By Priyanka Lohia

Syria’s history has been shaped by colonial rule, shifting borders, and decades of authoritarian control. Notably, Bashar al-Assad held onto power in the face of mass uprisings, global condemnation, and a devastating civil war. His survival was no mere  coincidence, but rather the result of a cumulation of deliberate strategies—combining brutal repression, strategic alliances, corruption, narco-statism, and the systematic dismantling of opposition forces. This article examines the mechanisms that allowed Assad to outlast regional counterparts and maintain an iron grip over Syria until his eventual downfall.

Assad inherited a regime built on fear. His father, Hafez al-Assad, had transformed Syria into a security state where intelligence networks, military control, and political repression ensured his absolute authority. Following Hafez’s death in 2000, Bashar, initially perceived as weak and politically unprepared, quickly adapted, reinforcing these same structures that had kept his father in power. At the core of his rule was the Mukhabarat, Syria’s intelligence apparatus, notorious for its use of surveillance, torture, and disappearances to eliminate dissent. Human rights organizations documented systemic abuse, with detainees subjected to extreme torture in facilities like Sednaya Prison. Indeed, reports indicate that over 13,000 detainees were tortured to death in Sednaya alone. Assad’s use of chemical weapons, such as the 2013 Ghouta attack, further demonstrated his willingness to cross international red lines to maintain control. .

Like other Middle Eastern autocrats, Hafez al-Assad maintained support for his rule amongst key factions of society through co-optation. But rather than make use of an existing pre-colonial system of elites, his strategy was deeply rooted in Syria’s colonial past. As Con Coughlin explores in Assad: The Triumph of Tyranny, the Alawite community had long been marginalised due to Syria’s sectarian divide between Alawites and Sunnis. While the Sunni middle classes were seen as sophisticated and educated, the Alawites were often regarded as rough, unschooled mountain dwellers. However, French rule had elevated the previously marginalized Alawite community into military and administrative roles to ensure that power remained out of Sunni hands, laying the foundation for Hafez al-Assad’s sectarian power structure. He expanded this system, turning a formerly oppressed minority into the country’s ruling class, legitimising his near-total monopoly on state violence through the unwavering loyalty of his core supporters. To sustain this, Bashar al-Assad balanced repression with strategic patronage. While Alawites dominated the military and security forces, he also rewarded loyal Sunni business elites and select military officers, ensuring that those with influence had a vested interest in his survival. This made sectarian competition a defining factor of Syrian politics. As the civil war escalated, Bashar capitalised on sectarian fears, portraying opposition groups as Sunni extremists. His regime aligned itself with Iran-backed militias like Hezbollah to solidify support among Alawites and other minorities. This sectarian framing fractured the opposition, preventing a united front and securing continued backing from external forces.

Bashar was heavily dependent on the support of such external forces, particularly Russia and Iran. Syria had long been a key Russian ally, with ties dating back to the Cold War. The Soviet Union first established naval access to Tartus in 1971, and Russia later solidified its presence through long-term military agreements, like the establishment of the Hmeimim airbase in 2015. After Iranian General Qasem Soleimani had lobbied for support, Russia’s intervention in 2015 shifted the war in Assad’s favour. Initially framed as an anti-terrorism campaign targeting groups like ISIS, Russian military action targeted opposition forces, reversing rebel advances in cities like Aleppo and Idlib. Moscow’s backing, through airstrikes and diplomatic shielding at the UN, allowed Assad to maintain control despite international condemnation. However, as Russia became preoccupied with Ukraine, its ability to sustain Assad weakened, creating an opportunity for opposition forces to regain ground.

While Russia provided strategic military support, Iran’s influence was deeply tied to sectarian alliances. Iran saw Syria as a strategic land bridge to support Hezbollah operations in Lebanon. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah forces fought alongside Assad’s military, reinforcing regime strongholds. Tehran also financed pro-Assad militias and provided billions in aid to circumvent sanctions. However, as conflicts between Iran and Israel escalated, Hezbollah and Iranian resources were redirected, reducing their direct support for Assad’s forces.

Despite Assad’s human rights abuses, the U.S. and Europe refrained from committing full military support to the opposition, fearing that extremist factions would gain power. The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 redirected Western priorities from regime change to counterterrorism. Rather than strengthening the Free Syrian Army or the Syrian National Council (SNC), the U.S. and EU focused on targeting ISIS. European nations were also entangled in managing the Syrian refugee crisis, leading them to prioritize diplomatic solutions over military intervention. Economic sanctions on Assad’s regime did little to weaken his rule and instead fuelled Syria’s war economy.

This political disarray was mirrored by Syria’s worsening economic conditions, as years of conflict had drained resources and deepened financial instability. Economic collapse was thus another defining feature of Syria’s war years, with 90% of the population living in extreme poverty. Inflation skyrocketed, and the Syrian lira lost over 700% of its value. However, rather than destabilizing the regime, this economic devastation consolidated Assad’s grip on power. Corruption under Assad was not just a byproduct of war, but a deliberate strategy. The elite, including businessmen like his cousin Rami Makhlouf, were allowed to amass vast wealth in exchange for loyalty. In 2020, when Makhlouf’s influence grew too large, Assad turned against him, stripping him of assets in a public display of dominance. This strategy of enriching elites while periodically purging those who became too powerful, ensured that the system of patronage remained intact, while the population remained too economically weakened to challenge the regime.

Additionally, Assad manipulated international aid meant for Syria’s war-torn population. Reports indicate that the regime controlled exchange rates to siphon off millions from humanitarian assistance, redirecting these funds to finance military operations and  maintain loyalty among key power brokers. By keeping the civilian population in dire economic conditions, Assad ensured that dependency on the state remained high, preventing the emergence of alternative power structures.

Beyond corruption, Assad’s regime also became the epicentre of the Captagon drug trade, transforming Syria into a global hub for the production and trafficking of this amphetamine. The Captagon industry, valued at billions of dollars annually, provided the regime with a crucial revenue stream amid economic sanctions and financial isolation. Assad’s relatives and military officials played a direct role in smuggling operations across the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE frequently seizing massive shipments traced back to Syria. Even as the international community pressured Assad to curb the trade, his regime continued to exploit the narcotics industry to sustain itself financially.

When it came to Syria’s opposition, unlike Tunisia or Egypt where opposition forces united to overthrow autocrats, Syria’s opposition remained deeply fragmented. The Syrian National Coalition (SNC), based in Istanbul, struggled to maintain legitimacy inside Syria. Meanwhile, local resistance groups had competing priorities, and their reliance on foreign sponsors like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. further divided them. Assad exploited this disunity by systematically eliminating moderate opposition figures while allowing extremist factions to gain ground. This tactic, known as the opposition paradox, ensured that international actors saw the choice in Syria as one between Assad and radical jihadist groups, thus discouraging full-scale intervention.

In contrast, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) strengthened its position by uniting rebel factions. HTS achieved key military victories in Idlib and established governance structures, positioning itself as a leading force against Assad. As Russia scaled back its presence and Iranian-backed militias weakened, HTS and other opposition groups seized the moment, launching a coordinated offensive that led to Assad’s downfall.

With Assad now in exile, Syria faces a period of profound uncertainty. Who fills the power vacuum? Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has stepped in, but its leadership remains fragile. Russia, which invested heavily in keeping Assad in power, now faces a loss of influence in the region, while Iran may attempt to expand its foothold in Syria through its continued military presence and allied militias, including Hezbollah and IRGC-backed forces. The U.S. and European countries will have to navigate the challenge of stabilizing post-Assad Syria without enabling extremist factions.

The collapse of Assad’s rule also raises broader questions about authoritarian resilience in the Middle East. His ability to cling to power for so long despite economic ruin and widespread opposition, demonstrates the strength of modern security states. However, his downfall shows that even the most entrenched regimes can unravel when conditions align. On the other hand,

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham now faces the monumental challenge of restoring stability, rebuilding institutions, and preventing further fragmentation. Syria’s economy remains in ruins, millions remain displaced, and foreign actors—Russia, Iran, Turkey—continue to shape its future. The fall of Assad closes a brutal chapter in Syria’s history, but what comes next remains uncertain.

Will Syria transition toward democracy, or will new authoritarian forces emerge? The answer lies in the ability of Syria’s political forces and the international community to steer the country towards lasting peace.

Assad’s downfall represents a significant shift in Middle Eastern politics. Unlike other leaders who fell quickly in the face of popular mobilisation, his survival for over a decade of war demonstrates the adaptability and resilience of authoritarian regimes. His use of sectarianism, economic manipulation, and foreign alliances extended his rule long beyond most expectations. However, his exile proves that no autocrat is invincible. What remains to be seen is whether Syria’s future will be shaped by reconciliation and rebuilding or by further conflict and fragmentation.

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