By Naela Elmore, PhD Candidate at UT Dallas EPPS

The evolution of the digital sphere and the rise of its technologies, particularly within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, has brought about significant changes in both the landscape and modality of protest movements and civil resistance campaigns. The Internet has become an increasingly popular tool for grievance materialisation and expression and an avenue for dissent orchestration, amplification, and mobilisation. Accordingly, autocratic regimes across the region have actively shifted their governance strategies and adopted increasingly sophisticated digital governance strategies. They do so to control public discourse, monitor the materialisation and mobilisation of regime opposition, and stifle political challenges.

The role of digital tools in protest movements reveals a complex dynamic. While the Internet and social media platforms have consistently enabled widespread mobilisation across the region, particularly during the 2011 revolutions, the reality of these movements was more nuanced than often portrayed.  The Arab Spring, while significantly amplified through digital platforms, was fundamentally driven by working-class Arabic-speaking youth rather than the tech-savvy, middle-class English speakers that dominated Western media coverage. Traditional media, particularly Al Jazeera, also played a crucial role in spreading information and mobilising citizens. Nevertheless, platforms such as YouTube, X (formerly known as Twitter), and Facebook became essential for voicing grievances, seeking comradery solidarity in their perceived experiences, and organising both physical and digital demonstrations of regime opposition. Social media, the Internet, and telecommunication technologies such as WhatsApp allowed people to bypass state-controlled media and draw (sub)national and international attention to their causes. Simultaneously, the digital tools that empowered citizens also became instruments of repression for the ruling elite of the MENA regimes. Currently, digital governance strategies are integral to how MENA governments maintain control of the populous, offering new avenues of repression and suppression through tracking and monitoring activists, manipulating and censoring online narratives and expressions, and curtailing the freedom of [digital] expression and assembly.

One of the most significant and rising trends in digital governance in the MENA region and beyond is the adoption and use of surveillance technologies. State agencies have heavily invested in tools and systems that allow them to monitor online activity, track what citizens say when and to whom it is said, and block access to particular speech, materials, and sources accordingly. Through initiatives such as the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China and its private companies have become critical in providing the region’s surveillance and censorship technology provisions, providing repression tools that range from facial recognition software powered through Artificial Intelligence (AI) to “Safe/Smart City” infrastructures that promote and employ hyper-policing measures and internet monitoring systems. While China’s initiative has made the country a prominent supplier of surveillance and censorship technology in the region, it is not acting alone. Western democracies, particularly the United States and Israel, have also played significant roles in supplying surveillance technologies to MENA countries, often prioritising regional stability through friendly autocratic regimes over democratic principles. As a result, MENA autocrats have now created an arena of virtual confinement, where digital activities and citizen behaviours are under constant scrutiny, regulation, control, and manipulation.

A notable example of such digital prevalence within the region is Saudi Arabia, where the government has implemented surveillance and hyper-policing technologies in high-profile infrastructure projects like Neom to monitor public spaces and virtual behaviours. Through partnerships with Chinese technology firms, such as Huawei, Saudi Arabia’s repressive digital capacity has increased, with surveillance intended to be deeply embedded within Neom’s infrastructure, such as AI capabilities, facial recognition software, and drones to monitor and curtail citizen behaviour deemed threatening to the regime’s longevity. Moreover, the country’s authorities have been accused by dissidents and human rights organisations of hacking and surveilling political dissidents living abroad through the use of digital technologies and foreign software.

Egypt has also intensified its use of digital repression, increasing its utilisation of surveillance technology to monitor activists’ and dissidents’ behaviour – both virtual and physical – through Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE’s supply of advanced surveillance equipment, telecommunications infrastructure, and artificial intelligence capacities. We see the application of these acquired capacities during the COP27 protests, where Egyptian authorities detained citizens based on their digital footprints by examining the contents found on their phones. These actions emphasise the state’s ever-increasing tight control over digital spaces and their manifestation in the physical realm, particularly regarding collective mobilisation attempts.

Iran has become one of the most prolific operators of digital repression tactics within the region, particularly during the Mahsa Amini protests of 2022. Iran’s response to these mobilisations and the Woman, Life, and Freedom movement illuminates how digital governance can suppress dissent (sub)nationally and internationally. The Iranian government shut down access to the Internet and particularly social media and telecommunication hosts, such as TikTok, WhatsApp, and Telegram, respectively, to prevent protesters from [further] organising demonstrations, the public from sharing information about the demonstrations, and the state’s reactions to the dissidents and protests? Through Huawei’s contribution to Iran’s telecommunications infrastructure, Iran gained the advanced capacity to surveil online conversations and narratives of state responses to demonstrations, block virtual private networks (VPNs), and filter content on social media. Hindering access to and shutting down the Internet was not a tactic unique to the 2022 demonstrations and has been repeatedly utilised by the Iranian regime to curb civil unrest throughout the years. By cutting off access to digital platforms and telecommunications, the state ensures that opposition groups cannot mobilise or coordinate their activities further and effectively.

Other examples of governments’ use of Internet shutdowns and censorship are Turkey and Algeria’s implementation of partial or total Internet shutdowns, particularly during periods of political unrest, further emphasising the region-wide strategy and adaptability of using digital mechanisms of control to quash dissent and target opposition members and organisations.

The growing use of surveillance technologies across the MENA reflects a broader shift in international norms surrounding governance and control, where governments adopt digital autocratic mannerisms and models to solidify their grip on power and align themselves with the global ambitions of foreign governments. Although China’s role in exporting its autocratic model is significant, it is crucial to recognise that Western democracies and Israel have also contributed to this landscape, often prioritising regional interests through supporting dictatorial regimes and their ambitions over democratic ideals. This is particularly the case with Gulf nations such as Saudi Arabia. The broader effects of utilising such digital monitoring and control models are profound, raising ethical questions regarding the responsibilities of state agents in the ever-evolving digital age.

Ethical Dilemmas and the Future of Digital Governance

Using digital tools for governance raises significant ethical concerns, particularly regarding human rights violations. While autocratic and democratic governments justify such measures as necessary for national security or public order, the moral implications differ significantly based on the supplier’s political system and stated values. For China, an authoritarian state, exporting surveillance technologies and infrastructure aligns with its governance model and strategic geopolitical interests. However, the role of democratic countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and Israel in supplying these technologies presents a stark ethical contradiction. These democracies, while publicly championing human rights and democratisation abroad, simultaneously provide the tools that enable autocratic control and suppress democratisation efforts and movements. This contradiction is particularly evident in their relationships with Gulf states, such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, where the provision of surveillance technology directly undermines the democratic values these nations claim to promote. The involvement of foreign governments, agencies, and private companies in facilitating repression thus raises complex questions about moral responsibility and political hypocrisy. While autocratic suppliers might face criticism for enabling repression (e.g., the violation of human rights, infringement of speech and assembly), democratic nations must contend with an additional layer of ethical scrutiny, given their proclaimed commitment to protecting human rights and democratic ideals. This dynamic highlights how commercial interests and geopolitical stability often supersede stated democratic principles in international relations.

As digital tools become more integral to governance and resistance, the battle between people and the state will likely intensify. Governments in the MENA region continue to refine, adapt, and advance their digital behaviours, whether by using big data, leveraging AI, or advanced surveillance and monitoring apparatuses to anticipate, regulate, and suppress dissent. Concurrently, activists are finding new avenues to evade state surveillance and censorship attempts. Whether through encrypted messaging applications, VPNs, or other circumvention tools, activists continue to find ways to allow opposition and dissident groups to organise without detection and/or reprimanding. However, these tools often cannot match the state’s vast and developing digital infrastructure and resources.

The intersection of digital governance and resistance movements within the MENA region reflects the broader struggle between autocratic control and resistant populations. As governments continue to adapt their strategies for the digital era, the ethical and human rights implications become increasingly urgent global concerns, demanding accountability not only from authoritarian suppliers but also – and perhaps significantly – from democratic nations that contribute to digital repression while simultaneously advocating for human rights and democracy abroad. In examining the moral aspects of digital governance, we see a broader and international responsibility involving the complicity of foreign actors and international organisations and the vulnerability of citizens caught in the crossfire of digital advancement and autocratic control.