By Dunia Essam

Suddenly, Niger, previously off radar for most people in the West, has become the focus for global media and public interest since the military coup d’état on July 26. Western countries have hastened to impose sanctions while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with the support of the West, went further in threatening collective military action if the Nigerien military did not back down by August 6.

Is the likelihood of military action receding? ECOWAS first warned that they would intervene militarily if President Mohamed Bazoum was not returned to his rightful place in the presidency by August 6. However, this date passed, and no intervention occurred. It is worth noting that the representatives of these countries were supposed to meet on the 12^th of this month in order to present a possible plan for any military intervention, but the meeting was postponed indefinitely, indicating that the military solution has been put on the shelf. 

One reason that led to this backing off from the brink of action is that the ECOWAS countries are poor and ill equipped. While Nigeria is  the richest, strongest, and generally most capable of intervention among the group’s fifteen members, its involvement at this time could lead to prolongation of the conflict . 

Neighbouring Nigeria decided to cut off the fuel that feeds the power stations in the villages and cities of Niger. Accordingly, three of the other neighbouring countries of Niger —Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea—  decided to show solidarity and declared that any attack on Niger is tantamount to a declaration of war on them. Besides that, Algeria has also objected to the idea of intervention, and these indicators show that in the event of a clash, African countries may not be able to bear the financial, humanitarian, and military costs, even if Western countries such as France or Russia intervened to protect their interests.

Since then, the countries involved have been divided into two groups, one that advocates for a change of the situation in Niger and another that supports the coup, or at least rejects military intervention. But the question that may have crossed the minds of the audience is: why all this fuss over a military takeover in a country that has witnessed four previous coups since independence from France in 1960, and only one peaceful transition of power in its history?

Given that France’s forces were compelled to withdraw from Mali in 2022 and move to Niger after the military coup of the previous year and the arrival of Wagner mercenaries, it is important to keep in mind that any change of government in Niger is based on a conflict between France, an ally of Niger’s ousted elected government, and Russia, which is expanding in place of Paris in Mali and Burkina Faso, which are adjacent to Niger. Both a government in Niger and one in Mali agreed to use French expertise in exchange for alliances with Russia. Washington, however, has asserted that Russia has not been involved in the coups and protests occurring in Niger.

In relation to Russia, a group of protesters in Niger hoisted Russian flags while yelling phrases like “Long live Putin”.  There are rumours that the coup would not have occurred without Russian backing, and the chanting in favour of Russia has rekindled suspicions of Russian participation in the Niger issue, although there are no concrete indicators of that. 

In 2017, Niger strengthened its relations with Russia as they signed a military cooperation agreement which also included a plan to confront terrorism. Surely, bringing back these ties gives Russia an opportunity to expand its interests in the Sahel region and mobilize support in the United Nations General Assembly from new countries, to break a state of near global consensus on its invasion of Ukraine, and even add Niger to the list of African countries that do not vote to condemn. The coup also enabled the expansion of Russian arms exports to Niger, allowing Russia to put a leg in the region as much as the US has been doing. 

Due to the following factors, the United States and Paris are concerned that Russia would take advantage of the coup situation in Niger and expand its influence. First, Moscow has Wagner elements in nearby nations to back the stability of the military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad, notwithstanding its condemnation of any Western military action in Niger. Additionally, the military coup in Niger was concurrent with the recent African-Russian meeting in St. Petersburg, following which Russia seemed to be supporting Africa by giving six nations free grain. Finally, Moscow can now act in Niger, whose economic interests are intertwined with Niamey. This is likely to rekindle the conflict between the West and Russia, as well as the Ukrainian scenario in Africa, which goes back to the weakness of the Nigerien army under French pressure. This is further evident as the military council of Niger has stated that a “military aircraft” used by the French forces’ took off a week ago from N’Djamena in Chad and deliberately cut off all communications with air traffic control upon entering the airspace of their country. 

Niger’s potential fall into the Russian sphere is not unlikely in the near future, but given how important Niger is to France, this shift would be a bitter pill for Paris and its remaining West African allies to swallow. The country’s stability aids the French army in its mission in the Sahel and Sahara, and its geographic location aids in preventing illegal immigration from countries south of the Sahara to European shores and in keeping an eye on the borders with Libya, a country that supplies weapons to terrorist organizations. Not only that but Niger is home to US soldiers and four French military bases, making it the hub of NATO operations in the Sahel. Since the coup in Mali and the West’s withdrawal there, it is less likely they will ignore the threat of similar developments just next door in Niger. 

Dunia Essam is a fellow, MA Candidate in International Relations and a Graduate Teaching Assistant at The American University in Cairo. She obtained her BA degree with a thesis titled ‘Great Powers in the Middle East: The Impact of the Great Powers’ Geopolitical Interests in the Prolongation of the Syrian Civil War’ at the Arab Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Transport. Her career interests lie at the nexus of International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies.