-engaged Iranian intellectuals was the implicit audience. This group advocates for fundamental change within Iran, and from the perspective of the USA and Israel, they were expected to welcome the war. However, based on in-depth interviews with a representative sample of 250 individuals, and close observation of social media behaviour among Iranian intellectuals and critics, it became clear that they do not see Israel as a liberating force.

This group – many of whom had previously opposed the Iranian government’s anti-Israel stance – has, during the war, grown more sympathetic to the view of Israel as a perpetrator of injustice. My field observations and interviews suggest that this paradigm shift cannot be reduced merely to the impact of a foreign military assault or a surge in nationalist sentiment. Rather, the visible suffering of civilians in the streets of Tehran and other cities has significantly contributed to this shift.

Iran and the Diversity of Domestic Activists’ Reactions to “Israel”

In the early hours of Friday, June 13, Israel launched a surprise and widespread attack on Iran, targeting senior military officials and nuclear scientists The scale of the attack on the first day was such that media reports confirmed the deaths of at least 20 children and 60 civilians in a residential building. In addition, reports in the following days indicate that Israel directly attacked seven hospitals in Iran. To this number must be added a direct strike on a welfare center – a facility for people with disabilities – an attack on civilians waiting at a red light in Tajrish Square, a direct attack on an ambulance, and a strike on the Iranian Broadcasting Corporation.

This occurred at a time when Iran and the United States were engaged in negotiations over what was being described as a potential peace framework.

At the time of writing, two weeks have passed since the ceasefire between Iran and Israel in the war, but the accounts and interviews in this report were gathered from Iranians who were under attack by drones and fighter jets. Twelve days of attacks that grew increasingly intense and dangerous each day left Iranians under constant bombardment. Reportedly, Iranian casualties in the war have exceeded 1,500, and according to an independent, volunteer-run website that tracks civilian deaths, a significant portion of these casualties are civilians.

In addition, following U.S. strikes on nuclear facilities, the fear of radioactive contamination has now become a part of everyday life for ordinary Iranians.

Amid all this, I posed a question to Iranians under bombardment through in-depth interviews: As those attacking Iran claim, can regime change through foreign military intervention truly succeed?

Insights from Interviews with 250 Middle-Class Iranian Dissidents and Intellectuals

One of Benjamin Netanyahu’s stated motivations for initiating the war was the idea of “regime change for the benefit of the Iranian people”. Some exiled opposition groups – commonly labelled “overthrowists” – share this view. They tend to favour external intervention by powerful states, believing that meaningful change within Iran cannot occur through domestic activism alone.

In contrast, a different faction of opposition-minded political activists places the potential for change squarely within Iran itself, through active civil engagement. This group has been at the forefront of many of the country’s major protest movements and social transformations in recent years. They advocate for a serious reassessment of Iran’s relationship with the West, emphasizing constructive economic and commercial engagement.

Before the war, this group did not necessarily share the government’s narrative on Israel. But my recent research shows a notable shift: over the 12 days of conflict, their perspective has aligned more closely with the state’s view. They interpret Israel’s actions as unjust, as deliberate efforts to weaken Iran, and as brutal assaults leading to mass civilian deaths – not as helpful steps toward democratic transformation.

To more precisely investigate this observation, I conducted hours of in-depth interviews and conversations with several political activists inside Iran, including a number of younger political voices. I also analysed thousands of social media posts. The findings confirmed the hypothesis that a segment of Iran’s intellectual class agrees with the Islamic Republic’s framing of Israel’s actions as unjust and aggressive.

The most significant conclusion of this inquiry was that this intellectual group strongly resonates with the idea that “Israel is killing civilians”. Remarkably, this group includes some of the most radical critics of the Islamic Republic. And yet, they believe that “foreign military attacks and assassinations will not lead to an ideal domestic government”, and that “it is internal actors who must resolve Iran’s problems from within”.

Subject	Beliefs about Israel before the war	Beliefs about Israel during the war
Iranian domestic dissidents	A military attack could save Iran from its internal political crisis.	Israel killed civilians.
	Israel only targets military figures.	Civilians and even children were killed.
	Israel conducts precise, surgical strikes.	Civilians and even children were killed.
Summary	A foreign saviour could, through war, help shape a new Iran.	There is no saviour coming from outside Iran; we must achieve civil progress from within through struggle and advocacy, just as we have done so far.

Of course, I emphasize that these statements were collected from 250 Iranians under bombardment, and it is important that, following the ceasefire, a public opinion poll be conducted among Iranians regarding these views.

A concrete example of this perspective is Alireza Rajaei, a well-known political dissident who spent years in prison for his activism and developed life-threatening cancer while incarcerated. However, his position on Israel is far from what Netanyahu and regime-change proponents might have expected. Just yesterday, in an interview, he said: “this is a war by Israel and traitors against Iran. This war threatens the territorial integrity and very existence of Iran”. Or take Zia Nabavi, another figure who spent many years in prison for his involvement in civil protests. From inside prison, he has openly condemned the war and referenced Israeli war crimes.

About 80% of the 250-person sample stated that prior to the Israeli assault on Iran, they did not share the Islamic Republic’s stance on Israel and were opposed to its aggressive posture. But now, amid the ongoing war, their thinking has shifted. While some attribute this change to the wartime context and the emergence of an external “other”, others point to evolving behaviour among domestic security forces as a significant factor.

They report a noticeable tolerance from law enforcement: for instance, during the war, officers have shown no punitive response to women without hijab in the streets, and some citizens have even witnessed officers refraining from confronting people carrying alcohol. This unusual leniency by the security forces in Tehran has contributed to a temporary convergence between the intellectual class and the state on the image of Israel as a common external enemy.

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Since the beginning of the war, I have conducted interviews and conversations with residents from across Tehran – from religious and traditional districts to the central, intellectual, affluent northern and western areas. The reactions reveal two distinct behavioural patterns that strongly align with the hypothesis presented above.

Days 1–4 of the War: Fear and Mass Exodus from Tehran

In the early days of the war, people were in shock—terrified and enraged.

> “We go to sleep to the sound of bombs and wake up to the sound of bombs.”

> “They’re hitting civilians.”

> “They even killed children.”

Many reported that nearly half of Tehran’s 14 million residents had left the city. Shops in the most affected areas were closed. The internet was unstable or completely down. These were the dominant sentiments expressed by ordinary people in the streets of Tehran.

Different segments of Tehran’s population responded differently. In the southern, more religious and traditional districts, people continued their lives as usual, seemingly unaffected. Death and destruction were interpreted through the lens of ‘martyrdom’. But as one moved northward through the city – towards more affluent and secular neighbourhoods more people had fled, and the general mood was one of despair over the war’s outcome.

However, this also reflects economic disparities: not everyone can afford to flee or temporarily stop working.

Take ‘Esmail’, a taxi driver who said, “I can’t leave. I have to keep driving. If I die on the street, so be it – I can’t afford the cost of leaving.”

Among the lower classes, there are also Afghan refugees who came to Iran during wars in their own country. For them, internal displacement during wartime is not as straightforward due to Iranian laws and migration policies.

Days 5–7: Living with War – Iranian Middle-Class Intellectuals Reject Regime Change via Foreign Assault

As the war wore on, Tehran’s atmosphere changed. People began to adjust to a life under siege. And within this adaptation emerged a clearer ideological stance among the middle-class intellectual dissidents: they do not support regime change through foreign attack and assassination.

This growing consensus represents a shift in the internal political paradigm. These are people who continue to oppose the Islamic Republic’s structure and policies, but now also reject the notion that foreign violence can deliver meaningful democratic transformation. What’s more, their growing identification with national sovereignty in the face of external aggression – even while remaining critical of the regime – may be signalling the emergence of a new form of Iranian political subjectivity.

From Day Six Onward: A Slow Return and the Emergence of a Different Atmosphere

By the middle of the sixth day of the war, those who had fled Tehran began to say they wanted to return home. The public feeding stations for birds and stray cats, which had stood empty for days, now had fresh food—an indicator that residents were slowly coming back. ‘Ahmad’, a vegetable seller in one of Tehran’s central neighbourhoods, told me that more neighbours were now coming to buy herbs for making āsh (a traditional Iranian stew). Ahmad was right; my field observations and statistics from Iran’s Road and Transportation Organization confirmed a population return to central Tehran. More shops were reopening, some even offering discounts as a show of support for wartime solidarity. Those who had access to VPNs became crucial bridges, relaying messages between Iranians at home and relatives abroad. People had grown noticeably more compassionate and united. On the streets, social interactions appeared bolder, with citizens frequenting central food stalls and spending more time outdoors than during the early days of the assault.

In different areas of the city, mobile checkpoints were established to inspect vehicles and pedestrians. But the behaviour of the officers at these stations had shifted – they were now focused on protecting the public and were ignoring issues that had previously triggered strict social enforcement. ‘Meysam’, a 32-year-old university student, recounted how he and his girlfriend – who was unveiled – were returning from a private party and passed through a checkpoint without any warnings or interrogation. He noted that several of his friends had experienced the same. To him, this marked a new and unexpected attitude from the Islamic Republic – an empathetic one.

> “I couldn’t leave Tehran in the first days of the war. I didn’t even dare step out of the house. But now that my friends have returned to the city, we’ve resumed our gatherings”, he said.

> “We’re learning, like people in other war-torn countries, how to live under air raids. And the fact that we don’t have to fear getting arrested for carrying alcohol or being unveiled – it’s given me a strange sense of mental peace.

> I think this is the first time in my life I’ve felt I could trust government officers.”

At a café in a central Tehran neighbourhood – a spot known to attract the city’s educated middle class – I sat down to speak with a group of young men and women. Some were students at the University of Tehran and Sharif University; others worked in Iran’s growing digital economy.

Sara, one of the women, told me:

> “This is the first time I trust a checkpoint. I really feel like they’re there to protect us.”

Vahid, a software engineer, spoke about the range of Israeli missile strikes and how some of his friends were injured while walking in the streets.

> “I used to think the government was giving us a skewed narrative about Israel. But now, despite all the anger I feel toward our policymakers, I believe Israel is a government that kills civilians.”

Morteza, who was jailed for protesting the 2009 election results, added:

> “No meaningful change has ever come from the outside. The USA said the same thing during Bush’s invasion of Iraq.

> For me, the boundary of being Iranian today is taking a stand against Israel. Even someone like Narges Mohammadi—no matter how symbolic—has to name Israel’s crimes.

> If anyone talks about Iran’s situation without mentioning Israel’s atrocities, they are complicit in the injustice we’re facing.”

The café employee – a 23-year-old woman from a city in western Iran – joined the conversation. She said her family, unaffiliated with the government and entirely civilian, had been seriously wounded in the war.

> “Sure, today’s misery is partly because of the Islamic Republic’s policies. But countries with hundreds of nuclear bombs attacking regular people under the pretext of stopping nukes? That’s ridiculous. At least for me – it just doesn’t make sense.”

It is clear that the claims made in this report require more comprehensive and rigorous studies with broader representation from across the Iranian population. However, based on in-depth interviews with 250 Iranians – both from Tehran and other parts of the country – and analysis of the activity of hundreds of social media users, it appears that Iranian protesters inside the country do not share Netanyahu’s perspective. Instead, this war seems to have reinforced a sense of an “Iranian us” in which those who seek meaningful change within the country still view agency as something that must come from inside Iran.

This group – although not necessarily aligned with the state’s stance on Israel before the war – has, in the aftermath of civilian casualties and the threat to the country’s territorial integrity, chosen to rally around a common national identity. In doing so, they have, even if temporarily, remained under a shared flag.