By Hamza Woodson

As Israel’s intensive bombardment and ground invasion of Gaza continues into its ninth month, a multitude of state and non-state actors throughout the region and across the world are more fervently calling for an immediate ceasefire. A number of these entities, including nationalised militant groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Shia Houthis of Yemen, are taking more drastic measures. On 19 October 2023, the Houthi movement (otherwise known as Ansar Allah) began targeting southern Israel and ships in the Red Sea it claimed were linked to Israel. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea announced that any ship destined for Israel was a “legitimate target” and that they would not stop the attacks until the enactment of a ceasefire. In January 2024, the assault on shipping prompted Israel’s ally, the U.S., to redesignate the Houthi movement as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group. In a move to differentiate the U.S’ foreign policy approach from that of the Trump administration, the Biden administration had removed the Houthis from the list of SDGT in February 2021. This removal indicated a redirection of U.S. foreign policy in the region, geared towards regional stabilisation and broader cooperation with Iran and its allies. Several Arab Gulf states had played the role of negotiator between Western powers and their antagonists in the region. While Qatar has been in the spotlight in recent months for mediating negotiations between Israel and Hamas, other Gulf states such as Oman also play a recurring role in regional peace talks. 

The Kingdom of Oman — strategically located on the borders of Iran, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia as well as some of the world’s most critical shipping routes for oil —is a frequent host of meetings and negotiations between conflicting parties. Oman’s neutral role as mediator in negotiations between Yemen’s Houthi movement and regionally involved Western powers has been vital in both recent and historic settlements between the diametrically opposed sides. However, the country made a critical and decisive shift away from its normative neutrality with its decision to bar the U.S.-led coalition from using its airspace to bomb Houthi targets in Yemen. In response to the Houthis’ deliberate targeting of international shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the U.S. and U.K. began targeted airstrikes against the Houthis on 11 January 2024 in an unprecedented escalation to which theHouthi forces pledged to retaliate. Nearby Gulf states have since been put in a precarious situation in their attempt to avoid involvement in the conflict. Notably, on 12 January 2024 the Omani government denied the coalition the use of its airspace to avoid becoming involved in what it saw as an unjustified campaign. Oman officially declared a no-fly zone for all military aircraft participating in the coalition’s strikes against the Houthis in Yemen on 15 January, 2024. While other Gulf states, such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, have allowed their airspace to be utilised for the operation in some capacity, Oman stands as an exception, closing it’s skies to an anti-Houthi coalition that includes the U.S., U.K., Australia, the Netherlands and a number of other countries. Oman’s decision comes in the wake of increasingly destabilised relations between Israel, Iran, and nearby Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states since the beginning of Israel’s bombardment of Gaza in October of 2023. Oman’s explicit political manoeuvring not only affects its relations with the West, but also has implications for the future viability of the Gulf’s neutrality in light of continued U.S. interventions. The move has raised questions about the future prosperity of the Gulf in the face of external military actions. Oman’s stance, while emphasising its commitment to being an active GCC member, is intentionally distinct from the decisions made by neighbouring nations, as it refrains from providing support for the U.S.-led coalition. However, in light of current events, Oman’s stance may put the GCC at risk of diplomatic fallout with the coalition going forward. 

Washington’s policy redirection under President Biden towards greater regional cooperation in the Gulf was completely halted on 10 December 2023, when the U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced the formation of an international maritime security force aimed at ending the Houthi’s maritime blockade and countering Houthi attacks against international shipping in the region. The coalition reportedly has more than 20 members, of which ten are anonymously involved. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both economically reliant on unhindered commercial shipping in the area, are absent from the listed participants. A number of other regional powers, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are also absent. This non-response by regional powers towards large scale intervention has become commonplace, largely out of fear of being sanctioned or blockaded by their neighbours. This fear was previously legitimised during the 2017 Saudi blockade of Qatar, which hampered Qatar’s diplomatic ties with the GCC countries, Western powers, and more importantly its vital oil exports. Rising tensions in the region once again threaten regional security and GCC neutrality. The question now lies in whether the GCC can handle increasingly diverging responses by its member states to the region’s rise in conflict and effectively maintain its future viability as an economic and diplomatic cooperative.

The U.S.-led coalition’s bombardment of Yemen was initially motivated by the U.S.’ desire to protect maritime trade interests in the Red Sea. However, the U.S’s defensive alliance with Israel prompted greater and more active military involvement to not only secure these maritime interests but to further prevent Houthi operations from reaching Israel’s borders. However, sustained targeting of Houthi land targets has now also been justified by Biden’s SDGT designation. While the designation mainly influences the imposition of sanctions and the freezing of any backing entities’ financial assets, Biden can also implore the international community to support coalition efforts against the Houthis to keep the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden open and navigable for commercial shipping. The U.S.-led airstrike campaign has much more legal manoeuvrability because of this designation, both in terms of financially pursuing Houthi supporters and leading offensive manoeuvres against Houthi operations.

The GCC, officially called the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf is a regional, intergovernmental, political, and economic union comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The GCC was formed in response to a crumbling Arab league and the need to maintain regional stability in light of threats to political leaders during the Arab Spring. Both trade and regional security were at the forefront of the GCC’s formation, with the stability of the cooperation guaranteed by a rigid focus on oil trade and political neutrality. Political neutrality, within the context of the GCC, refers to the coalition’s “non-interference” in member states’ domestic politics and with U.S and Iranian foreign affairs. However, GCC members have aligned themselves more closely with U.S. interests (e.g. by signing normalisation agreements with Israel) to maintain their economic security. Arguably, the GCC’s economic success relies heavily on two conditions. Firstly, its provision of cheap petroleum and oil exports to the U.S. and Europe, and secondly, its non-interference with Western geopolitical interests. These conditions allow for Gulf Arab countries to trade with the West without threatening their immediate national security. For example, Saudi officials have signalled support for Russian-led developments in OPEC+ despite continued U.S. sanctions and hostility towards Moscow over its war in Ukraine. Due to this active diplomatic and economic engagement between Western states and their foreign adversaries, GCC states can play the role of third party negotiating partners in talks between Western powers (mainly the U.S.) and conflicting states such as Iran and the Houthi regime. This was especially evident during the U.S – Iranian nuclear negotiations, which Oman hosted as a neutral negotiation zone. The role has historically marked GCC countries as vital regional players in U.S. intentions to counterbalance Iran, securing the GCC’s future economic security and political neutrality.

However, Oman’s refusal to facilitate the coalition’s airstrikes in Yemen might be the starting point for the Gulf’s destabilisation. As of now, Oman maintains a healthy relationship with the Houthi regime, which controls territory including around 70 percent of Yemen’s population. Unlike many other GCC states, the Omani leadership has never seen the armed Houthis as an enemy, but rather as a government faction representing a significant part of the Yemeni community. Oman’s two-pronged approach to foreign policy in this instance—based on preserving cordial diplomatic ties with rivalling factions and championing negotiation as the favoured conflict-resolution mechanism— should not be misunderstood as a lack of political decisiveness. In fact, Oman’s role in the Middle East as the “Switzerland of Arabia” in international diplomacy more often than not led to brokering peace deals benefitting Western agendas rather than favouring opposing parties. This is explicitly shown when, in 2009, the Omani state held talks to help secure the release of American prisoners held in Iran as well as in 2020 when Oman attempted to broker a deal between the U.S. and the new Taliban government. This Omani-mediated deal attempted not only to organise the safe withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, but to also negotiate the constitutional terms of the new Afghan government. It was subsequently rejected by the Taliban government, as it made few concessions to the clauses advocated by the Taliban and  U.S. presence in the region. The Omani government, while projecting a visage of political neutrality, still maintains close ties to its U.S. and European allies and aims to secure deals that largely favour Western interests. 

However, with the Houthis’ designation as a terrorist organisation, Oman’s firm stance in refusing to make its airspace available to the U.S.-led coalition might incite divisions within the GCC, largely on the basis of how dependent each member nation is on Western trade. Countries with minimal economic and military independence, such as Qatar, have in the past been sanctioned and economically blockaded by other GCC nations such as Saudi Arabia due to their political leanings towards Iran. The question that remains is whether Oman will receive the same treatment due to its refusal to support Western interests and seemingly greater interference in Gulf regional affairs. Furthermore, if Oman continues to further distance itself from the coalition’s assault on Houthi forces, could this impact the stability of the GCC? If the GCC were to destabilise, broader de-escalation efforts with Israel and its neighbours would halt and would be much more difficult to implement. A regional destabilisation would also mean that alliances within the GCC and with Western powers could unravel. In light of the state’s refusal to aid in the coalition’s assault on Yemen, the question now remains whether the aftermath of the Israel-Hamas war will still have Oman as a centrepiece in American and broader Western interests.